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Gill Althia Francis 
Pretence and Counterfactual Reasoning: What is the nature of the relationship? 
Abstract 
 This study aims to explore the theoretical assertion that pretence and counterfactual reasoning 
involve the same cognitive mechanisms. However, there is little empirical 
evidence concerning the nature of the association between pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning (CFR), and the associations of these constructs with other cognitive abilities. This 
study investigated shared cognitive skills proposed to link pretence to counterfactual 
reasoning and explored whether an underlying cognitive capacity might explain the 
associations shared between the two.   
This study uses a large-scale observational design to test the relationship between pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning at a structural level. 189 typically developing children (Mage = 
58 mths, SD = 4) completed measures of pretend play, counterfactual reasoning, executive 
functions (EFs) and receptive language. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was used 
to assess whether pretence and CFR measures each loaded on to latent factors. Hierarchical 
multiple repression analyses were used to assess predictors of scores on these factors. 
Structural equation modelling (SEM) was used to explore whether a second order ability 
explained common variance in CFR and Pretence latent variables.  
 CFA results confirmed the latent pretence and CFR constructs emerged as predicted. Further 
these factors were significantly correlated with each other.  The hierarchical 
multiple regression analyses identified inhibition as commonly accounting for unique 
variance in both latent constructs. SEM supported that a second-order factor, predicted by 
inhibition, accounted for the unique variance shared between pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning.   
 The findings are discussed with reference to the theoretical supposition that pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning share cognitive mechanisms. Based on the results of this first study 
to model empirically a unifying theory of pretence and counterfactual reasoning, a tentative 
new theoretical model is proposed which is based on the idea of a general mental state model 
of an imaginary representational capacity influenced by inhibitory control.   
Key Words: Pretence, Counterfactual Reasoning, Imagination, Hypothetical Thinking,     
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1.0 Background 
A remarkably interesting parallel has been observed between the naïve thinking that underpins 
young children’s engagement in pretence and the more sophisticated form of thinking called 
counterfactual reasoning. The similarities between pretence and counterfactual reasoning have 
been described as important, fascinating and puzzling because they both share the quality of 
disengaging from the real world and moving into the realm of imagination (Weisberg & 
Gopnik, 2013). For instance, a child who acts as if a banana is a telephone or observes someone 
performing this action and can accurately tell the true identity of the telephone from the banana 
in both real and pretence contexts is said to be engaging in pretend play or has the capacity to 
recognize pretence in others (Leslie, 1987). Alternately, a student who upon failing a test 
imagines that if they had more time to study; they would have surely succeeded is engaging in 
counterfactual reasoning (Byrne, 2016). In counterfactual reasoning, the student conjures up 
alternative versions of their experience and possible resulting outcomes, essentially reasoning 
from the false premise. What is common to both pretence and counterfactual reasoning is the 
ability to disengage with current reality, make inferences about an alternative representation of 
reality, and keep this inference representation separate from reality (Weisberg, 2015; Weisberg 
& Gopnik, 2013). These three characteristics are the basis for the theoretical proposition that 
the tendency to transition between the real and imaginary suggests that both pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning share similar underlying cognitive processes.  
 
 The study of pretence and counterfactual reasoning is relevant and potentially makes an 
important contribution to understanding learning and development in the early years. For one 
thing pretend play is ubiquitous for children across diverse cultures although it is perceived as 
an innate and mysterious development (Lillard, Pinkham, & Smith, 2011). Developmental and 
cognitive psychologists view pretence as a prevailing enigma of child development and 
question why children spend such a prolonged period of their formative years of development 
participating in pretend play when it does not appear to serve any obvious survival function 
(Lillard et al., 2011). Notwithstanding, symbolic pretend play has come to be looked upon as 
one of the most significant cognitive developments in young children and as the mature or 
developmentally appropriate play of the preschool child (Stagnitti et al., 2000).  
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Despite the well-established claim that pretend play is crucial to development; according to 
Lillard, Lerner, Hopkins, Dore, Smith, & Palmquist (2013) current evidence does not support 
strong causal claims about the unique importance of pretend play for development and 
suggested that much more and better research is imperative for clarifying its possible role.  In 
other words, it is widely agreed that pretend play is important but there is little evidence 
explaining precisely which aspects of development it directly facilitates. In response, Walker 
and Gopnik (2013) and Weisberg and Gopnik (2013) argued that the way forward for 
researching the relationship between play and development lies with developing an explanatory 
theory of the cognitive mechanisms that underlie pretence which can then be used to generate 
testable predictions about the role of pretend play in development. The researchers proposed a 
unifying theory of imaginative processes whereby pretence and counterfactual reasoning share 
an underlying capacity that explains how both cognitive skills inherently involve the practice 
of generating false premises and reasoning from them (Weisberg & Gopnik, 2016). The 
researchers’ premise is that given the early emergence of pretend play in development then 
pretending functions as an opportunity to practice important cognitive skills associated with 
planning causal models, including counterfactual reasoning and Bayesian learning. This is 
possible because children like adults possess intuitive theories of learning which are used to 
reason about causal relationships by actively generating hypothetical causal models (if X then 
Y; if not X then not Y) about possible worlds, assess the fit of the alternative models, and select 
the most likely causal model (Walker & Gopnik, 2013b). Albeit precociously, through 
pretending children practice generating and keeping in mind imaginary models 
(counterfactuals) of the real world (factuals) to make sense of causal relationships. Thus, 
pretending may actual serve the function of helping children to begin learning about 
psychological causal relationships. 
 
This present study is important as it sets out to test the prediction that an underlying imaginative 
representational capacity might be the nexus linking pretence and counterfactual reasoning. I 
believed that in response to the proposed unifying theoretical framework of pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning, the first logical step was to design a study that aimed to test the link 
between pretence and counterfactual reasoning, that is, whether imaginative processes are at 
the heart of generating mental causal structures of the world; before tackling the question about 
the role of pretence, that is, does early years pretence predict performance in causal and 
counterfactual reasoning? It is my take that the results from this present study, in its own right, 
can respond to the proposal by Walker and Gopnik (2013) and Weisberg and Gopnik (2013) 
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that a unifying theory of pretence might provide a new wave of evidence for considering the 
role of pretence in development.  
 
As a consequence, a powerful implication from this study is its potential to contribute to the 
conversation about the best practices for the structure of early years education, as well as, for 
the role of play in education more generally. Schooling in the early years are designed around 
variations of pretend play, for example, role-play, socio-dramatic play, object play, et. cetera., 
which mimic how young children naturally learn whilst also making learning engaging and 
fun. From my experience of teaching primary school for over ten years, I observed that the 
practice of including different forms of imaginative play in general education as children got 
older usually dissipated, eventually, being relegated to the confines of a specialist theatre, arts, 
and drama classroom. This practice tends to stem from a philosophy that the concept of play 
detracts from the seriousness required to succeed at general education and assessment; hence, 
the two must be separated. I contend that if this unifying theory that pretence is linked to causal 
models of learning like counterfactual reasoning holds true, then the findings from this present 
study can contribute evidence and make recommendations for integrating opportunities for 
imaginative thinking into the school curricula and teaching, as well as, for greater advocacy for 
learning through play.  
 
To date, evidence that the ability to transition between the real world and an imaginary world 
is a shared characteristic of both pretence and counterfactual reasoning comes mostly from 
separate, independent studies of the two phenomena (Amsel & Smalley, 2000; Beck, Riggs & 
Gorniak, 2009; Beck, Weisberg, Burns, & Riggs, 2014; Bergen, 2002; Byrne, 2016; Friedmam 
& Leslie, 2007; Harris, German, & Mills, 1996; Perner, 1991). What is known in relation to 
pretence is that the tendency to engage with an imaginative world or fantasy occurs quite 
overtly in young children and is seen when they begin to engage in pretend play early in 
development (Leslie, 1987). Pretence can be considered as referring to the cognitive construct 
of pretend play and pretend play is considered the behavioural manifestation of pretence. In 
other words, pretence is the premise of pretend play and it manifests in young children in the 
form of playful behaviours like object substitutions, role playing or acting out make believe 
scenarios that are typically drawn from children’s actual real-world observations and 
experiences. Consequently, a researcher’s inferences about a child’s capacity for pretence are 




Counterfactual reasoning is somewhat different, as it takes the form of reflecting on how the 
world might have been under different circumstances rather than how it is immediately 
presented (Amsel & Smalley, 2000; Riggs & Peterson, 2000). Thinking about how the world 
might have been seduces individuals to create imaginary versions of their world or the world 
presented to them. (Roese & Morrison, 2009) described spontaneous adult-like counterfactual 
reasoning as ruminating about how things might have turned out differently. In children, 
counterfactual reasoning is typically elicited by presenting children with cause and effect 
scenarios and getting them to imagine how a change in the event antecedent could lead to an 
alternative consequent or vice versa (Guajardo & Turley-Ames, 2004). Consistent in studies of 
pretence and counterfactual reasoning is the tendency for children as well as adults to generate 
imaginary or make-believe representations.  
 
Particularly noteworthy about pretence and counterfactual reasoning is the difference in the 
developmental trajectory of these two similar yet distinct cognitive skills. The ability to pretend 
seems to emerge naturally during the early years of development so much so that its absence 
is usually indicative of a developmental disorder (Jarrold, 2003). While different cultures and 
subcultures differ in the extent to which children engage in [pretend] play by their cultural 
values about childhood, gender, religious beliefs, social structures, cultural attitudes 
transmitted to children through the behaviours of their parents and so on; there is a clear and 
consistent manifestation of child [pretend] play in all cultures (Whitebread et al., 2012). The 
emergence of pretence results initially as: object-substitute pretence by imitating adults, 
imitating actions with objects that are dissimilar in either form or function and being able to 
produce (child-initiated) object substitutions without modelling. As children get older, they: 
display and comprehend child-initiated object substitutions with objects similar or dissimilar 
in form or function, as well as begin to understand object substitution action in others. Some 
difficulty with understanding object substitution actions in others persist but improves with age 
until engagement in overt pretend play atrophies as children get into middle childhood.  
 
On the other hand, researchers are less inclined to attribute counterfactual reasoning 
competencies to children until the age of three to four years. The developmental trajectory of 
counterfactual reasoning in young children follows a slow progression probably because it does 
not show off as overtly as pretend play which appears early in development and must be directly 
elicited from children in order for it to be measured. In sum, general indicators include children 
showing they have an understanding of the concept of almost, the ability to answer questions 
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about future hypotheticals before past hypotheticals, imagining an event could occur in the past 
using the strategies of basic conditional reasoning or reasoning from general assumptions about 
the world, being able to hold dual possibilities in mind by keeping in mind what happened and 
could have happened, and being able to hold multiple possibilities in mind which includes what 
happened and multiple possibilities of what could have happened (Beck, Robinson, Carroll, & 
Apperly, 2006; Byrne, 2016; Harris, 2000; Rafetseder, Schwitalla, & Perner, 2013). As a result, 
counterfactual reasoning is thought to have a prolonged period of development with adult-like 
counterfactual reasoning appearing after the preschool years and gradually becoming stable as 
children mature into adulthood (Beck & Riggs, 2014; Rafetseder et al., 2013). 
 
Overt pretence and pretend play in children emerges from eighteen months with children 
experiencing what is often referred to as a high season of pretence from two to five years, 
followed by a visible decline in routine, spontaneous engagement in pretend play (Friedman & 
Leslie, 2007; Leslie, 1987; Weisberg, 2015).  It is important to emphasize that less overt 
engagement in pretend play does not suggest the disappearance of a pretence ability, as 
children, to a greater or lesser extent depending on cultural orientations, continue to engage in 
pretence well into middle childhood (Harris & Jalloul, 2013). There is even evidence to suggest 
that for some people pretence dispositions persist in adulthood in the form of fantasy 
proneness1. Fantasy proneness is a tendency to imagine fictitious situations, often to escape 
reality (Bacon, Walsh, & Martin, 2013). The point is that a pretence stance can be adopted at 
any time even during later development but very rarely does it resemble the preoccupation with 
imaginary worlds that is seen during the early years of development.  
 
Around the time that spontaneous, explicit engagement in pretend play (the behavioural 
indicator of pretence) show signs of decline in children; counterfactual reasoning is becoming 
matured, explicit and spontaneous. This contrast between pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning raises a number of interesting questions. For example; Why is it that as overt, 
spontaneous child-driven pretence behaviours (pretend play) show signs of decline in children, 
the more thoughtful skill of counterfactual thinking begins to mature? Does the transition imply 
that overt, explicit pretence or pretend play gives way to a more explicit, spontaneous 
 
1 Fantasy prone-ness can be seen as normally distributed within the general population (Eisen & Lynn, 2001) 
with various degrees of daydreaming a fairly universal part of normal emotional functioning (Mason et al., 





counterfactual reasoning ability? Another more general but related and relevant question posed 
by Lillard, Lerner, Hopkins, Dore, Smith and Palmquist (2013)2 asked, “What contribution 
does pretend play (or pretence) make to child development?’. In the context of this paper, 
Lillard et al.’s (2013) question can be rephrased to ask, what role does pretend play have in 
children’s development of counterfactual reasoning? These are a selected few general questions 
of many questions which can be raised in relation to the theoretical claim that pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning engage the same component cognitive abilities (Weisberg, 2015; 
Weisberg & Gopnik, 2013). 
 
 
1.2.0 Rationale for Study 
There is currently a dearth of empirical research which has aimed to unpack claims of a 
relationship between pretence and counterfactual reasoning. Hence, I think that research 
endeavours need to begin to answer fundamental questions which attempt to detangle issues 
like; what are the specific ‘cognitive abilities’ or ‘shared cognitive dimensions or mechanisms’ 
that researchers are proposing links pretence and counterfactual reasoning? To what extent do 
pretence and counterfactual reasoning share underlying cognitive dimensions? This thesis 
seeks to fill the gap in the literature and state of knowledge about pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning by addressing these questions. The intention is to contribute empirical evidence by 
testing the theoretical claims that pretence and CFR are linked, and to evaluate and extend if 
possible, this growing theory.  
 
In acknowledging the need for such goals, Weisberg and Gopnik (2013) have stated there is 
need for large scale studies that use multivariate analyses to get at the unique variance that 
pretend play contributes to other abilities like counterfactual reasoning and causal reasoning, 
above and beyond other explanatory factors. Similarly, in their meta-analysis Lillard et al. 
(2013) recommended further research using correlational and training paradigms to explore 
whether pretending affects logical reasoning (of which counterfactual reasoning is a form) 
more generally. Given the limited empirical evidence available, the use of correlational studies 
aimed at understanding the relationship between pretence and counterfactual reasoning is 
necessary and timely especially since correlational studies are useful investigative procedures, 
 
2 Lilliard et al (2013) conducted a meta-analysis of pretend literature to answer the question what is the impact 
of pretend play on child development. 
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generally used first, before attempting to discover whether relationships are causal (Gall et al., 
2007). Furthermore, if this study finds evidence that pretence and counterfactual reasoning are 
indeed complementary skills; then the findings from this investigation can clarify and add to 
the theoretical principles needed for building a robust theory of pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning as well as contribute to discussions about the role of pretence or pretend play in child 
development. More importantly, I believe that the answers to these fundamental questions set 
the stage for further experimental, intervention or training studies involving pretence, pretend 
play and counterfactual reasoning. 
 
 
1.3.0 Overview of Thesis  
This thesis reports on how two seemingly distinct cognitive processes share similar 
characteristics. The thesis itself is divided into eight chapters including this first introductory 
chapter.  
 
Chapter two, which is the Literature Review, holds up to critical scrutiny the lines of arguments 
which inform suggestions that pretence and counterfactual reasoning are associated cognitive 
processes. The literature review begins by delineating the definitions, defining features, 
cognitive mechanisms, developmental trajectory and measures of pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning, separately. Next, this information is used to compare and contrast pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning primarily by looking at their cognitive mechanisms and the fact that 
both skills involve a capacity to represent real and non-literal aspects of the world, and to 
maintain, as well as transition successfully between both representations. Parallels between 
pretence and counterfactual reasoning are highlighted by taking into account links to other 
cognitive factors like, Language, and Executive Functions (EFs) which are believed to 
influence children’s abilities to engage in both pretence and counterfactual reasoning. 
Empirical evidence alluding to a relationship between pretence and counterfactual reasoning 
are also reviewed. The review of literature culminates with a discussion aimed at contributing 
to the theoretical claims about pretence and counterfactual reasoning and with a framework of 
the proposed study undertaken.  
 
Chapter Three and Chapter Four cover the Research Design and Research Methodology, 
respectively. Chapter Three explains why an observational research design study was the most 
appropriate for investigating the extent to which pretence and counterfactual reasoning share 
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cognitive mechanisms. The research questions are delineated, study variables are 
operationalized, sampling decisions are explained, and the process of piloting the study is 
described. Chapter Four presents the research methods employed in conducting this 
investigation including the selection of participants, study measures, data collection 
procedures, ethical considerations, the data analyses plans, and the treatment of missing data. 
 
Chapter Five and Chapter Six outline the results from the data analyses which addressed the 
four main research questions posed in this study. These two chapters are referred to as results 
A and results B, respectively. Chapter Five begins by describing the demographic background 
of the sample and the reports the findings to the first two research questions which unpack the 
characteristics of the constructs of pretence and counterfactual reasoning. Chapter Six reports 
on the relationship among the variables with the goal of determining the nature of relationships 
which exists between pretence, counterfactual reasoning, language and executive functions.   
 
Chapter Seven is the discussion chapter and Chapter eight is the conclusion. In Chapter Seven, 
the study findings are summarised and discussed in relation to relevant literature. In addition, 
the theoretical claims about pretence and counterfactual reasoning are appraised in light of the 
empirical evidence from the current research. Furthermore, the strengths and limitations of this 
study are considered and implications for further research are proposed. Chapter eight serves 
to conclude the thesis by overviewing the research project including a general discussion about 














Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
2.1.0 Introduction 
The relevant literature relating to pretence, counterfactual reasoning and the relationship 
between the two are examined in this chapter. In the first half of the chapter, the literature on 
pretence and counterfactual reasoning are reviewed separately. The intention is to give a broad 
over view of the representational qualities of pretence and counterfactual reasoning to elucidate 
why researchers think the two share cognitive mechanisms. In the second half of the chapter, 
the relationship between pretence and counterfactual reasoning is appraised by describing their 
cognitive mechanisms, the influence of other related cognitive skills like executive functions 
and language on the development and functioning of pretence and counterfactual reasoning are 
explained, and empirical evidence which have investigated the connection between the two are 
presented. A theoretical framework is put forward to explain how these two cognitive skills 
might be related and the framework of the thesis is explained.   
 
 
2.2.0 Pretence  
The study of pretence, its defining features, and characteristics are particularly interesting to 
cognitive-developmental researchers since pretence has been observed to be a unique attribute 
that separates human beings from other animate beings (Mitchell, 2002; Woolley, 2002). 
‘Pretend play’, ‘make believe’, ‘fantasy play’, ‘symbolic play’ and ‘acting as-if’ are all terms 
used to refer to pretence. According to Perner (1991, p.51):  
 “‘make believe,’ interpreted literally, carries a deceptive connotation: "She makes her 
 father believe she is sleeping." ‘Fantasy’ suggests detachment from reality: "She 
 imagines herself sleeping." ‘Symbolic’ suggests a representational function: "She 
 represents herself as sleeping." ‘Acting-as-if' suggests, "Although she is awake, she acts 
 as if she were asleep."  
Common across these different interpretations of pretence is that they involve representations 
of an alternative world which at the time is not real (Perner, 1991).  
 
It is this deviation from normality, whereby an individual entertains imaginary worlds that 
differ from reality that is the focus of the ensuing discussion. Hence, pretence is the projecting 
of a supposed or imaginary situation onto an actual one in the spirit of fun or play (Lillard, 
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1993). Imaginary play is also referred to as pretend play. In the context of cognitive research, 
a discussion of pretence begins with an acknowledgement of the representational nature of the 
mind, that is, its capacity to generate mental representations. What this means to the study of 
cognitive psychology is that human beings make sense of the world by forming mental 
representations (cognitive structures) that stand for aspects of the world encountered 
throughout one’s life time. In its simplest sense, mental representations are our cognitive 
representations of reality. Pretence, then, is a distortion of that reality, or a deviation from 
normality (Leslie, 1987; Perner, 1991). As a consequence, when we pretend, real world 
representations are substituted by an imaginary (representational) version.  
 
The earliest indicator of the capacity for pretence is seen in children from around eighteen 
months of age in the behavioural manifestation of pretend play (Weisberg, 2015). What makes 
children’s pretend actions remarkable is the fact that they are aware that the situation they are 
enacting is imaginary (Lillard, 1993; Perner, 1991). This is deduced from the child’s ability to 
keep separate, real world references from pretence representations. For example, in pretending 
that a block is a cookie a child would stop short of actually trying to eat the block (Lillard, 
1993). However, while pretend play may dominate young children’s play behaviours; it is not 
a necessary criterion for pretence (Lillard, 1993). It is quite plausible for one to formulate 
pretence scenarios without acting it out. In such a case, the pretence thought can be written 
down e.g. story writing, spoken aloud or shared e.g. story telling or simply kept in the recesses 
of the pretender’s mind.  
 
Moreover, pretence and pretend play comprise a variety of different types and distinguishable 
actions. Researchers tend to describe pretence based on the aims of their study (Frahsek et al., 
2010). One way of describing pretence involves identifying how the pretence is initiated, as in 
whether the pretence is self-directed/initiated or other-directed/initiated. Self-directed pretence 
emerges during the second year of life; whereas, other-directed pretence develops latter from 
actions directed towards another person to pretence involving a fictional character that grows 
incrementally in quality, for example: a child may act as if she was eating from an empty plate 
around her first birthday, show signs of awareness, such as exaggerated sounds around eighteen 
months of age, in her second year of life feed her mother with an empty spoon, sometime later 
she may pretend to feed her doll, later start to talking to her doll, and during her third year of 
life, even treat the doll as if it was an independent agent (Frahsek, et al., 2010). Self-
directed/initiated pretence may also look like solitary pretend play and other-directed/initiated 
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as joint pretend play with peers or an adult. For this reason, when assessing pretend play the 
social context must be taken into account (Frahsek, et. al., 2010).     
 
Pretence can also be described by the form of representational substitution that it takes on. Two 
forms of representational substitutions, symbolic substitutions and hypothetical substitutions, 
are identified by (Perner, 1991). According to Perner (1991), symbolic substitution involves a 
referent which is used to represent something else, for example, pretending that a stick is a 
soldier. Put simply, in symbolic play one thing or object is playfully treated as if it were 
something else (Russ & Dillon, 2011). Hypothetical substitution involves acting as if 
something were something else for example, acting on Monday as if it were Sunday (Perner, 
1991). These categories are further elucidated by Stagnitti, Unsworth, & Rodger (2000) who 
argue that pretend play includes symbolic play as well as imaginative play with functional toys, 
for example, a child pretending that ‘the doll is sitting at the table’ or ‘putting the doll to sleep’. 
An element of acting as if seems to underpin Stagnitti, Unsworth, & Rodger’s (2000) 
description of children’s imaginative play and is closely aligned to Perner’s (1991) definition 
of hypothetical substitution. In addition, Stagnitti, Unsworth, and Rodger (2000) listed several 
forms of symbolic substitution done in pretence:  
(a) substituting one object to represent another, for example, using a box as a car, using 
an action to represent a property e.g. rubbing the head to feign sickness,  
(b) the substitution of symbolic action to represent an absent object, for example, 
waving the hand as act of closing the door.  
(c) Symbolic play can be observed when a child uses an inanimate object or a 
conventional object, for example, a stick or shoe, respectively, in an unconventional 
way by pretending the object is something else.  
 
However, it must be pointed out that symbolic pretend play is distinct from other forms of 
object play such as exploratory play with objects seen when children arrange, sort, classify, 
construct with objects or participate in functional play where an object is used in accordance 
with its conventional purpose without any imaginative or elaborative element (Frahsek, et al., 
2010). In order to distinguish pretence from functional play, some researchers observe 
additional signs of awareness that accompany the action, such as exaggerations, sound effects, 




Given that pretence can manifest in different ways, there is a need for identifying all the 
attributes of pretence with the view of establishing valid common constructs of pretence that 
can be used to guide pretend play research across multiple contexts. An attempt of establishing 
a common theoretical framework for conceptualizing pretence is reported by Thompson and 
Goldstein (2019) who reviewed one hundred and ninety-nine empirical articles measuring 
pretend play and proposed that pretend play behaviours are likely to develop additively from 
least to most psychologically complex in the order of object substitutions, attribution of pretend 
properties, social interactions within pretend, role enactment, and pretence-related 
metacommunication. This organisation is meant to provide a theoretical framework to facilitate 
a more coherent, valid, and holistic approach to studying pretend play across different contexts 
(Thompson & Goldstein, 2019). Going forward, it would be useful to explore whether all these 
pretend attributes are correlated with each other or if they could be used to proxy a general 
construct of pretence. 
 
 
2.2.1 Defining Features of Pretence 
How is pretence conceptualized at a cognitive level and what are the cognitive mechanisms 
involved in pretending? Several researchers like Leslie (1987), Lillard (1993), Nichols and 
Stich (2000), and Perner (1991) have delineated the defining features of pretence. Their ideas 
are presented and compared in this section.  
 
(Leslie, 1987) is most succinct in his identification of two characteristics of pretence. The first, 
is the ability to quarantine or keep pretence separate from normal reference, truth, and existence 
relationships about the world such that representational abuse is avoided. For example, a 
toddler driving a car as part of his pretend play does not necessary translate to him thinking 
himself capable to drive his parents’ car nor would he expect that his toy car should be filled 
up with gas at a petrol station. To quarantine is the ability to transition between pretence and 
reality without getting confused between the two and being able to quarantine successfully is 
necessary for true pretence. The second, is the ability to also recognize pretence in others. 
According to Leslie (1987), understanding pretence in others is part and parcel of being able 
to pretend oneself. Often, children engage in pretend play with another (parent, sibling or 




The essential feature of pretence according to Perner (1991) is that it is a deviation from 
normality. Children deviate from reality to create imaginary situations as part of their play. 
However, for play engagement to be considered pretence, the child must be aware that their 
actions deviate from the normal, and of the fact that the situation is imaginary. Without an 
element of awareness, the child’s play may be merely functional, that is, object interaction 
where actions done on objects match the appropriate use of the objects for example, combing 
a doll’s hair (Zelazo & Kearsley, 1980). 
 
The features of pretence proposed by Lillard (1993) and Nichols and Stich (2000) draw from 
the contributions of previous play researchers including Leslie (1987) and Perner (1991). 
Lillard (1993) listed six features as necessary and sufficient for pretence3. Firstly, there must 
be a pretender. In other words, some mindful being has to do the pretending. Secondly, there 
is a reality to which the pretence contrasts. Thirdly, there is a mental representation different 
from reality for example, one cannot pretend to type while they are typing. Fourthly, there is a 
layering of the pretence representation over the reality, such that they exist within the same 
space and time. In other words, an imaginary scenario is imposed on a real state for example, 
pretending a stick is a horse such that the top of the stick is treated as if it were the head of the 
horse and the bottom as if it were the legs. Fifthly, there is awareness on the part of the 
pretender through features two, three and four. Hence, pretending is done knowingly and 
intentionally for example, the pretender knows the difference between a stick, a horse and 
pretending that a stick is horse.  Sixthly, pretence is frequently accompanied by some external 
manifestation for example, activities or bodily movements that are in accord with the pretence. 
However, the pretence action is one of potentiality and may not always be present in a pretence 
episode. An additional aspect of pretence, although not specifically identified as a feature but 
included in Lillard’s (1993) discussion is that the real and pretend situations are kept separate. 
The pretend world does not seep into the real world, nor is the real world expected to adopt 
features of the pretence for example, after pretending a block is a cookie one does not expect 
the block to become a cookie in real life or expect that a bag of blocks newly purchased would 
contain a cookie (Lillard, 1993a). 
 
 




Another set of defining features are proposed by Nichols and Stich (2000)4. Firstly, typical 
pretence episodes begin with an initial premise or set of premises where the pretender either 
produces the initial premise, that is, if he or she was the one who initiated the pretence. 
Otherwise, he or she figures out what the initial premise is and whether or not he or she will 
proceed with the premise if someone else initiated the pretence. The initial premise is what that 
gets the pretence started. An understanding of the pretence premise is the basis for generating 
appropriate thoughts and actions. Secondly, the details of what is happening in the pretence are 
filled out through a process called inferential elaboration. For example, for a child to answer a 
question about which cup is full after watching an experimenter pretend to fill up two empty 
cups and then turn one upside down; the child must infer that the cup which was turned upside 
down is empty. Thirdly, the details of what is happening in the pretence can also be elaborated 
in non-inferential ways where the pretence inference radically departs from what one might 
typically expect to unfold in a known setting. For example, in a fantasy restaurant pretence 
scenario, a waiter pretends to decapitate a diner. Fourthly, the actions that individuals engage 
in during pretence are appropriate to the pretence, for example, holding one’s arm rigidly to 
imitate the rigidity of a cat’s body after rigor mortis has set in. Fifthly, the ability to keep what 
is really believed separate from what is pretended through a process called cognitive quarantine 
where the pretence has limited effects on the later cognitive state of the pretender. 
 
The preceding discussion about the defining features of pretence shows that some researchers 
emphasize different aspects of pretence more than others. Hence, there is a degree of overlap 
across the researchers. Notwithstanding, it stands to reason that there can be no pretence 
without a pretender. Whereas, Lillard (1993), makes direct mention of a pretender, one can 
infer that the presence of a pretender is implicitly implied in the accounts of Leslie (1987) and 
Perner (1991). There must also be a pretender who generates the premise identified by Nichols 
and Stich (2000). Consistent among all four researchers is the ability of the pretender to avoid 
becoming confused as they manoeuvre between real world representations and representations 
formulated for the purpose of pretence. Leslie (1987) called this skill ‘quarantine’, Perner 
(1991) refers to it as awareness of the discrepancy between the real and imagined, Nichols and 
Stich (2000) calls it ‘cognitive quarantine’, and Lillard (1993) identifies the presence of two 
representations, the real world and pretence representation. Further parallels can be drawn by  
 




comparing the two pretence elaborations (inferential and non-inferential) identified by Nichols 
& Stich (2000) to Lillard (1993) explanations about ‘the layering of the pretence over the 
reality’. I would say that both relate to the details included in the pretence scenario and suggests 
that the pretender can extend his or her imaginary world as he or she deems fit. Lastly, Leslie 
(1987), Lillard (1993), and Perner (1991) all stated that it is important that the pretender knows 
he is pretending. Leslie (1987) in his paper, extends this idea to the ability of the pretender to 
understand pretence in others however, there is contention among play researchers about 
whether this characteristic is necessary for pretence. Lastly, pretence actions are a feature of 
pretence that all three researchers make reference to.  The defining features of pretence 





Figure 2.1 Defining Features of Pretence 
Nichols & Stich (2000) 
1. Pretence Premise 
2. Inferential Elaboration  
3. Non-inferential 
Elaboration 
4. Appropriate Actions 
5. Cognitive Quarantine 
Lilliard (1993;2002) 
1. Pretender 
2. Real world representations 
3. Pretence Representations 
4. Laying over reality 
5. Awareness 
6. Pretence Action 
Perner (1991) 
1. Acting-as-if 
2. Aware of the 
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2.2.2 Cognitive Mechanisms of Pretence  
In complement to the defining features of pretence researchers have gone further to outline the 
mechanisms which make the features of pretence possible. The main cognitive theories that 
give an account of the cognitive mechanisms of pretence include; ‘The Metarepresentational 
Theory of Pretence’ by Leslie (1987), ‘The Multiple Model Theory’ by Perner (1991) and ‘The 
Possible World Box Theory’ by Nichols & Stich (2000). 
 
The most influential mechanistic account of pretence was put forward by Leslie (1987) in his 
‘Metarepresentational Theory of Pretence’. Leslie’s description of the mechanisms underlying 
pretence was represented using what he referred to as the ‘decoupling model of pretence’ (see 








‘The Decoupler Model’ comprised three main components namely; perceptual processes, a 
central cognitive system and the decoupler; all of which form the cognitive architecture that 
facilitates pretence. Perceptual processes are responsible for taking in information about the 
world and represent our current situations. This information is transferred to the central 
cognitive system. The central cognitive system has structures corresponding to perceived 
situations, memory systems (including, for example, general knowledge) and systems for 
planning action. The idea of a central cognitive system (central executive) is widely purported 
as critical to cognitive processing as a whole and is discussed further when other cognitive 
factors that can likely influence one’s capacity for pretence are explored later in this chapter 
(see section 2.4.0 which discusses evidence for the link between pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning). 
 
According to Leslie’s mechanistic account, information about the world collected by the 
perceptual process goes to the central cognitive system and together they form primary 
representations of the world. Pretence expressions are formed when primary representations 
are raised to a second order representation or metarepresentation, by ‘the decoupler’. The 
‘Decoupler’ achieves this by engaging three separate processes, ‘the expression raiser’, ‘the 
manipulator’ and ‘the interpreter’. The ‘expression raiser’ does the following: (a) copies 
primary representations from the central system, and (b) removes the primary representation 
from its normal input-output relations and normal computational consequences through a 
process referred to as decoupling. ‘The manipulator’ then transforms the decoupled expression 
to a second order representation or metarepresentation. Lastly, the interpreter performs 
anchoring functions by; (a) accessing primary representations in central systems, (b) relating 
decoupled expressions to their current perceptual representation, (c) accessing inference rules 
and other information for passing to the manipulator for further cycle, and (d) passing 
metarepresentations to the central cognitive systems for storage. Thus, the feature of 
quarantining primary and metarepresentations are achieved.  
 
Moreover, Leslie (1987) argued in his paper that pretence is a fundamental ability in typically 
developing children which once having emerged does not develop any further. This leads to 
the following conclusions about pretence: 
1. Pretence is sophisticated in and of itself  
2. The qualitative changes in pretence are not necessarily due to a change in the ability to 
pretend as opposed to the influence of maturation in other cognitive structures and 
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abilities e.g. perceptual abilities, conceptual understanding, memory functions, social 
rules.  
To support this perspective, Leslie (1987) used the analogy that growth in a child’s 
‘encyclopaedic’ knowledge leads to changes in the contents of the child’s pretence. Hence, 
Leslie likened pretence to an early manifestation of Theory of Mind and at its core is the 
perspective that a child’s ability to pretend means that they can understand their own pretence 
as well as that of others. It is this aspect of Leslie’s theory that is most often criticized. A review 
of empirical evidence by Lillard (2001) has suggested that there is little evidence to support 
Leslie’s metarepresentational theory of pretence.  
 
In contrast to Leslie (1987), Perner (1991) proposed a ‘Multiple Model of Pretence’ where 
child pretence is described as ‘acting-as-if’ and is made possible by the child’s ability to switch 
between reality and imaginary situations. Unlike Leslie (1987), Perner (1991) purports that the 
ability to switch is sufficient for meeting the condition of being ‘aware’ of the difference 
between reality and pretence. According to Perner (1991), the cognitive mechanism which 
underpins pretence is facilitated by an ability to entertain two mental models: a ‘Reality’ model 
and an ‘As-If’ model. The two models simply represent two different situations: the real 
situation and a hypothetical situation that may not be and probably never was real. The two 
models are simply representations of two different situations or contexts and meet the following 
three assumptions: 
1. The representation controlling play action is contained in a different model than 
information about the real world controlling serious action; otherwise, the child would 
be confused about what is real and what is pretend. 
2. The models are labelled in a way that enables it to pick the right one for playful  
enjoyment and for serious action. 
3. In order that the pretend model can govern pretend action in the real world, the two 
models are about the same entities. This is ensured by the fact that expressions like "this  
object," "is," "piece of cloth," "my pillow," and so on, in the two mental models    
represent the same entities and relations. 
According to Perner (1991) his ‘Multiple Model’ offers a more parsimonious explanation of 
the mechanisms of pretence than Leslie’s (1987). I think Leslie’s model is more technical 
because it ventures to explain the specific mechanisms which facilitate decoupling of pretence 




Another cognitive theory of pretence fairly recently developed by Nichols and Stich (2000) 
proposed that the capacity for pretence rests on a mental workspace embedded in our cognitive 






Figure 2.3 Cognitive Model of Pretence (from Nichols & Stich, 2000) 
Illustration of Nichol’s & Stich (2000) ‘Cognitive Model of Pretence’ removed for 
copyright reasons. Copyright holder is Elsevier 
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Nichols and Stich (2000) described their ‘Possible World Box Pretence Theory’ as a highly 
eclectic one which borrows many ideas from other theorists like Leslie (1987) and Perner 
(1991). However, Nichols and Stich (2000) theory differ in its design of specifying a 
mechanistic account of pretence where the Possible World Box is a mental workspace where 
our cognitive systems build and temporarily store representations of one or another possible 
world. In addition, other mental state capacities are held in a separate box to pretence for 
example, beliefs are held in a Belief Box. Nicholas and Stich (2000) posited that the original 
evolutionary function of the Possible World Box may be to facilitate reasoning about 
hypothetical situations, thus the Possible World Box acquires a central role in pretence. The 
Possible World Box interacts with other cognitive systems to influence to varying degrees the 
contents of our pretence representations. 
 
Similar to Leslie (1987), Nichols and Stich (2000) agreed that pretence mechanisms require 
quarantining and decoupling of mental representations. However, Nichols and Stich (2000) 
aligned with Perner (1991) to conclude that Leslie’s (1987) assertion that pretence is a primitive 
manifestation of the ability to conceptualize mental states and therefore an early manifestation 
of Theory of Mind is flawed. Friedman and Leslie (2007) have given a rebuttal arguing why 
the metarepresentational theory of pretence provides a better account than theories which view 
pretence as behaving as-if. In Leslie’s defence he argued that it is not the representational 
capacity to pretend that changes but qualitative changes in pretence are the influence of 
maturation in other cognitive structures. Allowing for maturation based on connections with 
other cognitive connections may explain why children’s ability to understand pretence in others 
develops over time. Like Perner (1991), Nichols and Stich (2000) argued that in principle 
pretence could proceed perfectly well even if the subject did not hold a concept of pretence, as 
is often seen during the emergent stages of pretence in young children. By extension, it is 
entirely possible that young children have lots of beliefs and desires though they have no theory 
of mind at all and are entirely incapable of conceptualizing mental states Nichols and Stich 
(2000, p. 138). Both Nichols and Stich (2000) and Perner (1991) view pretence as a 
distinguishing between the real world and hypothetical world whereas, Leslie (1987) added the 
acquisition of a pretence concept by the pretender as a dimension. Nichols and Stich (2000), 
however, disagreed with Perner (1991) Multiple Models theory (‘Reality’ model and ‘As-if’ 
Model), to suggest that pretending draws upon a single code for interpreting pretence 




Conclusion. The commonalities observed across all the mechanistic theories of pretence 
suggest that; (a) knowledge of the world from observations or real experiences are foundational 
to pretence; (b) children use their imagination to recreate realities in similar ways or new and 
original ways to their understanding of reality; and (c) children can transition between their 
knowledge of their real world and their recreated versions without getting confused or getting 
them mixed up. The difference across the theories are in the descriptions of the cognitive 
architecture that facilitate these processes. Some points of contention include: (a) When does 
a child have a representational understanding of pretence? (b) How is a child able to prevent 
their imaginative pretence ideas from interfering with their concept of the world? – Leslie 
(1987) suggests a method of ‘decoupling’, Perner (1991) updated ‘codes’, and Nichols and 
Stich (2000) ‘Other World Box’; and (c) When do children begin to understand pretence in 
others?  
 
This present study is explicitly interested in unpacking the cognitive mechanisms of pretence 
in relation to counterfactual reasoning. For pretence, Leslie’s (1987) ‘Theory of Mind 
Mechanism’ account is seminal in the field. Its principles of decoupling and quarantine are 
foundational to explaining the cognitive mechanisms of pretence today and have become the 
tenet of subsequent theories including that of Nichols and Stich ‘Possible World Box and 
Perner’s ‘Multiple Model of Pretence’. For this study, I primarily adopted Leslie’s 
metarepresentational theory because according to this theory, from the onset of the appearance 
of pretence in development, children have a ‘mental concept’ of pretence; hence, pretence can 
be construed as a mental representation. In contrast, the other two theories begin from the 
premise that pretence begins from a non-representational behaviour model which is sometimes 
referred to as ‘behaving as if’ before being construed as representational (Friedman & Leslie, 
2007; Friedman et al., 2010). This would imply that in the early stages of its appearance, 
pretence could be not be classified as a mental state and would be independent from other 
mental state capacities relating to thinking, believing or remembering. The next obvious 
question would then be ‘when do children come to represent pretence as representational?’ - 
which is not the focus of this study. As discussed in the introduction, this study aims to address 
the suggestion that pretence and counterfactual reasoning are related constructs sharing similar 
representational qualities. Leslie’s theoretical account of pretence is therefore more aligned 





2.2.3 Development Trajectory of Pretence 
In this section, developmental markers of pretence are discussed with reference to the 
discussion on the defining features of pretence in section 2.2.1. Acknowledgement is given to 
the fact that pretence is a component of a broader capacity for imagination or fantasy. In 
addition, there is a brief discussion on what those developmental milestones might mean for 
child-development in general.   
 
The first indication of an imaginative capacity in humans is observed from when children begin 
engaging in pretend play (Woolley, 2002). The general consensus is that pretence emerges 
from eighteen to twenty-four months, becomes consolidated into the child’s play repertoire by 
their third year of development, by the fourth year children’s pretence capacities evolve into 
the creation of elaborate fantasies that involve imaginary characters and animals, and it 
atrophies by middle childhood although people continue to have an appreciation for the 
imaginary as adults (Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2000; Smith, 2009; Woolley, 2002). Between the 
ages of three to five, children begin to make clear reality and non-reality distinctions of pretence 
and understand that in comparison to knowledge, imagination reflects reality less accurately 
(Woolley, 2002). This is supported by the observation that children as young as three years are 
aware of different properties that distinguish mental entities from real physical objects. For 
example, a child imagining a pair of scissors and thinking about making them open and close 
does not mean that this same process will make real scissors open and close (Woolley, 2002). 
According to Woolley (2002) imagining and pretending are similar in that both involve: 
maintaining a conscious awareness of the real world, engaging in a mental event, and 
deliberate, planning, constructing, and controlled processing. The difference between the two 
is that imagination is non-propositional whilst one must always pretend that one thing is 
something else. For example, one can imagine owning a new car but that is different from 
imagining that their new car is a ‘batman mobile’. There is a general expectation that when 
children engage in pretend play they have the knowledge that: pretence is fictional, someone 
can pretend to do things that they in actual fact cannot, pretending something does not make it 
really happen, and something pretended can be different from what really exists (Woolley, 
2002). 
 
Although the disposition for pretend play emerges before the second year of life, peaks during 
the late preschool years, and declines during the primary school years; an ability to consistently 
recognize when another person is pretending is sustained after the age of two (Smith, 
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Englander, Lillard, & Morris, 2013). However, recognizing when another person is pretending 
is qualitatively different from acquiring a representational understanding of pretence or an 
understanding of pretence as a mental state. The evidence suggests that during the early years 
of development, young children’s representational understanding of pretence is fragile (Amsel 
& Smalley, 2000). Lillard (2002) argued that although children appreciate that pretence 
situations are framed separately from reality, most young children do not generally appreciate 
that those frames emanate from minds, or that pretence require a mental representation of a 
pretence scenario.  An assessment by Lillard (1993), resulted in the conclusion that children 
do not understand that pretending requires mental representation. They used several scenarios, 
for example; children were shown a doll named George and told that he knows what a bird is, 
he is pretending to be a bird, and then George was made to move around with his feet on the 
ground and his hands outstretched. In contrast, they were shown a troll-doll named Moe and 
told that Moe doesn’t know what a bird is, has never seen a bird, has never heard of one. Moe 
was then made to move in the same manner as George. Afterwards, children were asked: “Moe 
doesn’t know what a bird is, does he?” and “Is he pretending he is a bird”. Majority of children 
responded that Moe was pretending leading Lillard (1993) to conclude that children did not 
understand mental representations in pretence although they succeeded on false belief tasks 
which were indicative of understanding mental representations of belief. Lillard (1993) 
repeated several similar experiments and concluded from the experiments that children’s ability 
to understand pretence in others appeared to be very limited before elementary school. 
According to (Lillard, 1993a) children’s earliest understanding of pretence is as ‘acting-as-if’ 
because they do not appreciate the role of mental representations in pretence. It is not until 
from about the age of six that Lillard (1993) ascribes to children the understanding that when 
people are pretending, they are mentally representing. 
 
Woolley (2002) critiqued Lillard’s (1993) claim that children entirely lack an understanding or 
pretence as a mental state on the basis that the action component of the characters’ pretence 
from the scenarios used may have been more accessible to the children than the mental state 
component. Woolley (2002) reported setting out studies to address the perceived limitations 
from (Angeline S. Lillard, 1993) by using scenarios to equate the salience of action and mental 
state by using drawings of characters instead of dolls and depicting characters thoughts in 
speech bubbles. In a one-animal task, children were shown a character said to be from another 
planet, a Gleep, with a bunny rabbit depicted next to the Gleep. The Gleep was described to be 
hopping like a bunny rabbit hops but does not know what a bunny rabbit is as he is from another 
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planet. Children were then they asked “So, what’s Gleep doing, is he pretending to be a bunny 
rabbit, or is he just hopping?”. The children were also shown a comparable two-animal task - 
this time accompanying the Gleep was a creature called a Mins which resided on the same 
planet as the Gleep. Children were told that the Gleep was wriggling his nose like Mins and 
bunny rabbits wriggle their nose but the Gleep knew what a Mins was but did not know what 
a bunny rabbit was. The test question asked, “What would you say Gleep is pretending to be, 
a Min or a bunny rabbit?”. The results showed that for the one-animal task only four to five 
years performed significantly above chance but for the two-animals task all children, three, 
four, and five-year olds, performed above chance. Woolley (2002) suggested that the results 
revealed that children actually have a high level of understanding of the mental component of 
pretence and that the lack of alternatives in the task by Lillard (1993) is responsible for 
children’s poor performance. 
 
The contrasting findings by Woolley (2002) and Lillard (1993) indicated that, on one hand, 
there is the perception that children struggle to understand that pretence involves mental 
representation. On the hand, the argument is made that children can actually understand mental 
representations in pretence if the tasks are simplified such that the linguistic demands are 
minimized and the salience of actions and mental state actions are balanced. Sobel and Lillard, 
(2001) also showed that when the pretence involves fantasy characters children’s 
understanding of the mind may be more advanced. One of way of looking at it, is that it may 
be that children’s understanding of the mind is less stable than adults and this variable 
characteristic may actually be reflecting different levels of understanding such that different 
studies may be tapping into different aspects of the phenomenon (Woolley, 2002). 
Notwithstanding, the general conclusion is that children’s ability to recognize and take part in 
pretence is independent of (and precedes) their capacity to represent mental states in pretence 
(Smith, 2002).  
 
Another key question about pretence posed by child development researchers is the question 
of its contribution to individual child development. Three models for explaining the likely role 
of pretend play posited by Smith (2002) are detailed below (see Figure 2.4): 
(a) Pretend play may be a by-product of other aspect(s) of development, with no important 
developmental consequence(s) of its own (Figure 2.4a). 
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(b)  Pretend play is a facilitator of developmental consequence(s); it can help bring about 
important developmental consequence(s) but it is not essential for this if other expected 
developmental pathways are present (Figure 2.4b). 
(c) Pretend play is necessary for important developmental consequence(s); in the absence 
of pretend play, these developmental consequences will not happen or will at least be 
significantly held back (Figure 2.4c). 
 
Smith (2002) posited that evolutionary influences might have led shifts from one model to 
another but generally favours model 2.4b. In their review of evidence to substantiate the role 
of pretend play in child development Lillard, Hopkins, Dore, and Smith (2013) purported that 
the current state of empirical evidence favour models 2.4a and 2.4b but further and better 





Figure 2.4 Three Models of the Role of Pretend Play in Development (from Smith, 2002) 
Illustration of Smith (2002) ‘Three Models of the Role of Pretend Play in Development’ 
removed for copyright reasons. Copy right holder is Cambridge University Press 
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Some predictions have been proposed about the possible role of pretend play based on the 
observation that the simultaneous naturally occurring observation that overt pretend play 
begins to decline just when children seem to begin to acquire an understanding of the mental 
representational qualities of pretence. A suggestion put forward by Lillard (2001) is that when 
children come to appreciate mental representations in pretence; they eventually apply their 
understanding of mental representations outside of pretence domains. Drawing from the results 
from numerous experiments that concluded that children’s meta-representational 
understanding of pretence is acquired sometime after the emergent ability to engage in pretend 
play; Lillard (2001) proposed the ‘Twin Earth Model’ of pretence (see Figure 2.4) which 
distinguished pretence as pretend play from pretence as metarepresentational to suggest that 
the coinciding of a representational understanding of pretence with success on false belief tasks 
imply that the role of pretend play in development is to facilitate over time children’s theory 
of mind understanding. Theory of mind is a mental state concept which involves appreciating 
the distinction between the mind and the world and one of the ways it is determined is by 
assessing a child’s understanding that a person can have a false-belief  - a belief which 





Figure 2.5 Twin Earth Model of Pretence Theory of Mind Relations (from Lillard, 2001) 
Illustration of Lillard (2001) ‘Twin Earth Model of Pretence Theory of Mind Relations’ 
removed for copyright reasons. Copyright holder is Elsevier. 
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Another similar association with pretence has been observed with counterfactual reasoning. 
Counterfactual reasoning is just as intricately linked to theory of mind because thinking about 
events that contrast with reality is central to false belief tasks. For this reason, Riggs & Peterson 
(2000) have argued that the false belief tasks actually tap into counterfactual reasoning skills 
not belief, and children’s poor performance on the task is indicative of them being poor 
counterfactual reasoners. Success at mature counterfactual reasoning also coincides with 
children’s acquisition of a representational understanding of pretence. Additionally, the 
unifying theory of pretence and counterfactual reasoning investigated in this present study 
argued that early years may very well function as an opportunity to practice the cognitive skills 
associated with counterfactual reasoning (Walker & Gopnik, 2013b, 2013a; Weisberg & 
Gopnik, 2013). The nature of this relationship is explored further in this thesis. 
 
 
Conclusion. This section delineated the developmental markers of pretence by drawing on 
empirical evidence from the literature. It appears that pretence milestones culminate in an 
understanding of pretence as a mental concept. The sudden decline in overt pretence by middle 
childhood has raised queries about the role of pretence in child development.  
 
 
2.2.4 Measuring Pretence 
This present study focuses on the cognitive representation of pretence but without some 
manifestation or report of pretending it is impossible for cognitive researchers to say anything 
about pretence. In early-years studies, which is the focus of this thesis, children’s engagement 
in pretend play provides a reliable index of a child’s cognitive capacity for pretence. Part of 
the difficulty with gathering evidence on the quality of child pretence comes from limited 
rigorous, standardised measures of pretend play. Also, there is a limited consensus on the 
multiple components of pretence, how such multiple components could be measured in tandem 
for a comprehensive picture of a child’s pretend abilities, and how these components aid in 
understanding the developmental progression of pretend play itself across different studies 
(Thompson & Goldstein, 2019). Most pretence investigations use observational methods, 
studying children in simulated pretend play settings, and assessing the frequency with which 




For instance, the Affect in Play-scale is used to assess both affective and cognitive play 
processes (Fehr & Russ, 2014). In this assessment cognitive processes refer to pretend play 
skills of: imagination which assess fantasy; elaboration which assesses the amount of variety 
and complexity in story themes, toys used, character development; organization which assesses 
the coherence of the play narrative, and comfort in play which assesses the child’s ability to 
engage in the play task. Alternately, the Test of Pretend Play focuses explicitly on object 
substitution in symbolic play by assessing substituting one object for another, making reference 
to an absent object as if it was present, and attributing an imaginary property to an object (Clift, 
Stagnitti, & DeMello, 1998). Seldom are all the components of pretence measured together in 
one study (Thompson & Goldstein, 2019) and there has been little emphasis on targeting 
primarily only the cognitive components of pretence.  
 
A concern for measuring pretend play is the degree to which the assessment context reflects 
children’s naturalistic play contexts. Pretend play assessments may take the form of lab-based, 
task-based or naturalistic methods. A question raised is whether the context for assessing 
pretend play would matter if a common cognitive construct is being and measured. Would it 
be that only a pretence mental state is needed then regardless of the pretend play behaviours in 
which children are engaged (Thompson & Goldstein, 2019)? Having clearly defined measures 
of pretence is necessary for drawing robust inferences about the cognitive characteristics of 
pretence and would go a long way towards generating replicable studies explaining the links 













2.3.0 Counterfactual Reasoning 
The model governing pretence has been referred to as hypothetical because it is more often 
than not a counterfactual reasoning situation, that may not be and probably never was real 
(Perner, 1991). The idea that during pretence leads to the creation of hypothetical worlds is the 
basis for suggesting that pretence bears resemblance to counterfactual reasoning, and by the 
same token, that they each utilize similar cognitive processes. Counterfactual thoughts refer to 
mental representations that are explicitly contrary to facts or beliefs (Roese & Morrison, 2009). 
The paradox is that while pretence is attributed to children very early in their development and 
even in the absence of a stable understanding of the representational capacity of the mind, 
counterfactual reasoning is generally viewed as a more sophisticated form of reasoning. As a 
result, the similarities between pretence and counterfactual reasoning have led researchers to 
inquire whether pretence is a training ground for developing more sophisticated, higher order 
reasoning skills like counterfactual reasoning (Lillard, 1993; Weisberg & Gopnik, 2013).  
 
Counterfactual reasoning has been linked to a range of complex human behaviours, making it 
an area that is widely researched. For instance, in social psychology counterfactual reasoning 
has been linked to the study of emotions like regret and remorse; in clinical psychology it has 
been linked to pathological processes of depression, social anxiety, and schizophrenia; and in 
cognitive psychology the role of counterfactual in understanding causality has been explored 
(Harris et al., 1996; Rafetseder & Perner, 2014). This section of the review presents the defining 
features of counterfactual reasoning with a focus on child counterfactual reasoning, the 
cognitive mechanisms involved, its developmental trajectory, and how it is measured.  
 
 
2.3.1 Defining Features of Counterfactual Reasoning  
The process of reflecting on how the world might have been under different circumstances 
rather than how it is immediately presented to us is a powerful feature of human thinking known 
as counterfactual reasoning (Riggs & Peterson, 2000). Counterfactuals are diverse and can 
range from imagined alternatives that entertain and amuse as in that found in fantasy, fiction, 
literature, film and theatre to imagined alternatives that support logical, mathematical and 
scientific reasoning (Byrne, 2016). In everyday life, counterfactuals are spontaneously 
generated and generally serve four broad functions; (1) to explain the past, (2) prepare for the 
future, (3) modulate emotional experiences and (4) support moral judgments (Byrne, 2016). 
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The defining features of a counterfactual thought have been summarised by Roese & Morrison, 
(2009) as follows: 
1. Counterfactuals are usually grounded in some aspect of reality with the 
counterfactual itself being a juxtaposition against this reality 
2. Counterfactuals are typically triggered by negative or unusual events from which a 
resultant counterfactual concentrate on how the event might have been different  
3. A counterfactual is generated from a conditional statement or premise comprising 
of: 
• an antecedent, an action or decision by an individual e.g. If only Bob had kept 
his eyes on the road, and  
• a consequent, a state of being often framed in evaluative terms e.g. he would 
have avoided the accident.  
4. The counterfactual itself may be 
• An upward counterfactual, an alternative outcome that is better than the 
actuality e.g. If only Bob had kept his eyes on the road, he would have avoided 
the accident. 
• A downward counterfactual, an alternative outcome that is worse than actuality 
e.g. If Bob had not acted quickly, more people could have been injured  
• Additive whereby a behaviour or event is added to the situation e.g. If only Mary 
had accompanied Bob, he would not have fallen asleep and he would have 
avoided the accident. 
• Subtractive whereby some event or behaviour is removed e.g. If only Bob had 











2.3.2 Cognitive Mechanisms of Counterfactual Reasoning 
According to Byrne (2016) the underlying mechanisms of counterfactual reasoning maintain 
and update two representations, the imagined alternative and the known or presupposed reality. 
Byrne (2016) proposes that an algorithm to specify the mental representations and cognitive 
processes that create counterfactuals would involve the following: 
• take as input the relevant facts of actual events (grounded in reality) 
• produce as output a counterfactual alternative (an alternative to reality) 
• intervening processes would change aspects of the mental representation of the facts to 
create a second mental representation, the counterfactual alternative  
• A goal to produce counterfactuals that are plausible, that is reasonable, believable and 
acceptable. This makes the counterfactual thought dynamic as it can be challenged and 
changed by the discovery of further information or by others with different opinions  
 
Byrne (2016) further posits that generally people imagine similar sorts of counterfactuals and 
the decisions they make to change mental representations of the facts of an event are influenced 
by following factors: 
1. Exceptionality effect: the tendency to imagine an alternative by changing exceptional 
events to be normal 
 
2. Controllability effect: the tendency to imagine an alternative by changing a 
controllable event rather than an uncontrollable one  
 
3. Action effect: the tendency to imagine an alternative by changing an action rather than 
an inaction 
 
4. Temporal order effect: the tendency to imagine an alternative by changing the most 
recent event rather than earlier events.  
These factors are invoked under different circumstances and depend on the function of the 
counterfactual thought being generated. In child studies using counterfactual reasoning 
scenarios, the action effect tends to be most prevalent because the scenarios are usually 





2.3.3 Developmental Trajectory of Counterfactual Reasoning 
If we are to understand fully the cognitive processes that underpin the acquisition and use of 
counterfactual thoughts by children and adults then knowing how counterfactual thoughts 
develop and when children begin to reasoning counterfactually is critical (Beck & Riggs, 
2014). From all accounts, it appears that counterfactual reasoning emerges in early childhood 
and becomes an essential skill in adult life. Extensive research has inquired whether young 
children can engage in adult-like counterfactual reasoning and at what age does this ability 
emerge. As a result, several fundamental cognitive developmental milestones believed to 
evidence counterfactual reasoning have been observed in children.  
 
An understanding of ‘almost’ is one of the earliest developmental markers of counterfactual 
reasoning. A study by Harris (1995) reported in Robinson and Beck (2000) showing two and 
three-year olds scenes of two horses galloping across a table, one stopping well before the edge, 
but the other stopping short of it. Most children were able to identify correctly which horse 
‘almost’ or ‘nearly’ fell off the table before their third birthday (Harris, 2000). The finding 
from this investigation indicated that children are able to describe what actually happened in 
relation to what might have happened, (Harris, 2000).  Therefore, when alternate outcomes are 
not shown directly to young children; they show an understanding that observed outcomes 
(actualities) might have turned out differently (Harris, 2000). This indicates that young children 
have an awareness of the outcome of a sequence of events as well as alternate outcomes from 
a sequence of events.   
 
Asking children to generate likely outcomes for alternative antecedents is presumably a more 
taxing task. Children must set aside the actual antecedent plus the outcome observed, to 
imagine the antecedent being replaced by a different antecedent and to predict new outcomes 
for the new antecedent (Harris, 2000). Some researchers propose that by age three and four 
children are able to interpret both positive and negative outcomes to counterfactuals. One such 
scenario dramatized for children involved a tower of bricks which naughty Teddy comes along 
and hits with a stick (Harris, German & Mills, 1996). Follow up questions first check children’s 
recall of the scenario for example, ‘Are the bricks standing up now?’ and ‘Were the bricks 
standing up before?’; followed by counterfactual questions; ‘If Teddy hadn’t hit the bricks with 
his stick, would they be standing up now?’, and ‘If Teddy had hit the bricks with his hand 
instead, would they be standing up now?’. Children were able to identify alternative 
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antecedents that lead to different outcomes and antecedents that lead to the same outcome 
(Harris, German & Mills, 1996).  
 
Additional questions posed about children’s development of counterfactual reasoning asked 
whether children recognized that different causal factors play a role depending on the 
counterfactual antecedent brought to mind and can they go beyond the structure of 
experimental stories to generate counterfactual possibilities for themselves. To answer this 
question, Harris, German, and Mills (1996) presented three and four-year olds an experimental 
and control version of the following story; 
Experiment: ‘One day, Sally wanted to do a drawing. Her Mum said she could draw 
with a pencil or with a black pen. Sally said she didn’t want to draw with a pencil, she 
wanted to draw with a black pen. Guess what! When Sally was drawing with the black 
pen, she touched her drawing, and her fingers all inky’. 
Control: Sally wants to do a drawing. Her Mum said she could draw with a blue pen or 
a black pen. Sally said she didn’t want to draw with a blue pen, she wanted to draw 
with a black pen. Guess what! When Sally was drawing with the black pen, she touched 
her drawing, and made her fingers all inky. 
These two questions were posed to the children, “why did Sally’s fingers get all inky?”, and 
“what should Sally have done instead so that her fingers wouldn’t get inky?”. The children’s 
responses to both versions of the story referenced alternative antecedents, the pencil and blue 
pen, but the children responding to the control version did so less than the children responding 
to the experimental version. The children listening to the control stories imagined for 
themselves alternatives not mentioned in the story that might have led to a different outcome 
for Sally (that is not getting her hands inky). This experiment showed that children do recognize 
that different antecedents influence the process of selecting a causal factor and that by the age 
of four children can generate counterfactual possibilities outside of those presented in 
experimental scenarios. This finding was supported Guajardo and Turley-Ames (2004) who 
found that four and five-year olds were better than three year olds at spontaneously generating 
multiple counterfactual possibilities for set counterfactual antecedents.   
 
One observation is that before the age of three children tend to make ‘reality errors’ by using 
what was actually stated in the story to answer the counterfactual question otherwise referred 
to as reasoning with the current state of affairs (Rafetseder et al., 2010; Rafetseder & Perner, 
2010; Robinson & Beck, 2000). Children, however, tend to overcome the predilection for 
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realist  errors between the ages of three and five (Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas & Perner, 2010). 
Additionally, students’ success on counterfactual tasks are frequently held up to scrutiny by 
counterfactual reasoning researchers resulting in conclusions drawn from seminal studies being 
critiqued. For example, Beck and Guthrie (2011) posited that Harris’s (1997) suggestion that 
children can reason about ‘almost’ from about the age of two is a false positive because in their 
studies three to four year olds identified a character who ‘almost’ completed an action when 
the comparison character also did not complete the action but children performed poorly when 
the comparison character completed the action. At age five to six children consistently passed 
the tasks indicating they made appropriate counterfactual interpretations of ‘almost’ leading to 
the conclusion that understanding almost was more challenging than standard counterfactuals 
(Beck & Guthrie, 2011).  
 
Standard counterfactuals have also come under scrutiny. The suggestion is that children’s 
success may be attributed to basic conditional reasoning, that is, where real world plausible 
answers are the default response as opposed to mature counterfactual reasoning where the 
details of the counterfactual premise is integrated into the counterfactual response to arrive at 
the correct answer. Distinguishing between basic conditional reasoning and mature 
counterfactual reasoning on standard counterfactual tasks is difficult for researchers because 
both yield correct answers. To understand children’s preferred reasoning strategy standard 
counterfactual tasks have been revised by designing stories in which counterfactual reasoning 
results in different answers from basic conditional reasoning. For example, Rafetseder, Cristi-
Vargas, and Perner (2010) designed a sweet story involving a mother who regularly puts sweets 
on either a top shelf or a bottom shelf and either a tall boy or short girl comes looking for the 
sweets to take them into their room. For different locations of the sweets (top and bottom shelf) 
the counterfactual question asked is, “what if not the tall boy but the short girl had come looking 
for the sweets, where would the sweets be (and vice versa)?”. Basic conditional reasoning could 
be distinguished from counterfactual reasoning by comparing when both characters have an 
equal chance of getting the sweets to when only one character could take the sweet so a default 
answer would yield an incorrect response (when the sweet is on the top shelf). Children were 
less likely to provide correct answers in situations where basic conditional reasoning yielded 
the wrong response. The conclusion was that children were most likely to give correct 
counterfactual responses around the age of six (Rafetseder et al., 2010). Similar findings were 
replicated in different studies by Rafetseder and Perner (2010, 2012), and Rafetseder, 
Schwitalla, & Perner (2013). 
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Other study designs have varied counterfactual scenarios by using physical causal tasks to 
determine if children were more likely to integrate the contents of counterfactual premises into 
their counterfactual responses using different paradigms. For instance, McCormack, Ho, 
Gribben, O’Connor, and Hoerl (2018) used the paradigm of doubly-determined outcomes 
which compared scenarios where an outcome would still have occurred even in the absence of 
its actual cause to singly-determined outcomes where only one possible outcome could occur 
using a novel causal structure. The structure used by McCormack, et al. (2018) comprised two 
runways of unequal length and two distinct heavy metal discs (one with a picture of red bird 
and one with a picture of a yellow bird) used to roll down the two runways and knock over an 
object (a green pig) located in the centre of the runway. Both objects had an equal chance of 
knocking over the green pig but the object on the shorter side would always have the advantage 
of knocking down the green pig first. Children were shown doubly-determined trials where 
both discs rolled down the runway all the way to the bottom and singly-determined trials where 
only one of the discs rolled all the way to the bottom because a peg was used to stop the descent 
of the other disc. The counterfactual question involved undoing the descent of one of the metal 
discs. This task aimed to reduce the complexities of tasks aimed at differentiating basic 
conditional reasoning from counterfactual reasoning like those used by Rafetseder, Cristi-
Vargas, and Perner (2010), Rafetseder and Perner (2010, 2012), and Rafetseder, Schwitalla, & 
Perner (2013). The perception was that using a novel causal, physical structure would remove 
the bias of familiarity with real world contexts which generally underpin the inclination to 
apply basic conditional reasoning to counterfactual questions and allow children to focus 
expressly on the counterfactual premise presented to them. However, the conclusion was that 
four to five year olds performed below chance, six to seven year olds were above chance, and 
eight to nine year olds were at ceiling (McCormack et al., 2018). These findings were replicated 
by Nyhout, Henke, and Ganea (2019) using modified versions of Rafetseder, Schwitalla, and 
Perner (2013) social-causal task involving the characters Susie and Max walking into the room 
with their muddy boots. The results were consistent with McCormack, et al. (2018) finding that 
children could reason in doubly-determined events, otherwise termed as causally 
overdetermined events in this study, between the ages of six and eight years. 
 
Notwithstanding, the ability of four to five year olds to engage in counterfactual reasoning still 
has scope for exploration due to the suggestion that children’s lack of success at applying 
counterfactual reasoning stems from issues of task complexity and tasks may have 
underestimated children’s performance (Beck & Riggs, 2014). Nyhout and Ganea (2019) 
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reopened the discussion in their study which reported that given a clear and novel causal 
structure four to five-year olds can reason about causally-over determined events and display 
adult-like counterfactual reasoning. Causally-over determined scenarios being the same as a 
doubly-determined scenarios – children are essentially presented with two antecedent actions 
where both will result in the same causal outcomes. The researchers use a physical-causal 
paradigm and ague that tasks like those used in Rafetseder, Schwitalla, and Perner (2013) may 
have mischaracterized the causal structure of the events children were representing. In their 
study, the researchers used a blicket-detector machine which is a box with four light bulbs and 
four blocks that are causally linked to the bulbs being lighted. Four differently coloured blocks 
were placed in front of the box, two of the blocks cause all the light bulbs to be switched on 
and two of the blocks caused nothing to happen – none of the light bulbs get switched on. 
Children were shown over-determined and single-determined trials and four to five year olds 
answered all the different types of counterfactual questions with a high degree of accuracy 
which led the researchers to conclude that children could over-ride prepotent basic conditional 
reasoning in favour of counterfactual reasoning (Nyhout & Ganea, 2019).  
 
Conclusion. The evidence shows that although children are generally able to reason from false 
premises, in recent times research has focused on when children can use adult-like or mature 
counterfactual reasoning. The benchmark for successful mature counterfactual reasoning is to 
hold in mind and contrast two worlds – the real and possible world and integrate the contents 
of the counterfactual premise into the possible world to arrive at the correct answer to the 
counterfactual question posed. Merely showing that children are able to reason with premises 
that are known to be false has been criticised on the basis that children’s success can be equally 
attributed to basic conditional reasoning that is where real world plausible answers result in the 
same answer as the counterfactual response  (Beck & Riggs, 2014; Rafetseder et al., 2010; 
Rafetseder & Perner, 2010). In such contexts, it becomes hard to distinguish whether children 
have actually taken into account the counterfactual premise or simply relied on a plausible 
answer. For children to reason counterfactually, they must appreciate that at a specific point in 
the past two possible worlds diverged because of a single causal event. Hence, one possible 
world is understanding the causal relation between a specific past event and its subsequent 
outcome, and the other possible world is understanding that had that specific past event been 
different, another outcome would have ensued (the counterfactual) (Beck & Riggs, 2014). This 
is also referred to as the application of the nearest possible world constraint. Rafetseder, 
Schwitalla, and Perner (2013) aptly describes it as one assuming that the counterfactual world 
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is exactly like the real world except for the facts that are incompatible with the false premise 
and changing only the facts that depend causally on the counterfactual premise. According to 
Beck and Riggs (2014), it is relating these two possible worlds that children find challenging.  
 
 
2.3.4 Levels of Counterfactual Thinking  
The contrasts in studies from the counterfactual reasoning literature make it clear that mature 
counterfactual reasoning is a complex higher order thinking skill with multi-tiered layers of 
development. In response to the complexities of counterfactual reasoning, Beck, Riggs, and 
Burns (2011) argue that there is not one critical development that should be thought of as 
marking children’s ability to engage in counterfactual reasoning, but rather a sequence of (at 
least) four developments or types of thinking taking place from early to middle childhood 
which include: generating alternative worlds, representing falsity as if it were true, representing 
multiple possibilities, and comparing multiple possibilities. Beck, Riggs, and Burns (2011) 
describes these types of thinking in the following way: 
1. Generating alternative worlds. According to Beck, Riggs, and Burns (2011) children 
can think about future hypotheticals by ignoring the current state of affairs and 
imagining an alternative. The researchers refer to the example from Riggs, Peterson, 
Robinson, and Mitchell (1998) which involved a sorting game where pieces of paper 
with pictures on them were sorted into one tray and blank papers went into another tray. 
Three and four year old children were asked counterfactual questions after a picture had 
been drawn on a piece of paper and it had been sorted, ‘If I had not drawn on the piece 
of paper, which box would it be in?’ and they were asked future hypothetical questions 
before a picture had been drawn, ‘If I draw on this piece of paper, which box will it go 
into?’ In both cases the child has to ignore the current state of affairs (whether or not 
the paper has a picture on it) and imagine an alternative. Three and four-year-old 
children found it much easier to answer the future hypothetical question than the 
counterfactual. The onset of pretend play precedes when we know that children can 
entertain future hypotheticals and is the earliest sign of an ability to entertain 
alternative, non-real worlds or of an imaginative capacity in general. 
 
2. Representing falsity as if it were true. Beck, Riggs, and Burns (2011) explain that the 
difference between thinking about a counterfactual event and a future hypothetical 
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event is that the counterfactual event imagined is known to be false. In a counterfactual 
condition the child thinks about something that contradicts what they know to be true 
but in the future hypotheticals the child does not know the true state of affairs. We know 
that children start to answer explicit counterfactual conditional questions correctly at 
around three to four years of age. Children start to make reference to counterfactual 
worlds in their spontaneous speech at about the same time and begin describing ‘what 
if’ something had happened (Kuczaj & Daly, 1979). Beck, Riggs, and Burns (2011) 
refer to the experiments by Riggs, Peterson, Robinson, and Mitchell (1998) and 
Guajardo and Turley-Ames (2004). For example, in Riggs, et al.’s (1998) paper, in one 
of their stories, Peter is at home in bed when he receives a phone call asking him to go 
help put out a fire at the Post Office. Once he is there the counterfactual conditional 
question is, ‘If there had been no fire, where would Peter be?’ Riggs et al. found 
substantial improvements between three and four years on these types of tasks. Children 
stopped giving realist answers, that Peter would be in the Post Office, and instead began 
to give counterfactual answers, that he would still be in bed. Children are also 
successful at generating new alternatives for example, Guajardo and Turley-Ames 
(2004) found similar developments occurred between the ages of three and five as 
children in their study were able to answer consequent counterfactual conditional 
questions, such as the one above about Peter and the fire, which require generating 
multiple counterfactual antecedents. For example, if a character walks through mud, 
comes in to the house, and makes the floor dirty it is possible to imagine many different 
answers to the question “What could you have done so the kitchen floor would not have 
gotten dirty?” such as not walking through the mud, taking the boots off, wiping her 
feet. Most studies find that children’s performance on these types of questions improved 
between three and five years. Pretence is also a case of ‘what is being imagined is 
known to be false’ in that a false representation is knowingly imposed on a real-world 
object by pretending that an object is something else.  
 
3. Representing multiple possibilities. Beyond, children being able to answer explicit 
questions about counterfactual worlds prompted both by counterfactual antecedents 
(Riggs et al., 1998) and counterfactual consequents (Guajardo & Turley-Ames, 2004); 
there is good evidence that at least two further developments occur. According to their 
reasoning, Beck, Riggs, and Burns (2011) argue that there is no evidence that four year-
olds who answer counterfactual conditionals such as those used by Riggs et. al. (1998) 
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are thinking about two possibilities in the manner of ‘dual possibilities’ that is, hold in 
mind both the counterfactual possibility and the actual possibility as described by Byrne 
(2016). A similar proposal is presented by Rafetseder and Perner (2010) who argue that 
four-year olds who answer counterfactual conditionals correctly may only be using 
hypothetical reasoning and unlike adults, may not be constraining their thinking based 
on the real world. For example, in a game used by Beck, Robinson, Carrol, and Apperly 
(2006) children saw a toy mouse run down a slide that split in two halfway down. Once 
the mouse was at the bottom of the slide children were asked the counterfactual 
questions, either ‘What if he had gone the other way, where would he be?’ (standard 
counterfactual conditional) or ‘Could he have gone anywhere else?’ (the new open 
counterfactual). On undetermined trials the mouse waited at the top of the slide and 
children were asked to put out mats to ensure that he was caught at the bottom. The 
correct cautious response was to put out two mats, implicitly acknowledging that the 
mouse could go either way. The common incorrect response was to place only one mat. 
Children found the counterfactual conditional questions significantly easier to answer 
than the open counterfactuals. What’s more, they found it relatively difficult to use two 
mats to cover the two possible outcomes in the undetermined trials. For both younger 
(three and four-year-olds) and older (five and six-year olds), performance on open 
counterfactuals and undetermined trials were not different to each other, but both were 
significantly worse than performance on the standard trials. The results imply that in 
standard counterfactual conditions children’s reasoning may not incorporate actively 
holding in mind as possibilities  what happened and what could have happened (Beck, 
Riggs, et al., 2011). Dual possibilities can be looked at as a constraint which forms part 
of the counterfactual scenario which dictates the parameters of the likely possibilities 
within a given counterfactual. Pretence may observe similar constraints, especially, in 
social contexts where the pretender applies rules to set boundaries for the imaginative 
adventure which may involve some negotiation among the agents participating in the 
play. The difference is that within a specified counterfactual reasoning context the 
boundaries are more often fixed (given there are correct and incorrect responses) that 
are not tenable for negotiation. In solitary pretence, when the premise of the pretence 
is not shared there is an impression that the imaginary possibilities are unconstrained. 
 
4. Comparing multiple possibilities. These refer to not only holding multiple possibilities 
in mind, but also making a comparison between reality and what could have happened 
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(Beck, Riggs, et al., 2011). An example used by Beck, Riggs, and Burns (2011) presents 
a scenario of given a choice between two envelopes and the one chosen contains ten 
pounds then you will be pleased. However, it is likely the choice would be re-evaluated 
upon learning that the unchosen envelope contained one hundred pounds. Beck, Riggs, 
and Burns (2011) suggest that this comparison between the actual and counterfactual 
world suggests that understanding counterfactual emotions may more cognitively 
demanding that thinking about counterfactuals as possibilities. In one study, Weisberg 
and Beck (2010) used a task in which children chose between one of two boxes and 
won a number of stickers. They found that children as young as five showed some 
evidence of regret, but relief was not seen until the age of seven. When children watched 
another person play the game; they did not attribute counterfactual emotions.  
 
Additionally, alongside counterfactual emotion tasks, reasoning from holding multiple 
possibilities as alternatives to the real-world in other contexts is generally challenging. 
An example is from Rafetseder, Crisit-Vargas, and Perner (2010) sweet-story task 
explained in the section 2.3.3 on developmental trajectory of counterfactual reasoning 
on page 47. Children must keep in mind the real world – where mother places the 
sweets, and compare the real world to multiple possibilities in the counterfactual world 
– if the sweets are on the top shelf the little girl cannot reach the sweet so it remains on 
the top shelf as she cannot take it to her room, if the sweets are on the bottom shelf the 
little girl can reach the sweet and can therefore take it to her room, or if the tall boy 
came first he would be able to reach the sweets irrespective of their location so he could 
carry the sweets to his room, hence the little girl would not be able to take the sweets 
to her room. Children struggled with answering correctly in the final condition.  
 
Generally, children are in control of the hypothetical possibilities in their imaginary 
worlds and they are not usually asked to compare and reason across the multiple 
possibilities that they generate. According to Amsel & Smalley (2000) children specify 
the true and pretend identities of objects noncontingently, asymmetrically, and do not 
necessarily form and retrieve a counterfactual proposition. 
 
Conclusion. From Beck, Riggs, and Burns (2011) account of levels of counterfactual reasoning, 
children between the ages of three to five are generally able to ‘generate alternative worlds’ 
and ‘represent falsity as true’. They begin to show success at ‘representing multiple 
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possibilities’ and ‘comparing multiple possibilities’ but the results are tenuous at best. The 
suggestion is that children show mastery on representing and comparing multiple possibilities 
after the age of six.  
 
From the preceding discussion in this section, it is clear that counterfactual reasoning is a broad 
construct inferred from specific milestones or levels of counterfactual thinking observed in 
development. In recent times, researchers like Rafetseder and Perner (2010) contend that these 
early developmental milestones differ from mature adult-like counterfactual reasoning and 
question whether they should count as true counterfactual reasoning. This argument makes a 
valuable contribution to our understanding of the construct of counterfactual reasoning and 
makes a strong case for thinking carefully about inferences made about counterfactual 
reasoning throughout (lifespan) development and across different measures used to help us 
define the construct. Given our understanding of child development and for the purpose of this 
study which aims to contrast counterfactual reasoning to pretence during the early years of 
child development; early years milestones or levels of counterfactual reasoning need to be 
studied in order to allow appropriate comparisons across the two constructs. For these reasons, 
in this study, I view counterfactual reasoning as a broad construct and whichever levels of 
counterfactual thinking that are measured (potentially inclusive of basic conditional reasoning 















2.3.5 Measuring Counterfactual Reasoning 
To elicit counterfactual reasoning in young children, researchers have generally used two types 
of tasks – social-causal tasks which are heavily narrated and physical-causal tasks which 
require children to act on objects within a causal sequence paradigm.  The narrative element of 
social-causal tasks are criticised for not being fully transparent leading children to make 
unwarranted inferences about the events in question (Nyhout & Ganea, 2019). The concern is 
whether counterfactual tasks using social-causal structures do enough to ensure children’s 
comprehension of the causal structure is correct and sufficient to answer counterfactual 
questions if children possessed the ability to do so (Nyhout & Ganea, 2019). Similar criticisms 
have been levied at physical-causal tasks like that of McCormack, Ho, Gribben, O’Connor, and 
Hoerl (2018) for the learning demands from having to learn a number of rules about how a 
device functioned on the basis that having to learn too many rules might equally affect 
children’s representation of a causal structure.  
 
Notwithstanding, the short stories use in social-causal tasks may describe events occurring in 
the physical environment or be about emotions rather than having an environmental component 
(Guajardo, Parker, & Turley-Ames, 2009). One thing common across these tasks is that 
counterfactual scenarios present a conflict between the stated premise and the actual state of 
affairs (Rafetseder et al., 2010). Participants are generally required to respond to a subjunctive 
question which is usually close-ended for which the likely answer is known or as is typically 
done with adults an open-ended question to encourage divergent responses. The responses on 
counterfactual reasoning tasks are assessed by looking at the respondents’ ability to produce a 
counterfactual response. Further evaluation may take into account the structure (upward or 
downward) and direction (additive or subtractive) of the counterfactual response (Guajardo et 
al., 2009).  
 
Counterfactual reasoning tasks which were used in early counterfactual reasoning studies are 
now referred to as tasks of basic conditional reasoning, for example, a scenario where a child 
is asked “If Carol were walking with dirty shoes on the clean floor, would the floor be dirty or 
clean?”. Such tasks are referred to as tasks of basic conditional reasoning because it has been 
found that such counterfactual reasoning questions may be answered using basic conditional 
reasoning, that is, ignoring the subjunctive premise and simply providing plausible answers. 
The criticism of tasks of basic conditional reasoning is they demonstrate an ability to entertain 
counterfactual states but often the tasks do not require the respondent to take into account a 
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nearest possible world option where the conditional contradicts a corresponding fact, like “if 
before Carol entered the room with her dirty shoes her brother had already messed up the floor 
with his dirty shoes, would the floor be dirty or clean?”. Basic conditional tasks can be 
answered correctly without requiring the respondent to keep in mind the real sequence of events 
when considering alternative possibilities (Rafetseder et al., 2010). The point is in basic 
conditional reasoning children may arrive at the correct response by relying on what they 
typically know about the world.  
 
 There has also been focus on real-world counterfactual tasks designed to encourage children 
to integrate the reality of the given scenario into their counterfactual assumptions. Such tasks 
are pitched to determine whether children apply the levels of counterfactual thinking previously 
described in section 2.3.4 – dual thinking and holding multiple possibilities in mind. One 
example is an open counterfactual task which checked whether children could pinpoint when 
in a given scenario an alternative possibility could have occurred, that is, keep dual possibilities 
in mind (Beck et al., 2006). The open counterfactual task assesses whether children think about 
counterfactual and actual events as two separate possibilities, dual possibilities, that could once 
have happened such that the counterfactual was a possibility that could have replaced an actual 
event. Open counterfactuals require children to directly compare between the actual and 
counterfactual outcomes in a given scenario (Beck & Crilly, 2009). According to Beck, 
Robinson, Carrol, and Apperly (2006) children find standard counterfactual questions easier 
than the open.  
 
Other counterfactual tasks include nearest possible world tasks which go one step further by 
checking whether children can answer a counterfactual subjunctive question about a past event 
correctly when a basic conditional reasoning approach will produce a wrong answer. Nearest 
possible world tasks are designed to ensure that respondents keep active the real sequence of 
events that is being counterfactually altered (Rafetseder et al., 2010). These counterfactual 
tasks are based on the Lewis (1973) nearest possible world constraint argument that in 
reasoning counterfactually the alternative needs to be maximally similar to the real scenario 
and stay logically consistent or else everything would follow from the premise (Rafetseder & 
Perner, 2010). This is a basis of adult-like counterfactual reasoning; hence such tasks are used 
to assess the extent to which children’s early years counterfactual reasoning reflect adult-like 
counterfactual reasoning.  Nearest possible world tasks require the respondent to make only 
logically or causally necessary changes to the actual event to arrive at the counterfactual 
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alternative (Rafetseder et al., 2010). The researchers assessed variations of conditional 
reasoning including whether linking the counterfactual information to actual events is of 
critical difficulty for children (Perner et al., 2004). Such tasks are a response to the argument 
that counterfactual tasks should require children to remember or know the contents of the 
counterfactual scenario to answer a counterfactual question and not rely on their own empirical 
knowledge of the world. A result is that children younger than six years old find nearest 
possible world tasks the most difficult. One explanation is that the increased complexity 
requires greater processing and memory capacity which may exceed that of young children 

























2.4.0 Evidencing the Link Between Pretence and Counterfactual Reasoning 
In this section, the previous independent descriptions of pretence and counterfactual reasoning 
will be used to show how the two concepts are related, why they should be studied in tandem 
and the factors that should be taken into consideration towards this goal. The researcher will 
illustrate the similarities and differences between pretence and counterfactual reasoning as a 
way of clarifying the proposal that the two are related cognitive processes. The subsequent 
comparisons between pretence and counterfactual reasoning are drawn from the preceding 
discussions of the defining features, cognitive mechanisms, developmental trajectory and 
assessment approaches of each.  
 
2.4.1 Mental Representations of Reality  
At the core of the ability to engage in either pretence or counterfactual reasoning is the basic 
cognitive capability to generate mental representations of the world. Mental representations are 
cognitive structures that both represent one’s general knowledge about a given concept or 
stimulus domain and one’s memory for specific experiences (Fiske & Taylor, 2013). Pretence 
involves mental representation of behaviours or actions that are not meant to literally reflect 
reality (Weisberg, 2015). Counterfactual reasoning is the mental simulation of alternatives to 
reality (Bacon et al., 2013). According to cognitive psychology information processing theory, 
all cognitive understandings of the world are a collection of mental representations that we 
form to depict our interactions with the world. Leslie (1987) explained that the mental 
representations that underpin our pretence are built through our perceptual processes, and 
Byrne (2016) proposed that during counterfactual reasoning we take as input the relevant facts 
of actual events. Both are grounded in reality; hence, mental representations are definitional to 
both pretence and counterfactual reasoning.  
 
2.4.2 Alternative Representations of Reality 
 When pretence is observed in its action form, pretend play, it has been called an ‘as-if’ 
orientation to actions, objects and verbalization (Smith, 2009). During pretend play an ‘as-if’ 
orientation would manifest as actions that are not meant to literally represent reality, for 
example pretending that a doll is drinking tea. People also represent reality in alternate ways 
during counterfactual reasoning when they consider inaccessible things by focusing on ‘what-
ifs and comparing what they know to be true with what might have been for example, a child 
wondering what they would play with if their doll was taken away (Beck & Riggs, 2014; Riggs 
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& Peterson, 2000). The ‘as-if’, imaginative process of pretend play, is thought to be similar to 
‘what-if’ tendencies generated during counterfactual reasoning. It is this similarity that is the 
crux of postulations that pretence and counterfactual reasoning are similar cognitive processes 
because during both pretence and counterfactual reasoning an agent conjures up an imaginary 
or hypothetical version of the world (Perner, 1991).  
 
Grounded in a Premise. As part of this process, both pretence and counterfactual reasoning 
theorists make clear that the process of generating hypotheticals is preceded by establishing a 
premise about the world. Nichols and Stich (2000) stressed that all typical joint-pretend play 
scenarios begin with a premise (or premises) which gets the pretence started and is the basis 
by which appropriate thoughts and actions are generated. Similarly, a counterfactual thought 
emanates from a premise, or what is sometimes termed a conditional statement for example, 
“What if Tom hadn’t called his dad, would Tom be happy or sad? (Amsel & Smalley, 2000; 
Roese & Morrison, 2009). In typical assessments of pretend play and counterfactual reasoning, 
researchers set up the premise.  
 
In naturalistic settings and for typically developing children, pretend play is a spontaneous 
enterprise involving; (a) elaborate scripts, (b) themes that change often, and its playful aspect 
is characterized by; (a) flexibility, (b) positive affect and (c) long-term, intense, intrinsic 
motivation, and (d) meta-communicative behaviours (Bergen, 2013; Lillard et al., 2013). On 
this basis, investigations of children’s pretend play are criticized for being simulated, and by 
virtue, are considered inadequate representation of children’s natural, spontaneous pretend play 
interactions. According to Bergen (2013), laboratory simulated pretend play is a far cry from 
adults’ recollection of their memorable pretend play engagements when they were young 
which; (a) were often private and occurred outside the knowledge and influence of adults, (b) 
had few restrictions on the materials used (c) had flexibility in theme direction, (d) gave them 
an intrinsic feeling of player control and motivation. Further criticism levelled includes: (a) 
adults are highly visible and directive of the pretend play, (b) children are unfamiliar with the 
researcher and do not feel like pretending, and (c) limited time or objects are made available 
for pretence (Bergen, 2013).  
 
These are legitimate criticisms but are often practically impossible to overcome using theory 
driven research paradigms since objective and replicable assessments of pretend play require 
that researchers set up the pretence premise or play frame. To some extent, some standardised 
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assessments overcome such criticisms by (a) lessening the role of the researcher, (b) providing 
reasonable lengths of child initiated pretend play encounters will range from fifteen to thirty 
minutes, (c) tap into children’s motivation by encouraging them to initiate the pretend, (d) use 
of conventional toys and unstructured play materials to encourage diverse themes in pretence, 
and (e) offer diverse play materials (Stagnitti, 2007 based on the CHIPPA manual). 
 
On the other hand, counterfactual reasoning researchers agree that children’s counterfactual 
thoughts are by and large different from real world, adult-like counterfactual reasoning because 
real world counterfactual reasoning skills are advanced cognitive skills used to learn from past 
mistakes and regulate emotions like regret; skills which are slow to develop during the early 
years of development. In contrast to pretence, counterfactual reasoning researchers are more 
focused on interpretations of the processing demands of the task (refer to the discussion on 
levels of counterfactual reasoning) hence, counterfactual reasoning tasks are highly structured.  
 
Hypothetical or Imaginary Ideas. Premises are the platform from which hypothetical ideas are 
generated. When children engage in pretence or counterfactual reasoning, they construct non-
literal mental representations, that is, imaginary worlds that differ from what holds in reality. 
Some researchers posit that any alternative to a reality is actually a counterfactual and children 
in pretend contexts reason counterfactually by virtue of creating a reality that is an alternative 
to the one known or believed to be true (Amsel & Smalley, 2000; Perner, 1991). In a book 
chapter entitled, ‘Beyond really and truly: Children’s counterfactual thinking about pretend 
and possible worlds’, Amsel & Smalley (2000) argued, playing pretend and pondering 
possibilities (counterfactual reasoning) are close relatives in the reasoning family like siblings 
who may be different but nonetheless share a common underlying nature. According to Amsel 
and Smalley (2000) two distinct levels of cognitive processing can explain how children reason 
counterfactually in pretend contexts: 
1. Low-level processing of pretend information – the manner by which information regarding 
true and false states of affairs is represented and managed.  
2. Higher-level understanding of pretence – when or if young children conceive of pretence 
in terms of thoughts of a pretender. 
This classification reiterates that pretence and counterfactual reasoning develop along a 
continuum of representational ability and representational understanding (refer section 2.2.3 
on developmental trajectory of pretence and section 2.3.3 on developmental trajectory of 
counterfactual reasoning). What’s more, Amsel and Smalley (2000) proposal is also quite 
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similar to Beck, Riggs, and Burns (2011) multiple development of counterfactual reasoning 
(see Table 2.2). However, the difference between pretence and counterfactual reasoning may 
lie in that, when children play pretend, false states of affairs are created from true ones as 
playful alternatives, but when they ponder possibilities (counterfactuals), the false state of 
affairs are copied and edited versions of true ones which are seriously compared to and 
contrasted with true ones (Amsel & Smalley, 2000). 
 
 
Table 2.1 A Comparison of the Levels of Cognitive Processing in Pretence and CFR 
Amsel and Smalley (2000) Beyond really and 
truly: Children’s counterfactual thinking about 
pretend and possible worlds 
Beck, Riggs, and Burns (2011) Multiple 
developments in counterfactual thinking 
Low level processing of pretend information generate alternative worlds 
represent falsity as true 
Higher Level understanding of pretence representing multiple possibilities 
comparing multiple possibilities 
 
 
Conclusion. Pretence and counterfactual reasoning are comparable cognitive skills. Both are 
mental state concepts that involve generating alternative representations of reality. To achieve 
this cognitive feat, an alternative representation is grounded in a real-world premise from which 
becomes foundational to the imaginary, hypothetical ideas generated. Children’s ability to 
reason between true and false state of affairs develop progressively as they develop. There is 
also the expectation that other general cognitive abilities like language and domain-general 









2.3.3 Links with Language  
 In order to make inferences about children’s hypothetical world, cognitive researchers must 
be able to observe it. In child development research, inferences about a child’s capacity for 
pretence are indexed from their pretend play behaviours which are usually punctuated with a 
lot of talk and decisions about a child’s capacity for counterfactual reasoning is elicited through 
oral means (sometimes older participants are asked to write out their counterfactual thoughts)5. 
Language also involves mental representation and is critical aspect of child development. 
Therefore, language is an inherent factor in assessments of pretend play and counterfactual 
reasoning, and it should be accounted for in statistical analyses of pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning because differences in children’s language ability are found to affect how children 
perform on measures of pretence and counterfactual reasoning.  
 
Receptive language, the ability to understand or comprehend language heard or read and 
expressive language, being able to put thoughts into words and sentences, in a way that makes 
sense and is grammatically accurate, are important to pretence and counterfactual reasoning. 
In a validation study which assessed children’s symbolic ability during pretend play (Test of 
Pretend Play-TOPP), when age was partial out, the partial correlation between ToPP scores 
and language scores remained statistically significant r (56) = 0.36, p = 0.003. (Language scores 
were derived from the language subtest of the FirstSTEP Miller (1993) which is a screening 
assessment, used to identify children who may be at risk of developmental delay).  
 
The influence of language on pretence is substantiated by (Lewis et al., 2000) who examined 
the relationships between functional play, symbolic play, non-verbal ability, and expressive 
and receptive language in normally developing children aged between one and six years using 
standardized assessment procedures and found that when effects of chronological age were 
partialled out, symbolic play remained significantly correlated with both expressive and 
receptive language, but not with functional play or non-verbal ability; and functional play was 
only correlated significantly with expressive language. Similarly, Beck et al. (2010) found 
children with low receptive vocabulary find counterfactual reasoning tasks difficult. 
 
 
5 Bauchsbaum et al. (2012) children are engaged in a pretend play manipulation and then asked counterfactual 
questions; Bacon, Walsh & Martin (2013) asked participants to write a free narrative of their thoughts  
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2.4.4 Links with Executive Functions 
 Domain-general Executive Function skills also share strong links with both pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning. Executive Functions (EFs) are higher order, self-regulatory cognitive 
processes that aid in the monitoring and control of thought and action by enabling individuals 
to override more automatic or established responses (Beck, Carroll, Brunsdon, & Gryg, 2011; 
Garon, Bryson, & Smith, 2008). Executive Functions comprises several cognitive dimensions 
but the most common skills, identified from confirmatory factor analysis techniques were 
working memory, inhibition, and cognitive-flexibility. Working Memory (WM) require 
holding information in mind, updating and manipulating that information; inhibition involves 
withholding or restraint of a motor response; and cognitive-flexibility involves shifting from 
one ‘mental set’ to another (Garon et al., 2008). Research using confirmatory factor analysis 
found all three executive functions to be consistently, partially independent but still correlated 
with each other over separate age groups (Beck, Carroll, et al., 2011; Garon et al., 2008). 
 
 
2.4.5 Overview of Research Involving Pretence, Counterfactual Reasoning, Theory of 
Mind, Language and Executive Functions  
Several researchers have investigated the relationship between pretence or counterfactual 
reasoning with theory of mind, language, and executive functions. A correlational study by 
Nielsen and Dissanayake (2000) which aimed to investigate the association between false 
belief comprehension, the exhibition of pretend play, and the use of mental state terms in pre-
school children found that for three to four-year olds certain components of pretence, like 
object substitution and role assignment, were related to false belief understanding. A limitation 
of the study, however, is that the researchers did not control for language when general 
language development have been found to be associated with false belief. Another study by 
Schwebel, Rosen, and Singer (1999) who observed children during naturalistic spontaneous 
play and tested their ability to differentiate appearance and reality, and to understand false 
belief concluded that make-believe play develops concurrently with children’s understanding 
of multiple representational tasks.  
 
Guajardo and Turley-Ames (2004) examined associations between theory of mind and 
counterfactual reasoning using both antecedent and consequent tasks among three, four and 
five-year-old children. They found that the generation of specific types of counterfactual 
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reasoning statements and overall counterfactual reasoning as a whole accounted for significant 
variance in children’s theory of mind performance beyond age and language. In another study 
aimed at clarifying their previous work on associations between counterfactual reasoning and 
false belief, Guajardo, Parker, and Turley-Ames (2009) determined whether these two 
variables are related and if so, if executive function skills mediate the relationship. The 
researchers tested three, four, and five-year-old children and concluded that counterfactual 
reason accounted for limited unique variance in false belief, both working memory and 
representational flexibility mediated the relationship between counterfactual reasoning and 
false belief, and language partially accounts for the relationship between counterfactual 
reasoning and false belief. Additionally, Beck, Riggs, and Gorniak (2009) tested three and four-
year old children and found; that inhibitory control predicted performance on counterfactual 
reasoning tasks, suggesting that the difficulty three to four-year olds have with counterfactual 
reasoning is ignoring what they know to be true. There was no evidence that working memory 
was related to the development of counterfactual reasoning, and there was a strong relationship 
between language (receptive vocabulary) and counterfactual reasoning. Despite Beck, Riggs, 
and Gorniak’s (2009) findings about working memory, the argument that representing a 
counterfactual alongside the true state of affairs stretches the mental resources of many 
preschool children to their limits and the demands on working memory during a counterfactual 
reasoning task could be too great for a young child, even though a matched hypothetical can 
be within their capacity is quite plausible (Byrne, 2016; Robinson & Beck, 2000).  
 
It is not uncommon to also consider whether there are gender differences in children’s abilities 
across these different variables. Some studies report that girls engage in pretend play more than 
boys whereas others studies report that there is no effect of gender (Jing & Li, 2015).  A study 
by Carlson, White, & Davis-Unger (2014) exploring the relationship between executive 
function and pretence representation in preschool children reported no gender differences on 
these measures. Similarly, studies of counterfactual reasoning have also reported no effect of 
gender (Beck, Schaefer, Pang, & Carlson, 2011; Beck, Riggs, & Gorniak, 2009). It would be 





2.4.6 Empirical Studies of Pretence and Counterfactual Reasoning 
There are several notable observations and findings from the study of pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning to date.  Firstly, the study of pretence predates the study of 
counterfactual reasoning in young children, as a consequence, most of the research in the two 
areas has proceeded independently. Counterfactual reasoning research has largely explored the 
structure of counterfactuals, under what conditions different types of counterfactuals are 
generated and when are children able to generate and reason from counterfactuals.  In 
psychology, the study of pretence and pretend play has a longer history but a recent review by 
Lillard, Lerner, Hopkins, Dore, Smith, & Palmquist (2013) raised a call for better research 
exploring the role of pretence or pretend play in children’s development. A result from the call 
is a proposal purporting a possible developmental link between pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning and the suggestion that since pretend play may function as an opportunity to practice 
the cognitive skills associated with counterfactual reasoning (refer to the discussion on the role 
of pretence in section 2.2.3 developmental trajectory of pretence). A few theoretical papers 
have been written expounding on the theory of a unified framework of pretence (Gopnik & 
Walker, 2013; Walker & Gopnik, 2013b, 2013a; D.S. Weisberg & Gopnik, 2013) but there is 
only one empirical paper that reports an investigation of the direct relationship between 
pretence and counterfactual reasoning (Buchsbaum, Bridgers, Weisberg, & Gopnik, 2012). 
This present study, therefore, aims to explore the potential relationship observed between 
pretence and counterfactual reasoning further.  
 
The study by Buchsbaum et al. (2012) entitled “The power of possibility: causal learning, 
counterfactual reasoning and pretend play” investigated the correlational link between pretend 
play and counterfactual reasoning by asking three to four-year-old children to reason about a 
causal model. The researchers reported that to their knowledge there had been no previous 
empirical demonstration that pretence and counterfactual reasoning were specifically related 
in development. The children were taught a novel causal relationship and were then encouraged 
to engage in a pretend game to see if they would maintain and act on this relationship in the 
context of an imaginary world. The researchers found that children’s pretence scores 
significantly correlated with their counterfactual scores and remained significant even when 
controlling for age. Seventy-one percent of the children engaged in spontaneous elaboration 
and forty-four percent engaged in extended pretence. Since, the experiment was aimed at 
drawing conclusions about children’s causal reasoning; it was replicated with the Piagetian 
conservation task included along with an executive function (EF) - Stroop task (day-night task) 
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to assess inhibition. The findings from the second experiment were consistent with the first. 
However, no correlations were found between children’s performance on the conservation task 
with age, pretence or counterfactuals. Children’s performance on the day-night task correlated 
their age but not with pretence or counterfactual reasoning. The relationship between 
counterfactual reasoning and pretence remained significant after controlling for EF, age and 
conservation. Buchsbaum, Bridgers, Weisberg, and Gopnik (2012) concluded that their 
findings suggested: (a) a link between pretence and counterfactual thinking, (b) that pretence 
provides an opportunity for children to practice and perfect the skills of reasoning, and (c) that 
when children are given new information about a causal system, they made similar inferences 
when they considered counterfactuals about the system and when they engaged in pretend play 
with the system. The findings from Buchsbaum, et al.’s (2012) study provided valuable 
preliminary evidence for further testing the relationship between pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning at a latent level to determine whether an underlying capacity might underpin this 
observed relationship.  
 
Conclusion. Much of the research into pretence has focused on children’s engagement in 
pretend play versus when they develop a meta-representational understanding of pretence. 
There is now conclusive evidence that engagement in pretend play precedes having a meta-
representational understanding of pretence. Towards affirming the distinction between 
pretence as representational and meta-representational, it is interesting that there seems to be 
consensus that children’s early pretend play behaviours are pretence in and of itself as long as 
it meets the criterion of contrasting reality. It might therefore be appropriate to conclude that 
both naïve pretence and sophisticated counterfactual reasoning are achieved by alternatively 
representing reality. Children begin to pretend from eighteen months but the capacity for 
counterfactual reasoning is not ascribed to them until later (over three years old at least). It 
appears that the quality of a child’s pretence representations and counterfactual reasoning skills 
are dependent on their cognitive maturation. Moreover, it would seem that counterfactual 
reasoning mirrors the cognitive skill of pretence and that both depend on a capacity mentally 
represent true worlds as false. However, at this point the theoretical trail runs cold as empirical 
evidence is required before more can be said about the extent and nature of the links shared by 






2.5.0 Theory of Pretence and Counterfactual reasoning  
The preceding sections of this chapter have laid the foundation for explaining the basis upon 
which claims have been made that pretence and counterfactual reasoning are associated 
cognitive skills. The discussion delved into the cognitive structure of pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning separately to observe commonalities between the two and used the 
common features identified to justify why pretence and counterfactual reasoning may be 
associated cognitive skills. This section responds to the claims proposed in the unified theory 
of pretence and counterfactual reasonings. Several researchers like Amsel and Smalley (2000), 
Buchsbaum, Bridgers, Weisberg, and Gopnik (2012), Walker and Gopnik (2013), Weisberg 
(2015), and Weisberg and Gopnik (2013) have suggested that a shared underlying cognitive 
mechanism might be responsible for the observed associations shared by pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning but they provide little explanation of what this underlying cognitive 
mechanism might be or what form it might take.  
 
In this section, I draw on information processing and computational theories of cognition to 
outline a theoretical argument that specifies what could be meant by the idea that an underlying 
cognitive representational ability underpins pretence and counterfactual reasoning or that the 
two may share cognitive mechanisms. I draw on a cognitive model developed by Amsel & 
Smalley (2000) that outlines a model of counterfactual reasoning about possibilities which 
involve processes of representing the real world as a false premise, holding dual representations 
in mind, reasoning from false premises. Discrepancies in children’s success at reasoning from 
false premises are influenced by children’s developmental understanding of the 
representational mind. I contend that current explanations of dual representations in pretence 
and counterfactual reasoning can be applied across all contexts of hypothetical thinking, 
including, pretence and counterfactual reasoning. I suggest that the common underlying 
mechanism attributed to pretence and counterfactual reasoning may be a general capacity for 
imaginary representations which is relied on to evoke the kinds of representations involved in 
hypothetical thinking about imaginary worlds. This imaginative capacity links with other 
domain general executive control cognitive skills. I propose that a connectionist view of the 
computational mind provides the best explanation for the developmental differences between 




2.5.1 Dual Representation System 
An initial proposal conceptualizing the link between pretence and counterfactual reasoning by 
showing how true and false state of affairs are mentally represented is proposed by Amsel & 
Smalley (2000).  The researchers gave a developmental account of the qualitative differences 
observed in children’s successes and challenges when mentally manipulating false premises 
about the real world. Amsel & Smalley (2000) presented a model of thinking about 
counterfactual possibilities which explained that information in counterfactual contexts are 
represented in dual mental models where information is represented as true state of affairs and 




Figure 2.6 A model of counterfactual reasoning about possibilities (from Amsel & Smalley, 
2000) 
 
According to Amsel and Smalley (2000) a mental representation of an event sequence is 
marked as ‘true state of affairs’ (event 1 – 4 based on the model), and a copied and edited 
version of that representation is generated such that a particular node is altered to become the  
representation of the ‘false state of affairs’ paralleling the true event sequence except for the 
altered event node (labelled ‘E’ in the diagram for edited). However, beyond editing a change 
in an event sequence, the consequences of the edited change must be imagined (depicted by a 
broken arrow to an event node labelled ‘I’ for imagined) and the imagined node is compared 
and contrasted with the corresponding event node in the true state of affairs such that the 
assessment of an actual state of affairs can be evaluated for a possible one (depicted by an 
arrow going from a false state of affairs to a true one). For both pre-schoolers or adults, the 
Illustration of Amsel & Smalley (2000) ‘Model of counterfactual reasoning about 




representational format is assumed to be the same and to involve copying an actual sequence 
of events, editing it by altering a specific event, then imagining the consequences of the edited 
change. However, pre-schoolers are unable to bring bear the evaluation (comparing and 
contrasting) from the false state of affairs on to the true state of affairs (Amsel & Smalley, 
2000). In other words, although the mechanism by which children and adults create alternative 
worlds in pretence and counterfactual reasoning contexts are similar; they are dissimilar in how 
information about the false state of affairs which could have occurred are used to evaluate the 
true state of affairs.  
 
Amsel and Smalley (2000) attribute children’s difficulty with reasoning from false premises to 
them having low-level pretend processing skills in the early years which eventually develops 
to higher-level understanding of pretence later in development. What this means is that 
children: (a) are able to encode an object’s true and pretend identity as separate representations; 
(b) are able to activate representations in memory but the two representations are unequally 
activated; (c) are able to link the two representations but the more salient or more strongly 
activated representation can be the most influential; (d) are not always successful at retrieving 
representations if they are decoupled and acted upon independently of each other (Amsel & 
Smalley, 2000). These levels of processing are similar to the related component cognitive skills 
that Weisberg and Gopnik (2013) identified – disengaging with current reality, making 
inferences about an alternative representation of reality, keeping this representation separate 
from reality. The discrepancy lies with children’s ability to successfully reason from the false 
premise and this is the key expectation of mature counterfactual reasoning. Specifically, 
children’s low-level processing appears as a difficulty in remembering both states of affairs in 
order to reason from the false premise. When children come to understand meta-representations 
or have the knowledge that false states are representational – intentionally created mental 
representations of false states of affairs instead of actions which simulate false states - the 
transition in children’s understanding that the false state of affairs is false, marks a shift towards 
a higher-order understanding of mental representations.  
 
This transition between low-level processing and higher-level understanding may explain why 
during their early years of development children struggle with understanding imagination as a 
representational state of mind across different contexts. For instance, the difficulty that children 
have at first with conceptualizing pretence as a mental representational state (Lillard, 1993b); 
with overcoming basic conditional reasoning (Rafetseder & Perner, 2010); or even with 
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understanding false beliefs (Lillard, 2001; Lillard & Flavell, 1992). Across these different 
contexts children generally begin to show mental state understanding from four years. In their 
arguments, Amsel and Smalley (2000) suggested that as children develop more powerful 
cognitive capacities and control systems more complex forms of counterfactual reasoning 
become possible while children’s spontaneous or naïve form of engaging in pretend play begins 
to dwindle. The development of more powerful cognitive capacities is attributed to maturation 
and control systems refer to domain general executive function skills like inhibition and 
working memory. Mental imagery is central to hypothetical thinking but the extent to it is 
required to integrate information between real and imagined worlds varies according to the 
reasoning demands of the task (Kulakova et al., 2013). I think Amsel and Smalley’s model 
does a good job of modelling how specific cognitive processes work together to generate 
alternatives to reality. 
 
 
2.5.2 Proposal for a General Underlying Imaginary Representative Capacity 
In Amsel and Smalley’s (2000) model of counterfactual reasoning about possibilities, the dual 
representation system identified that the false state of affairs is really an edited version of the 
true state of affairs that is imagined. The notion that pretence and counterfactual reasoning 
requires one to venture into an imaginative cognitive workspace is implicitly implied in the 
definitions of the two concepts discussed in sections 2.2.0 and 2.3.0. Pretence was defined as 
having to do with projecting an imaginary situation unto an real-world situation (Lillard, 
1993a) and counterfactual reasoning as imagined alternatives to reality (Byrne, 2016). Both 
pretence and counterfactual reasoning involve conjuring non-literal representations of the 
world which are essentially ‘imaginative representations’ of the world as it is perceived or 
experienced; making the ‘imagination’ the nucleus from which pretend play or counterfactual 
reasoning emanates.  
 
In this present study, I propose that the ‘imagination’ should have a more central feature in any 
discussion that involves generating alternatives to reality. One might argue that ‘imagining’ is 
an implicit feature given the references to ‘other possible worlds’, ‘hypothetical worlds’, or 
even ‘impossible worlds’ and in this context, what is important, is the juxtaposing of the real 
world to the imagined world. However, I think the ‘imagination’ needs to be more explicitly 
attended to in discussions like this one because it is the basis of all hypothetical thought. In 
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early conceptions of the imagination by David Hume in his writing Treatise of Human Nature 
he described the imagination as being free to join ideas together in any way it pleases but that 
it does not always join ideas at random and so implying that there were limitations on how free 
the imagination is (Warnock, 1976). Hume identified three defining features of the imagination 
– resemblance, contiguity in time or space and causal connexion. According to Warnock’s 
(1976) descriptions of Hume’s work, the imagination collects impressions of the world from 
memory to fill the gaps in our experiences and to bring lively and vivid ideas of our experiences 
to mind. Therein, the representational power of the imagination to allow us to form images, 
ideas, and likenesses in the mind contributes to our awareness of the world (Warnock, 1976). 
Clearly, the imagination has long been perceived as a hallmark of human cognition. In this 
present study, imagination is defined as a dynamic process by which one “‘leaves’ the here and 
now of a proximal experience to explore a distal experience in the past, future, or any 
alternative reality before ‘coming back’ to the here and now” (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016). This 
definition of imagination captures how pretence and counterfactual reasoning have been 
described in the literature review thus far; furthering the argument that the imagination plays a 
central role in our ability to think about alternatives to realities, more than has been 
acknowledged in discussions of concepts involved in generating possible worlds that are 
counterfactual to reality. In his book ‘Understanding Children’s worlds: The Work of the 
Imagination’ Harris (2000, p. xi) laid out an ontogenetic description of the human imagination 
and argued that “the capacity to imagine alternative possibilities and to work out their 
implications emerges early in the course of children’s development and lasts a lifetime”. 
Similarly, I am putting forward for consideration that the ability to imagine is the common 
denominator that comes up in all descriptions of hypothetical thinking and is the nexus 
underpinning our ability to represent true states of affairs as false ones.  
 
 
2.5.2.1 Contributions of Connectionist Perspective 
In section 2.4.2, I established that mental representations are definitional to understanding the 
cognitive mechanisms of pretence and counterfactual reasoning. This implies that imagination 
is a type of mental representation. One way of thinking about how representations work, that 
might be applicable to thinking about how an imaginary representative capacity might function, 
comes from a description of representations provided by Smith and Conrey (2007) who 
described how representations operate in connectionist memory system. To make this 
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argument, I first provide a brief explanation of connectionism, then explain Smith and Conrey’s 
(2007) descriptions of ‘mental representations’ in a connectionist system, and then comment 
on how a connectionist network might shed light on the idea that the link between pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning might be facilitated by an underlying capacity to generate imaginary 
representations. Alternatives different from connectionism are also attended to briefly. The 
discussion here will be revisited in the Chapter 7 Discussion section 7.3.3 when the 
applicability of connectionist theories will be considered in light of the empirical evidenced 
generated from this study. 
 
Connectionist theories broadly conceive the brain as a network of units or nodes, each with a 
degree of activation that are connected to each other and the connections are weighted so that 
the extent of activation of a unit along with the weight of its connections to others will excite 
or inhibit those other units (MacDonald, 1995). According to Smith and Conrey (20017), 
representations, therefore, function as richly connected units sending signals to each other, 
whereby, each unit has an activation level which can change from one moment to another in 
response to signals that the unit receives from its connections. These include incoming input 
connections from outside the network, for example, sensory information, as well as, unit 
outputs sent to other units through its outgoing connections. What makes a connectionist 
network view of representations interesting is the perception that learning takes place through 
the strengthening and weakening of interconnections in response to examples encountered in 
the input (McLaughlin, 1990). Weighted connections are thought to change slowly with time 
and the weights are assumed to be shaped by a learning process where each weight is 
incrementally adjusted as the network processes stimuli (Smith & Conrey, 2007). Smith and 
Conrey (2007) used the analogy of a computer screen to explain how network connections 
work in a connectionist system works. A computer screen operates on a fixed number of pixels 
to facilitate different colour and brightness levels which generate very large numbers of 
different but meaningful images, more than the number of pixels that exist, but no individual 
pixel has meaning by itself, as the unit meaning is the pattern of states from combining many 
different pixels. In the same way, the number of states represented in a connectionist system is 
constrained by the number of unique patterns that can be activated and the unit of meaning is 
the pattern of nodes and links that it is activated (Smith & Conrey, 2007). Three characteristics 
stand out in how connectionist systems operate: (a) cognitive skills occur by sharing processes 
across a distributed network; (b) representations require that relevant weights become activated 
whilst non-relevant weights are inhibited; and (c) the interaction across network systems with 
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the environment facilitates learning. Based on these characteristics, I think the dynamism of 
network systems as that explained by connectionist theory has the potential for explaining how 
an imaginative workspace facilitates different forms of hypothetical thinking, including 
pretence and counterfactual reasoning, that rely on a capacity to imagine other possible worlds. 
Further to describing how connectionist systems work, Smith and Conrey (2007) explained 
that ‘mental representations’ in a connectionist system have the following defining features: 
• Representations are dynamic in that as a representation is maintained in memory it is 
changed by learning due to other stimuli the network is processing 
• Representations that are currently active states exist in a different representational 
format from those that are currently inactive. 
• A representation is constructed by flows of activation in the network given appropriate 
inputs so to find a desired representation does not require to search through a number 
of other irrelevant representations.  
• Representation construction is an ongoing process, qualitatively the same as 
representational change and both are solely due to incremental change in the network’s 
connection weights and not constructed at a specific point in time, going from non-
existence to existence.  
• If people’s responses demonstrate context sensitivity or change over time, it could be 
because the same focal inputs (e.g., a target stimulus) result in the elicitation of 
different reconstructed representations, due to (a) intervening learning, or (b) effects 
of other inputs representing nonfocal or contextual elements of the overall situation. 
Essentially, in a connectionist system, representations can be broad, have multiple, contextual 
versions of a concept each of which can have distinct, and even unrelated sets of attributes 
(Smith & Conrey, 2007). On this premise, I propose that a capacity that uses ‘imaginary 
representations’ would adhere to general descriptions of how ‘mental representations’ work 
and connectionist theory provides a framework for understanding the cognitive architecture of 
a mental imaginary workspace.  
 
One way of determining the adequacy of connectionist theory as a model for describing the 
cognitive architecture of an imaginary representational workspace is whether it can address 
questions about the nature of the associations between pretence and counterfactual reasoning, 
and, by extension, other forms of hypothetical thinking in this context. For instance, can a 
general underlying capacity explain the differences in the appearance of pretence and 
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counterfactual reasoning in development? How would a general imaginary representational 
cognitive workspace facilitate different forms of hypothetical thinking over the course of 
development? How can we explain the differences in the constraints placed on the imagination 
from pretending as oppose to reasoning counterfactually? Can the connectionist model account 
for Amsel and Smalley (2000) observation that maturation and links with other cognitive 
processes influence children’s ability to compare and contrast true and false premises and 
reason from a false premise? How might domain-general executive function skills interact with 
both pretence and counterfactual reasoning? Are domain-general executive function skills 
equally important to both pretence and counterfactual reasoning? Essentially, a theory 
explaining a general cognitive imaginary representational workspace needs to account for the 
qualitative differences in the development of pretence and counterfactual reasoning and their 
timing in appearing in development, as well as, the similarities in their cognitive mechanisms. 
In other words, a theory of a general imaginary representational process should explain the 
process by which the representations are generated and must be dynamic enough to explain the 
similarities and differences of the concepts being compared.   
 
A starting point for thinking about how a connectionist network might illuminate the questions 
raised is to consider the characteristics of ‘imaginary mental representations’ in a connectionist 
system. The description of representations discussed by Smith and Conrey (2007) may provide 
a good account of describing how a general ‘imaginary representational’ capacity might 
operate across the two conceptual domains and perhaps other contexts which depend on 
hypothetical thinking.  If Smith and Conrey’s (2007) descriptions of representations are upheld 
then the contents of imaginary representations being held in memory would be influenced by 
other stimuli the network is processing. Other stimuli may come from the environment, 
physiological reactions or from being activated as the mind engages in other cognitive 
activities, for example asking one to consider an analogy requires some level of imaginative 
thought. In a connectionist system, variations in the extent to which imaginary representations 
are unconstrained is possible as representations in active states exist in a different format from 
those in a current state. So, only imaginary representations relevant to a specific context are 
attended to while other unrelated imaginary representations can be suppressed. Additionally, 
previous imaginary representations can be mutually exclusive from each other given that a 
representation is constructed by flows of activation in a neural network given appropriate inputs 
and does not depend on a search through irrelevant representations. In connectionist systems 
differences in how imaginary representations are constructed are influenced by maturation 
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because representation construction is an ongoing process solely due to incremental change in 
the network’s connection. Also, connectionist systems are influenced by context and 
environmental factors; similarly, imaginative representations are grounded in a real-world 
premise and this suggests that they are context sensitive. Moreover, developments in the quality 
of the contents of the imaginative representation would change over time owing to different 
reconstructed representations in a connectionist system being elicited from intervening learning 
or the effects of other inputs representing nonfocal or contextual elements of the overall 
situation.  
 
Connectionism is considered, although speculatively, because it overviews a structural as well 
as functional characteristic of the brain (Herberle, 1998) that can perhaps illuminate questions 
about the cognitive mechanisms that facilitate imaginary representations for thinking skills like 
pretence and counterfactual reasoning which depend on them. This is only one possible 
perspective proposed here. To provide an analogy, the proposed suggestion is that humans may 
have an innate capacity to imagine possible worlds represented as different types of imaginary 
representations, for example, pretence, counterfactual reasoning, thinking about future 
hypotheticals, et cetera; the real world, and other properties that may be relevant to what is 
being represented but each having their own representative cluster. Say someone is pretending 
that a banana is telephone then the object, banana, comes to be represented as a unit in the 
pretence cluster. It is activated as two-way weighted connections, activated across units within 
a cluster and between units across clusters. Excitatory connections are activated within and 
between clusters and weights are used to form inhibitory connections among units within a 
cluster such that activation of one property tends to suppress the activity of other properties in 
its cluster (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2002). Over time, learning occurs by changing the 
connection weights between units not by adding or modifying propositions (Bechtel & 
Abrahamsen, 2002). So, the relevant attributes of the banana necessary for the pretence context 
are activated and the irrelevant attributes are inhibited. The strengthening of weighted 
connections over the course of development would explain the process of how children come 
to understand pretence representations as meta-representations. Connectionism, therefore, 
gives a broad explanation of; (a) how units are connected to one another; (b) how the activations 
of individual units are determined, (c) the nature of the learning procedures which change 
connections between units; and (d) the ways in which systems are interpreted semantically” 




Connectionists attempt to explain cognition by describing how information is represented in 
the brain. Similar use of connectionism to explain mental states have been applied to social 
psychology and thinking about how attitudes are mentally represented (Conrey & Smith, 2007; 
Smith, 1996). By using a connectionist paradigm, the aim was to explain how imaginary 
representations could vary across different contexts which rely on hypothetical thinking about 
possible worlds and how domain-general cognitive processes might interact to influence the 
component processes involved in pretending or reasoning counterfactually. Criticisms of 
connectionism are from rival classical and modular theories of cognition (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 
1988). Classical computational theories follow the traditional symbolic paradigm of construing 
cognition as involving symbol manipulation and transforming of symbols according to rules; 
whereas, connectionists do not provide for either stored symbols or rules that govern their 
manipulations (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2002). Connectionists generally account for domain 
general as well as domain specific skills in contrast to classical, modular theories of cognition. 
For instance, according to Herberle, (1998) modular theorists like Fodor (1983) claim that 
global processes like those arising from the imagination are less understood as compared to 
domain-specific processes (like mathematics, science, language) which use specific, localized, 
and structured neural systems operating through the manipulation of symbols much like a 
computer. According to Herberle (1998) modular cognitive systems are domain-specific, 
computational autonomous, innately specified and associated with specific, localized, and 
elaborately structured neural systems; whereas, nonmodular cognitive systems are not content 
specific, for example, memory, attention, imagination, perception et. cetera, involving creative, 
interactive, problem solving thinking skills that cross content domains.  
 
Conclusions. In this section, an argument was made for considering connectionist theory as a 
model for explaining the mental representations involved in thinking about alternative 
imaginary worlds to reality. It must be acknowledged that considering a connectionist paradigm 
moves away from traditional approaches which usually compares modularity theories and 
simulation theories to explain how the mind computes mental state representations; typically 
from research of pretend play (Lillard, 2001). I suggest, that in light of the proposal, that mental 
state representations involving alternate versions of reality have something in common by way 
of shared cognitive mechanisms; then theories of connectionism and parallel distributed 





2.5.2.2 Neuroscience Evidence 
There is some evidence from neuroscience research that the cognitive processes involving 
mental imaginative representations share neural correlates in similar components of the brain. 
A study investigating neural correlates from observing pretend play where one object is 
pretended as another found observing pretend play activated additional areas previously 
associated with theory of mind tasks and listening to narrative, including medial prefrontal 
cortex, posterior superior temporal sulcus and temporal poles (Whitehead et al., 2009). 
Similarly, counterfactual thought has been found to depend on an integrative network of 
systems with coordinated interaction between three networks: (1) mental simulation in the 
medial temporal lobe and prefrontal cortex region; (2) cognitive control in the frontoparietal 
and cingulo-opercular network; and (3) affective processing including motivation and 
valuation in limbic regions and ventral medial prefrontal cortex regions (Van Hoeck et al., 
2015). These findings overlap with neural links relating to theory of mind. A meta-analysis of 
neuroimaging theory of mind studies reported support for a specialised mechanism for mental 
attributions where all sorts of theory of mind tasks engaged a particular brain network including 
the medial prefrontal cortex region and bilateral temporal parietal junction (Schurz et al., 2014). 
The neural networks engaged in different mental state abilities have neural correlates in 
specialised components of the broad which generate from general related cortical regions in 
the brain. The findings from the neuroscience research makes a case for thinking about related 
cognitive processes as connections in a cognitive network system. Connectionism is greatly 
influenced by neuroscience research for providing neural support that sheds light on the 
cognitive architecture of the mind. Evidence that pretence and counterfactual reasoning overlap 
and may activate similar cognitive components in the brain amplifies support for thinking about 




A suggestion was proposed in response to the question of whether pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning share cognitive mechanisms. Amsel and Smalley’s (2000) model of counterfactual 
reasoning about possibilities was used as starting point to explain the process of generating 
alternatives to reality and reasoning from false premises. The ability to imagine was identified 
as integral to forming a false premise of a real-world premise. Additionally, being able to 
compare and contrast real and counterfactual worlds is influenced by maturation made apparent 
87 
 
by the transition in low-level processing skills which gives way to higher-level understanding 
over the course of development. The evidence from reviewing the literature seem to suggest 
that mature counterfactual reasoning relies on an imaginary representational capacity, along 
with help from other domain-general skills. For this reason, a connectionist model was used to 
show how a network of cognitive processes might explain how imaginary representations 
facilitate pretending and counterfactual reasoning. Evidence drawn from neuroscience research 
supports the idea of an interconnected neural network at play in similar cognitive skills as 
related cognitive processes appear to emanate from similar locations in the brain. Overall, this 
section makes a case for considering that an explanation for a unified theory of pretence may 




2.6.0 Thesis Framework 
The aim of this present thesis is to clarify claims that pretence and counterfactual reasoning 
share cognitive mechanisms and that a shared underlying capacity underpins the relationship 
between the two. The evidence proposing a joint theory of pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning were reviewed by examining what is known about the cognitive structure, 
development, and cognitive mechanisms of these two cognitive skills during the early years of 
child development, independently and jointly. One thing which is clear from this review is that 
there is a dearth of empirical evidence which has examined the extent to which pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning are related cognitive skills. For this reason, the goal of this research 
is to test theoretical claims made about pretence and counterfactual reasoning by addressing 
the following questions: 
RQ 1. Is there evidence that observed pretence behaviours depend on a common underlying 
ability in this domain? 
RQ 2. Is there evidence that observed counterfactual reasoning behaviours depend on a 
common underlying ability in this domain? 
RQ3. How are pretence, counterfactual reasoning, executive functions, and receptive language 
associated? 
RQ4. Is there support for the idea that the constructs from the domain of the pretence and 




This research endeavour is theory driven because it aims to provide explanations to clarify the 
nature of the relationship between pretence and counterfactual reasoning. At the end of the 
thesis an attempt will be made to: organize the knowledge already known and the knowledge 
generated about pretence and counterfactual reasoning into statements that describe the 
relationships among the study variables for the purpose of proposing a coherent explanation of 
the nature of the relationship between the two, and also to discuss predictions about the 
behavioural manifestations expected if pretence and counterfactual reasoning are associated 
(Goodwin & Goodwin, 2014). The expectation is to contribute to the current body of 
knowledge about pretence and counterfactual reasoning in a parsimonious way with the 
understanding that the findings are open to being falsifiable.  
 
 
2.7.0 Chapter Summary 
The literature reviewed in this chapter surveyed the state of knowledge about pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning in early childhood from a cognitive psychology perspective. The 
discussion covered five main topics. The first and second section overviewed pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning separately by outlining the defining features, cognitive mechanisms, 
developmental trajectory, and general approaches to how each construct is measured in 
research with children. The third section presented evidence to explain assertions that pretence 
and counterfactual reasoning are related cognitive skills. The tenets on which claims about 
associations between pretence and counterfactual reasoning rest come from observations that 
both take mental representations of reality and re-represent them as alternate representations 
that are contrary to fact. Additional evidence is pooled from reports showing links between 
pretence and counterfactual reasoning shared with language, and executive functions, as well 
as, empirical evidence directly testing the two cognitive skills. The fourth section developed a 
theoretical argument providing support for the claim that pretence and counterfactual reasoning 
are associated potentially because both cognitive skills rely on an imaginary representational 
capacity responsible for conjuring up non-literal versions of the real world. The last section 
overlays the framework of the thesis. The thesis goal is to test theoretical claims that that 
pretence and counterfactual reasoning share cognitive mechanisms and that an underlying 
cognitive dimension might explain associations shared by the two constructs. The outcome of 




Chapter 3 Research Design 
 
3.1.0 Introduction 
In response to the theoretical propositions outlined in the literature review about the potential 
contribution of early years pretend play to the development of counterfactual reasoning; a 
large-scale empirical study was designed. This chapter outlines the research design of the study 
by presenting the statement of problem, purpose of the research, and the research paradigm 
which influenced the study design. The research questions are stated, key constructs are 
operationalized, and the pilot study which was conducted is reported. A chapter summary is 
included at the end. 
 
3.2.0 Statement of the Problem  
The literature review delineated a theoretical perspective that suggests that the cognitive 
processes activated during pretend play reflects the cognitive processes of counterfactual 
reasoning; therefore, the two may share similar cognitive mechanisms (Weisberg & Gopnik, 
2013). In response to this theoretical proposal, this study was designed to investigate the extent 
of the relationship between pretence and counterfactual reasoning as related cognitive skills. A 
hypothetical model was specified to test the theoretically proposed links between 
counterfactual reasoning and pretence both at an observable level and at the level of latent 
constructs (see Figure 3.1). The boxes identify the observed variables measured and the circles 
indicate the latent constructs being inferred. The goal was to explore whether the variance in 
the data might support a general factor, described as a cognitive capacity to generate imaginary 
representations (IR), to be extracted which would imply that pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning represent the same component skill and there would be remaining variance sufficient 
to extract specific latent factors of pretence and counterfactual reasoning (Eid et al., 2018). The 
implication of a shared cognitive association between pretence and counterfactual reasoning 
opens the possibility for future explorations of a causal relationship between pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning and the proposal that early years pretence is an opportunity to practice 
and perhaps scaffold counterfactual reasoning in later development (Weisberg, 2015). Hence, 












3.3.0 Research Paradigm 
In undertaking this research, I adopted a post-positivist paradigm as my world view because it 
involves an understanding that observations are subject to critical evaluation given that there 
may be multiple, co-relating explanations (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, & Bell, 2018). Such 
a stance was especially important since this study aimed to generate empirical evidence to test 
what is still an inchoate theoretical proposal of the associations between counterfactual 
reasoning and pretence. Post-positivism ideologies retains the positivists perspective that the 
strength of theories are contingent on their ability to withstand ‘severe tests’ of their 
falsifiability and that their discoveries are subject to future falsification in the light of the new 
evidence (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, Bell, 2018). As consequence, confirmatory and non-




The aim of this study is to explore the theoretical claim that counterfactual reasoning and 
pretence are associated cognitive skills. 
 
 
3.4.0 Research Questions 
 
RQ 1. Is there evidence that observed pretence behaviours depend on a common underlying 
ability in this domain? 
 
RQ 2. Is there evidence that observed counterfactual reasoning behaviours depend on a 
common underlying ability in this domain? 
 
RQ3. How are pretence, counterfactual reasoning, executive functions, and receptive language 
associated? 
 
RQ4. Is there support for the idea that the constructs from the domain of the pretence and 






3.5.0 Operationalization of Variables 
The concepts in this study are operationalized within a cognitive psychology domain. The 
operational definitions of the main study variables are drawn from the literature but are also 
aligned to how each variable was measured and subsequently interpreted to answer the research 
questions. The operational definitions of the variables in the study are stated in Table 3.1 below. 
 
Table 3.1 Operational Definition of Study Constructs 
Variables Operational Definitions 
Pretence  Pretend play behaviours involving fantasy or imagination with 
functional and symbolic toys or objects inferred from: elaborate 
imaginative actions and objects, verbally attributing properties 
to objects, using one object to represent another, and referring 
to an absent object as if it were present. It also involves 





It is a process of generating alternative antecedents or 
consequents to a counterfactual sequence  
 




– inferred from 
working memory, 
inhibitory control  
Working memory - the number of units of verbal information a 
child can hold and manipulate in their minds. 
 
Inhibitory control - the ability to resist the urge to engage in an 







3.6.0 Cross-sectional Research Design 
A cross-sectional research design framed the development of this study. Cross-sectional 
research takes a snapshot of multiple variables at a single point in time with the aim of 
understanding the relationships among the variables (Cohen, Manion, Morrison, & Bell, 2018; 
Field, 2016; Thomas, 2013). The research here collects data from children at a single timepoint 
to understand how the variables pretence and counterfactual reasoning are related. Cross-
sectional studies are quantitative in nature, applying correlational analyses methods based on 
multi-subject designs in which participants are not randomly assigned to experimental groups 
(Thompson, Diamond, McWilliam, Snyder, & Snyder, 2005).  
 
A cross-sectional research design was selected for this study because it is ideal when state of 
knowledge in a field is still immature as they reveal whether there is a relationship among the 
variables of interest before committing resources to complex experimental designs (Howitt & 
Cramer, 2011). At the time of writing this thesis, only one empirical study reporting on 
associations between pretence and counterfactual reasoning was found indicating that there is 
little published research about how pretence and counterfactual reasoning are related. 
Counterfactual reasoning research with children dates back to the past two decades beginning 
with Harris, German, and Mills (1996) seminal paper which showed children’s capacity to 
reason counterfactually. Whilst pretend play has been researched extensively; empirical 
research focused on the intersection between pretence and counterfactual is only attributed to 
Buchsbaum, Bridgers, Weisberg, and Gopnik (2012). Hence, if the findings from further 
correlational research methods corroborates a robust relationship between pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning; then this provides justification for undertaking longitudinal and/or 
experimental designs. This is prudent as longitudinal and experimental designs tend to require 
a longer timeline to complete the research cycle resulting in a knock-on effect of increased cost 
to complete the research.   
 
The limitations and strengths of cross-sectional studies were critically considered when making 
decisions about this study. A drawback of cross-sectional designs is that they do not provide 
evidence that variables are causally related (Thompson et al., 2005). However, establishing and 
understanding how variables are correlated is a critical first step before attempting to detangle 
predicted causal links. It provides a basis from which predictions about the relationship 
between variables can be tested in related sectional samples. In this vein, this investigation does 
not aim to assert unequivocally the direction of the relationship between pretence and 
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counterfactual reasoning but to only explore how they might be associated. Hence, a cross-
sectional design was deemed suitable for this study as cross-sectional research is a type of 
explanatory research that is appropriate for investigating theories about a phenomenon like that 
specified in Figure 3.1 (Gall et al., 2007; Howitt & Cramer, 2011). A strength of cross-sectional 
research is that it is a type of observational research which takes a naturalistic view of the 
question being researched while ensuring that the findings are not biased by the presence of 
the researcher (Field, 2016).  
 
 
3.7.0 Sampling  
A critical aspect to designing cross-sectional studies is drawing an adequate sample so that the 
information from which inferences are based are comprehensive (Cohen, Manion, Morrison, 
& Bell, 2018). Three factors influenced determining the sample size for this study; effect sizes 
and post-hoc power analyses from a previous study which found counterfactual reasoning and 
pretend play to be correlated, an a-priori power analyses to predict sample size by taking into 
consideration statistical power given the number of variables being measured in this study, and 
consideration of the sampling criteria to facilitate advanced quantitative analyses like factor 
analyses to tests latent variable models.  
 
In the one reported study that shows that pretence and counterfactual reasoning are correlated, 
the researchers found a medium to large effect size (r = .44) in a sample fifty-eight 3-4-year-
old typically developing children (Buchsbaum, Bridgers, Weisberg, & Gopnik, 2012). 
Subsequently, a post-hoc power analysis with the program G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) was 
conducted to determine the statistical power of Buchsbaum et al.’s (2012) study and it revealed, 
based on a two-tailed correlation bivariate normal model, the power to detect an effect of this 
size was determined to be .94. Given the high statistical power and medium effect size, an a-
priori power analysis to predict an adequate sample size was conducted based on a linear 
multiple regression with 6 predictors – pretence (2 variables), working memory, inhibition (2 
variables), and receptive language – with counterfactual reasoning as the dependent variable. 
The a-priori analyses indicated that with a power of .95 the chance of finding a significantly 
large (.35), medium (.15) or small (.02) effect size exists with sample sizes of 67, 146 and 1050 




Given Buchsbaum et. al.’s (2012) finding of a medium to large effect size in their study and 
the aim of this study to undertake latent variable modelling which typically requires large 
datasets, it was assumed that a sample size greater than one hundred and forty six but 
approximating two hundred would meet the minimum criterion of a large dataset with  adequate 
statistical power to run analyses like confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) or structural equation 
models (SEM). Some researchers argue that SEM models can be robust with varying sample 
sizes (Kline, 2015; Wolf et al., 2013). 
 
 
3.8.0 Pilot  
This section discusses the piloting phase of the research. A pilot is small-scale testing of the 
procedures intended for use in the main study and informs the revising of procedures based on 
what the testing reveals (Gall et al., 2007). The goal of this pilot was to check the suitability of 
measures used with 3-5-year-old children. A lot of care went into selecting measures that: were 
age-appropriate, could be administered within a reasonable time frame, and had a record of 
being reliable and valid measures of the constructs in the study. These factors were crucial 
because the inferences made in any study are only as good as the measures upon which these 
inferences are based. All the measures considered have been reported in published research 
and include experimental tasks and tasks standardized and/or published by their developers. 
Standardised assessments are formal assessments that have been designed to measure a child’s 
abilities compared to other children of their own age. They are norm-referenced by a period of 
trialling on large samples of a representative population and children’s score can be compared 
to the average score of other children of similar ages.  In contrast experimental tasks are usually 
research developed, designed to carefully manipulate a particular variable of interest by 
controlling for confounding variables (Purser & Van Herwegen, 2016).  
 
 
3.8.1 Measures Piloted 
The variables measured in the study were pretend play, counterfactual reasoning, inhibition, 
working memory and language. A range of tasks were considered but after piloting a final 
selection of measures were selected for inclusion in the main study. The study measures 





Table 3.2 List of Study Measures Trialled 
Variables Measures Task Description 
Pretence Child Initiated Pretend Play 
Assessment - CHIPPA (Stagnitti 
et al., 2000)  
a norm-referenced standardised assessment 
designed to measure children’s cognitive 
skills in pretend play by assessing the child’s 
ability to self-initiate pretend play. 
 
 Pretend Action Task – PAT 
(Overton & Jackson, 1973) 





Antecedent and Consequent 
Task (Guajardo & Turley-Ames, 
2004)  
 
Travel Scenario Task (Perner et 
al., 2004) 
A comparison of counterfactual responses to 
antecedent and consequent counterfactual 
questions. 
 
Lends itself to simulating different types of 
counterfactual questions in one task  
 
Road Task (Beck & Crilly, 2009) 
 
Sweet Story (Rafetseder et al., 
2010) 
 
assesses the influence of considering dual 
possibilities  
 
considers the nearest possible world where 
respondents keep active the real sequence of 
events that is being counterfactually altered 
Location Change Task 
(Rafetseder & Perner, 2010) 
Task aimed at differentiating basic 
conditional reasoning from adult-like CFR 
 
Inhibition Head Toes Knees and Shoulders 
Task – HTKS (McClelland, 
Cameron, Duncan, Bowles, 
Acock, Miao & Pratt, 2014) 
  
 
A measure of behavioural self-regulation and 




 Delay of Self-Gratification Task 
(Mischel & Underwood, 1974; 
Thompson, Barresi, & Moore, 
1997) 
 
A measure of the initial choice for a delayed 
reward in preference to a current reward 
Working 
Memory  
Spin the Pots (Hughes, 1998) A WM task assessing skills for mentally 
acquiring and retrieving information 
Language Clinical Evaluation of Language 
Fundamentals -CELF (Wigg et 
al., 2006) 
A norm-referenced standardized language 
test including a test of receptive language 




The purpose for doing a pilot study was to trial the measures in my research context, check that 
they yielded appropriate data and for the researcher to become familiar with procedures for 
administering the measures accurately and efficiently.  There were two phases of piloting. In 
the first pilot all the measures initially selected were piloted. However, a second pilot study 
was needed because the counterfactual reasoning measure, the Antecedent and Consequent 
counterfactual reasoning task, initially selected was revised since the results from the first pilot 
study did not yield satisfactory results. Four other counterfactual reasoning measures were 
trialled in a second pilot and are also included in Table 3.2 as part of the total list of the 
measures trialled in this present study. The result from both pilots are discussed at length in the 
subsequent sections - Piloting Phase One and Piloting Phase Two. 
 
 
3.8.2 Piloting Phase One 
Participants. The first pilot took place at the Observation Laboratory at the Faculty of 
Education with ten 3-5-year old children who lived in the city of Cambridge.  
 
Procedures. Children participated in two consecutive testing sessions each lasting 
approximately thirty minutes with a break between the two sessions. In session one the pretend 
play task (CHIPPA) was administered whilst the remaining tasks were administered in session 
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two (Antecedent & Consequent CFR Task, Spin the Pots, HTKS, CELF receptive language 
tests).  
 
Results. Except for the counterfactual reasoning task, all other tasks showed good variability 
across the age-ranges of children sampled, that is, generally older children performed better 
than their younger peers. The variability in the scores across age groups suggested the tasks 
were functioning satisfactorily so no further adjustments were made (refer to Appendix A for 
children’s scores on the tasks performed during phase one pilot). 
 
 In the case of the counterfactual reasoning task while the Antecedent Task showed good 
variability across participants of different ages, children performed at ceiling on the 
Consequent Task. Essentially, six of ten participants scored at ceiling on the Consequent Task 
and of the six children their ages ranged from 3-5 years old which suggested all ages had a 
good chance of obtaining the maximum score on this task. It is worth mentioning that 1st and 
2nd Order False Belief tasks were trialled in the first pilot but are not reported on as they were 
eliminated from the study because it became necessary to reduce the number of variables 
measured so as to reduce the length of time taken to administer the measures. No further report 
is given about false belief tasks being used in this study.  
 
Given that children had good performances on the Antecedent task but performed poorly on 
the Consequent counterfactual reasoning task; additional counterfactual reasoning tasks were 
piloted to select an appropriate task for the study. The other measures trialled in the phase one 
pilot, except the Antecedent and Consequent counterfactual reasoning task, were included in 
the main study. They are described in detail in Chapter Four Research Methods in section 4.3.0 
which describes all the measures used in the main study.   
 
Four other counterfactual reasoning tasks were trialled in the second phase of piloting. Before 
reporting on the phase two piloting, all the counterfactual reasoning tasks trialled are described 
together beginning with the Antecedent and Consequent task used in the first pilot. The purpose 
is to provide an over-view and contextual background on all the different counterfactual 
reasoning tasks trialled. A brief description of the counterfactual reasoning task trialled is 
presented first. Afterwards, the results of the phase two pilot are presented. The counterfactual 
reasoning task selected for inclusion in the main study is identified and the rationale for 
selecting the task is explained.   
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3.8.3 Piloting Phase Two 
The purpose of the second phase of pilot testing was to trial other counterfactual reasoning 
tasks to select a suitable task for the study. Counterfactual reasoning is multi-dimensional, so 
there are differences in the difficulty and complexity of different tasks. The core of these 
differences arises from researchers wanting to understand how counterfactual reasoning 
develops in children in relation to what constitutes adult-like counterfactual reasoning. The 
background of each of the counterfactual reasoning tasks are described first. To provide context 
to the battery of counterfactual reasoning task trialled; the counterfactual reasoning task trialled 
in the first pilot is described here followed by the other four counterfactual reasoning tasks 
trialled in the second pilot. Afterwards, the procedures and results from the trialling are 
discussed and the final measure selected is justified. This is to elucidate the decision-making 
process undergone to arrive at the final counterfactual reasoning measure selected for this 
present study.  
 
3.8.3.1 Background of the Counterfactual Reasoning Tasks Trialled 
The five counterfactual reasoning tasks trialled are listed below: 
1. The Antecedent & Consequent Task by Guajardo and Turley-Ames (2004) 
2. The Travel Scenario Task by Perner, Sprung, and Steinkogler (2004) 
3. The ‘Road Task’ by Beck & Crilly (2009)  
4. The Sweet Story by Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas, and Perner (2010)  
5. Location Change Story Rafetseder and Perner (2010)  
 
3.8.3.1.1 Antecedent & Consequent Task Counterfactual Reasoning Task 
The task used was developed by Guajardo and Turley-Ames (2004) and designed for 
participants to identify alternative antecedents and consequents to counterfactual reasoning 
questions. In a given counterfactual scenario; an antecedent – is an action or decision, and a 
consequent – is the outcome resulting from the action or decision. An Antecedent Task gets 
the respondent to generate as many different antecedents as they can different to the antecedent 
stated in the task with the goal of providing an alternative response to change the outcome of 
the sequence of events presented. For example, “What could you have done so that the kitchen 
floor would not get dirty?” A Consequent Task gets the respondent to come up with an 
alternative consequent or outcome given a stated change in the story antecedent (the changed 
antecedent forms the counterfactual reasoning question). In a Consequent Task the response 
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leads to an altered consequent because respondents identify a different outcome given a specific 
change to an antecedent. For example, “If the wind had not blown, where would Jenny’s picture 
be?” An example of a Consequent Task and Antecedent Task taken from Guajardo and Turley-
Ames (2004) is illustrated in Figure 3.2 below. Participants listened to the researcher read 
counterfactual reasoning scenarios whilst watching accompanying pictures on an android tablet 










This counterfactual reasoning task can be classified as a task of basic conditional reasoning. 
Children from as young as three perform successfully on tasks like the Consequent Tasks by 
applying basic conditional reasoning – the application of general knowledge to answer a 
question independent of the actual content of the question. The pattern of children’s responses 
– ceiling on Antecedent task but variable on Consequent task is consistent with Beck, 
Robinson, Carroll, and Apperly’s (2006) suggestion that children who correctly answer 
questions to Consequent Tasks could more than likely also generate correct answers to 
questions on Antecedent Tasks. However, I made the decision to not use this counterfactual 
reasoning task because the ceiling effects on the Consequent Task raised concerns that the task 
would produce limited variability in children’s scores if it was used with the intended 
participants of the main study, 4-5-year-old children. The age of participants for this present 
study was more restricted than those from the original paper where these tasks were used where 
the ages of children were reported to range from 3-years to 5.9-years (Guajardo & Turley-
Ames, 2004).  
 
 
3.8.3.1.2 The ‘Road Task’ (Beck & Crilly, 2009)  
This task involves the following scenario: A car drives to a fork in the road and children are 
told, ‘Sam had decided to go for a drive in his car. He could either go down this road to the 
swimming pool or he could go down this road to the sweet shop. The character takes one of 
the roads and the children are told, “Today Sam decided to drive down this road to the sweet 
shop”. Then the children are asked a standard counterfactual question, “What if he had gone 
the other way, where would he be?” or an open counterfactual question, “Could he have gone 
anywhere else?” Thereafter follows three further trials each using a different car and driver. 
Standard and open counterfactual questions are counterbalanced, and each child has two 
standard questions and two open questions. This task is classified as an open counterfactual 
reasoning task and assesses whether children think about counterfactuals and actual events as 






3.8.3.1.3 The Travel Scenario Task by (Perner et al., 2004) 
The task is a modified version of the task developed by Perner, Sprung, & Steinkogler (2004). 
It is based on the following scenario depicted in Figure 3.3. 
 
 Equidistant from Peter’s house are two train and bus stations. From the green station, a bus 
leaves for the lake and a train for the mountains, and from the blue station a bus leaves for the 
mountains and a train for the lake. “Peter gets up and walks to the green station and takes the 
train to the Mountain. The children are asked a control question: Where is Peter now? [correct 
answer: “at the mountain”]. Then they are asked alternative departure counterfactual question, 
“If Peter had gone to the blue station and had taken the train, where would he have ended up?” 
[correct answer “at the lake”]. Afterwards, they are asked an alternative transport 
counterfactual question, “If Peter had taken the bus instead, where would he have ended up?” 
[correct answer “at the lake”]. There after follows three additional trials accounting for the 
different routes which could be travelled. For the purpose of this study only complete 
counterfactual questions were posed as possible variations to the path that Peter travelled 
although the task can simulate variations of counterfactual reasoning questions including future 
hypothetical counterfactual questions which are questions that ask children to predict outcomes 




Figure 3.3 Travel Scenario Task (Perner, Sprung, & Steinkogler, 2004) 
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3.8.3.1.4 Sweet Story (Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas & Perner, 2010)  
In the sweet story four different sequences of events could take place, each sequence comprised 
two transformations of an object’s location. The scenario explains that mother puts sweets 
regularly on either the top shelf or the bottom shelf (the first transformation) and then either 
the tall boy or the little girl comes looking for the sweets and takes them into his or her room 
(the second transformation). The tall boy can reach both shelves, so he takes the sweets into 
his room regardless where mother puts them. The little girl can only reach the bottom shelf so 
if she comes looking for sweets either they will remain on the top shelf or she will take them 
from the bottom shelf into her room. A subjunctive past question would be, “If not the little 
girl but the tall boy had come along looking for sweets, where would the sweets be?” could 
give a basic conditional reasoning answer “his room” because whenever the boy comes looking 
for the sweets they end up in his room, but when the subjunctive past questions are about the 
girl, given the girl can only reach the bottom shelf children must consider the ‘nearest possible’ 
answers ‘either she went without sweets or took the sweets to her room. This task assesses 
whether children can hold multiple possibilities in mind. 
 
3.8.3.1.5 Location Change Story (Rafetseder & Perner, 2010)  
Task Administration Location Change Story. This task involves four stories involving 
protagonists – doctor, teacher, firefighter, and police officer engaged in sequences of events 
but only two scenarios were included in the pilot (see Figure 3.5). For example, the Doctor 
Story involves: a doctor, sitting in the park reading a book, is called to an emergency at the 
swimming pool. The question, ‘‘If there had been no emergency, where would the doctor be?’’ 
should counterfactually be answered ‘‘in the park’’. But by ignoring the doctor’s intentions, 
and just reasoning from premises about the default location of a hospital and the doctor who 
has been called out to an emergency, one might answer: ‘‘in the hospital’’. Each story has four 
variations, in two stories the protagonist moves between two locations – from a typical and 
atypical antecedent location to the consequent location and in the other two stories the 
protagonist moves between three locations – between the typical and atypical locations (vice 
versa) before moving to the consequent location. The task is described more fully in Chapter 
Four Research Methods. In section 4.3.2. The Sweet Story and Location Change tasks can be 
referred to as nearest possible world tasks because they are designed to ensure that respondents 


















3.8.3.2 Administration and Results from Trialling the Counterfactual Reasoning Tasks 
Participants. Ten participants were recruited from a nursery in Cambridge. Parents were 
invited to opt their child out of the study. Children took part in the tasks, but no participant data 
was solicited from the school or parents because of the nature of the consent requested. An opt-
out consent was suitable as the goal of the pilot was only to trial the tasks with age-appropriate 
children. Participants were between the ages of 4-5 years old.  
 
Procedures. The testing took place in a quiet space at the nursery. Four counterfactual 
reasoning tasks were administered, and the time taken varied between 5-10 minutes; ‘Travel 
Scenario’, ‘The Road Task’ (5 minutes), ‘The Sweet Task’ (10 minutes) and two ‘Location 
Change Tasks’ (10 minutes) as only two of the stories were trialled.  
 
Results. The process of trialling the various counterfactual reasoning tasks familiarized the 
researcher to several factors like: the duration of the task, complexity of the task to be 
administered, how children in this study context performed on the task, and the comparability 
of the counterfactual reasoning task to the pretend play measure used in this study. All of these 
factors influenced the process of deciding which counterfactual reasoning task was suitable for 
the main study. The results of the phase two piloting are presented in Appendix E but the 
rationale for excluding and including tasks are given here.  
 
The Travel Task trialled had been modified by excluding parts of the task which assessed False 
Belief and Hypothetical Reasoning which were part of the original task to make it a complex 
task but were not relevant to this study. Due to concerns that the modified version of the Travel 
Task which was trialled did not retain the original complexity and challenge of the task; the 
Travel Task was excluded from the main study.  
 
Children’s performance on the Road Task and Sweet Story showed reasonable variability. In 
the Road Task, the children did better on the standard counterfactuals than on the open 
counterfactuals. In the Sweet Story they were better at predicting where the boys would look 
for the sweets than the girls. However, both tasks were excluded for not being comparable to 
the pretend play task, the other main study variable, in terms of being considerably shorter 
tasks to administer and having a smaller range of scores.  The Location Change Task was 




Conclusion. Most of the tasks trialled were designed in response to the argument that responses 
to traditional counterfactual reasoning questions may be answered using basic conditional 
reasoning by ignoring the subjunctive premise and simply providing plausible answers. Real 
world counterfactual reasoning tasks like the Travel Task are designed to encourage children 
to integrate the reality of the given scenario into their counterfactual assumptions. Open 
counterfactuals like the Road Task check whether the children can pinpoint when in a given 
scenario an alternative possibility can occur, that is, keep dual possibilities in mind (Beck et 
al., 2006). Nearest possible world tasks like the Sweet Story Task and Location Change Story 
Task go one step further by checking whether children can answer a counterfactual subjunctive 
question about a past event correctly when a basic conditional reasoning approach will produce 
a different answer. Nearest possible world tasks require the respondent to use only logically or 
causally necessary changes to the actual event to arrive at the counterfactual alternative 
(Rafetseder & Perner, 2010). Given this study aims to draw inferences about whether pretence 
and counterfactual reasoning share cognitive processes; a primary factor taken into account is 
that the counterfactual reasoning task does a good job of simulating the cognitive skills required 
to mentally represent alternatives; consider the given premise and propose a relevant alternative 
(refer to discussion in the literature review section on Dual Representations of Reality’ in 
section 2.5.1).  
 
 
3.8.5 Conclusions from the Pilot 
The piloting phase was integral to the selection of the study measures. The selection of the 
measures was based on the extant literature, but piloting provided a means of checking how 
individual tasks performed in the context in which the study was being carried out. An attempt 
was made to make measures comparable by focusing on tapping into the cognitive 
representations of the different constructs of interest. The aim was to ensure the data collection 
process was rigorous which will in turn ensure that quality data was collected to facilitate 
appropriate inferences from the analyses. However, a key limitation of the data collection is 
that it was conducted under time-constraints hence small samples of children were recruited – 
approximately ten children for each phase of the pilot. Consequently, basic descriptive 
statistics, rather than inferential statistics, were used to check that the measures were 
functioning as intended. The piloting allowed me to become familiar with administering the 




3.8.6 Chapter Summary  
This chapter set out the research design which framed the development of this study. A cross-
sectional research design was planned to support large scale data collection to test the 
theoretical claim that pretence and counterfactual reasoning share similar cognitive 
mechanisms. The piloting phase informed how the main study was conducted. After two phases 
of piloting, appropriate study measures were selected for assessing 4-5-year old children’s 
cognitive ability in relation to pretence, counterfactual reasoning, inhibition, working memory 
and receptive language. The final selection of measures was chosen on the basis of being age-
appropriate, could be administered within a reasonable time frame, and having a history of 
being reliable and valid measures of the constructs in the study. Additional goals achieved 
included: becoming familiar with the procedures for administering the different tasks, 
understanding the scoring procedures for each task, determining the length of time taken to 
administer each task, identifying the materials needed and trying out the audio and video 
equipment to be used. This is important given that the inferences made in any study are only 
as good as the measures upon which these inferences are based. The next chapter outlines the 

























































Chapter 4 Research Methods 
 
4.1.0 Introduction 
The research methods which guided the implementation of the main study are described in this 
chapter. The study participants are described, the ethical principles adhered to are discussed, 
each measure used to collect data is described, the data collection procedures are outlined, and 




Study participants were sampled from across schools in Cambridgeshire, UK. Typically 
developing, reception-aged children were selected because it was thought to be the middle 
ground – an age where pretend play is still a self-initiated overt activity of children’s interaction 
before it atrophies by middle childhood whilst counterfactual reasoning ability is burgeoning 
before it matures by middle childhood. Children with atypical development were therefore 
excluded from the study. The sample was conveniently drawn from seven primary schools 
across Cambridgeshire as due to financial constraints the research was conducted in the area 
where the researcher lived. Cambridge is a diverse university city and for many residents 
English is a second language. Hence, the language backgrounds and the general language 
development of the children were taken into account.  
 
 
4.3.0 Study Measures 
Two main variables, pretence and counterfactual reasoning, were investigated in this study and 
four additional variables, inhibition, working memory and receptive language, were also 
measured. The full task battery of measures selected to collect data on the study variables are 
stated in Table 4.1. Each measure is reviewed by providing a brief background on the task 
including information about task reliability, validity, the list of materials, procedures for 







Table 4.1 List of measures used in this study 
Variables Measures 
Pretence Child Initiated Pretend Play Assessment - CHIPPA 
(Stagnitti et al., 2000) 
 





Location Change Task (Rafetseder & Perner, 2010) 








Working Memory  
 
 
Head Toes Knees and Shoulders Task – HTKS 
(McClelland, Cameron, Duncan, Bowles, Acock, Miao, & 
Pratt, 2014)  
Delay of Self-Gratification Task (Mischel & Underwood, 
1974; Thompson et al., 1997) 
 
Spin the Pots (Hughes, 1998) 
 
Receptive Language Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals -CELF 










4.3.1 Pretence  
Two measures of pretence were administered; the Child Initiated Pretend Play Assessment 
(CHIPPA) which assessed child pretend play and the Pretence Action Task (PAT) which 
assessed a child’s ability to represent objects symbolically. 
 
4.3.1.1 Child Initiated Pretend Play Assessment (CHIPPA) - 
Background. The Child-initiated Pretend Play Assessment (CHIPPA) developed by Stagnitti, 
Unsworth, and Rodger (2000) was used as the measure of pretend play. The CHIPPA 
assessment was video recorded and children’s performance on CHIPPA was scored from video.  
CHIPPA is a norm-referenced standardised assessment designed to measure children’s 
cognitive skills in pretend play by assessing the child’s ability to self-initiate pretend play. The 
CHIPPA can be used with children aged 3-years to 7-years 11 months.   
 
CHIPPA is reported to be a clinically viable, reliable and valid assessment of child pretend 
play. Several studies have validated the reliability and validity of CHIPPA and found the 
CHIPPA shows: (a) concurrent validity with a test of children’s social competencies assessed, 
Penn Interactive Play Scale (McAloney & Stagnitti, 2009; Uren & Stagnitti, 2009); test-retest 
reliability as evidence that the assessment produces a stable measure of pretend play (Stagnitti 
et al., 2000); and, inter-rater reliability in discriminating between the play of typically 
developing pre-schoolers and pre-schoolers with pre-academic problems (Stagnitti et al., 
2000). According to Stagnitti, Unsworth, and Rodger (2000) their test is a more comprehensive 
measure of child pretence as compared to other measures like ‘The Symbolic Play Test 
developed’ by Lowe, and Costello (1982) which only assesses conventional-imaginative play 
and ‘The Test of Pretend Play or The Warwick Symbolic Play Test’ by Lewis and Boucher 
(1997) which only assesses a child’s ability to substitute objects, attribute properties to objects, 
and refer to absent objects as if present. CHIPPA measures the elaborateness of a child’s play 
(that is, how complex and organised the play is), the ability of a child to use symbols in play, 
and also considers if a child relies on someone else for play ideas.  
 
Task Materials. There are two conditions of pretend play with the CHIPPA, symbolic play and 
conventional-imaginative play. A Wendy house is made by hanging a cloth over two chairs. 




1) Conventional-imaginative play: 1 truck, 1 trailer, 1 male doll, 1 female doll, 1 wrench, 
4 sheep, 2 horses, 3 cows, 2 pigs, 3 goats, 1 rooster, 12 fences 
2) Symbolic play: 1 large box, 1 small box, 1 dowel stick, 1 flat stick, 3 pebbles, 1 tin, 1 
cone, 1 tea-towel, 1 face washer, 2 cloth dolls 
 
Task Administration. The administration of CHIPPA involved engaging children in symbolic 
play and conventional-imaginative play for fifteen minutes each. Children were randomly 
assigned to the play conditions. According to the CHIPPA manual the order of the presentation 
of the play materials does not affect the overall assessment results. To administer the task each 
child was invited to sit in front of the Wendy House with the researcher. The toys for a given 
condition were presented but the researcher retained one doll for the modelling segment of 
play. 
 
 Each play condition ran for 15 minutes and to begin play the child was instructed, “Here are 
some toys for you to play with, you can play with them anyway that you like”. For the first 5-
minutes the child was observed playing. In the second 5-minutes the researcher could randomly 
model five different play actions where ever possible. For conventional-imaginative play five 
play actions could be modelled, namely: (a) The doll walks; (b) The doll pats the cow; (c) The 
doll fixes the truck or fence; (d) The doll drives the truck; (e) The doll waves. In the symbolic 
play the five play actions modelled were: (a) The doll waves; (b) The doll drinks; (c) The doll 
drives; (d) The doll walks; (e) The doll sleeps. The modelled actions were repeated as often as 
possible when the examiner had the opportunity to do so, but if the modelling interfered with 
a child’s play, then the examiner did not persist, as the child did not need a model to play. The 
modelled actions could not suggest a story line. The researcher avoided modelling a play action 
that a child was actively demonstrating. In the final 5-minutes the child was encouraged to keep 
on playing, if encouragement was needed. The fifteen minutes of play were child-initiated, so 
the researcher allowed the child to take the lead and made no suggestions of what to play with 
or how to play. At the end of the thirty-minutes children were rewarded with stickers as a thank 
you for their participation.  
 
Task Scoring. Each play action performed by a child while playing with CHIPPA toys is coded 
(see Appendix C for the CHIPPA coding scheme). The category of play action codes extracted 
from the coding scheme include: 
• Non-play action – non-play action, child is not engaged with the play materials 
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• Repetitive action – repeats a series of actions or action more than twice 
• Functional action – play materials are used in a functional way 
• Elaborate action – functional actions used in a logical sequence; verbally attributes 
properties; refers to absent objects 
• Object Substitution – represents objects given as if it were something else 
• Imitative Action – child imitates the actions modelled by the researcher immediately 
 
Pretend play behaviours on the CHIPPA are quantitatively scored on three attributes:  
(1) Percentage of Elaborate Pretend Play Actions (PEPA): which measures the 
elaborateness of the child's pretend play. PEPA is calculated by dividing the number 
of elaborate actions by the total number of actions performed by the child and 
multiplying the answer by one hundred to get the percentage of elaborate actions score 
for each child.  
(2) Number of Object Substitutions (NOS): measures the number of times the child uses 
an object in object substitution, for example, using the shoebox as a table. NOS is 
scored by counting the number of instances of object substitution coded for each child. 
(3) Number of Imitated Actions (NIA): measures the ability of a child to carry out his/her 
own play ideas, without relying on a model to play. NIA is scored by counting the 
number of instances of imitated actions coded for each child. 
 
Percentage of Pretend Play Actions and Number of Object Substitutions measure cognitive 
play skills and are referred to as cognitive play scores. Imitated actions measure the number of 
times the child imitates the examiner during the modelling segment of the play session may 
indicate that a child is not developmentally able to organise their own play and take charge of 
their play situation. Thus, a low score for imitated action suggests that the child did not rely on 
a model for play ideas whereas a high score for imitated actions is indicative of developmental 
delay and/or inability to self-initiate play ideas. Standard scores accompanied raw scores as 
test was normed on an Australian sample. A sample of the CHIPPA scoring sheet can be seen 






4.3.1.2 Pretend Action Task  
Background. The Pretend Action Task developed by Overton and Jackson (1973) is a measure 
of children’s ability to represent objects and actions symbolically. In the Pretend Action Task 
children are required to physically demonstrate a series of pretend actions designed to assess 
their level of representation of pretend gestures (Carlson, White, Davis-Unger, 2014). The 
Pretend Action Task is considered a reliable and sensitive measure for detecting differences in 
the developmental complexities of pretence as it relates to symbolic representation (Kirkham 
& Kidd, 2015).  
 
Task Materials. The materials required are a piece of wood and a piece of paper.  
 
Task Administration. Children were asked to perform action sequences directed to self: (1) 
pretend you are combing your hair with a comb (comb); (2) pretend you are brushing your 
teeth with a toothbrush (toothbrush); (3) pretend you are drinking out of a cup (cup); and action 
sequences directed to the external world (4) pretend you are hammering this (wooden block) 
with a hammer (hammer); (5) pretend you are cutting this (wooden block) with a knife (knife); 
(6) pretend you are cutting this (piece of paper) with a pair of scissors (scissors). The first three 
actions are referred to as actions directed to self (self-directed actions) and the remaining three 
are referred to as actions to the external world (externally-directed actions) and the two 
categories of actions were presented to students randomly.  
 
Task Scoring. Scores ranging from 0 to 3 are assigned based on three criteria, respectively;  
(1) no representation or performance of action sequences; (0) 
(2) the participant uses their hand as the experimental object, for example using a finger to 
brush one’s teeth; (1) 
(3) the participant uses his hand 'as if'' correctly holding and operating on the experimental 
object; (2) 
 
The assumption is that children come to perform symbolic representations of imagined objects 
toward self, earlier than actions directed toward the external world (Overton & Jackson, 1973). 





4.3.2 Counterfactual reasoning  
To assess children’s counterfactual reasoning abilities the Location Change task developed by 
Rafetseder and Perner (2010) was selected. 
 
4.3.2.1 Location Change Task 
Background. The Location Change task was designed to check whether children can inhibit the 
tendency to use basic conditional reasoning to arrive at the correct answer to counterfactual 
reasoning questions in favour of effortful reasoning by integrating the counterfactual premise 
to arrive at the correct counterfactual response. Although this measure has only been reported 
in one published study it potentially has good construct validity as it is designed to discriminate 
among the different errors and reasoning strategies children make when reasoning 
counterfactually for example, realist errors from typical errors and basic conditional reasoning 
from effortful or adult-like counterfactual reasoning. The task which was originally written in 
German was obtained from the corresponding author on the publication Rafetseder and Perner, 
(2010) who translated it to English before sharing. The translation was further reviewed by an 
independent translator at the University of Cambridge to ensure that the content validity was 
maintained after translation.   
 
Task Description. The task design uses four story themes relating to four main protagonists - 
Doctor, Teacher, Fire-fighter, and Police. The task was administered with the use of props 
designed using toys and cut-outs to create miniature versions of the setting where each 
character works. The materials used to administer the task are listed below:  
(1) Doctor Story: hospital, park, swimming pool, doctor, doctor bag, toy- boy 
(2) Teacher Story: school, house, playground, toy- teacher, toy- girl, toy-students,  
(3) Firefighter Story: fire-station, forest, living room, fire-extinguisher, fire, toy fire-fighter 
(4) Policeman Story: police station, car park, shopping centre, motor cycle, cars, toy-
policeman  
 
Task Administration. Each story has four variations or conditions. The four variations or 
conditions are referred to as Typical-1 (T1), Atypical-1 (At1), Typical-2 (T2), and Atypical-2 
(At2). In Typical-1 and Atypical-1 tasks there is one location change – the protagonist moves 
from the typical or atypical location (counterfactual antecedent) to a final location where they 
are needed to solve a problem (counterfactual consequent). In the Typical-2 and Ayptical-2 
tasks there are two location changes – the protagonist moves between the typical and atypical 
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locations or vice versa (counterfactual antecedents) before going to the final location where 
they are needed to solve a problem (counterfactual consequent).  
 
The task simulates a protagonist moving between a typical location where they work to a 
consequent location and moving between an atypical location where the protagonist goes to 
the consequent location. The CFR question requires children to identify where the protagonist 
would be if they had not been called to their final location and the correct answer is the last 
typical or atypical antecedent location. The Location Change task essentially assesses if 
children can correctly answer whether the protagonist would counterfactually be in a typical or 
atypical location if he did not move to his last location (Rafetseder & Perner, 2010). A 
breakdown of the different location changes across all four of the story themes is presented in 
Table 4.2. 
 
The administration of the four stories in the Location Change task followed a similar pattern. 
The full task battery of the Location Change task used in this study is in Appendix D. Each 
story was presented to participants by first familiarising the child with the different locations 
the protagonist navigates in the story. An illustration of how the Location Change Task was 
administered is provided using the Fire-fighter story. All four variations of the Fire-fighter 
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(a) Typical-1: Fire-fighter Story. The firefighter moves between the typical location of a fire 
station (antecedent location) to the forest (consequent location). The story sequence and 











(b) Atypical-1: Fire-fighter Story. The fire fighter moves between the atypical location of a 
living room (antecedent location) to the forest (consequent location). The story sequence and 














(c) Typical-2: Firefighter Story. The firefighter moves between the atypical location of a living 
room and typical location of a fire-station (two antecedent location changes in the story) before 
proceeding to the forest (consequent location). The story sequence and location changes are 














(d) ATypical-2: Firefighter Story. The firefighter moves between the typical location of the 
fire-station and an atypical location of a living room (two antecedent location changes in the 
story) before proceeding to the forest (consequent location). The story sequence and location 













Task Scoring. All responses were assigned a score of one for correct responses and zero for 
incorrect responses. This applies to control questions as well as the CFR question.  Error 
patterns from incorrect responses were also coded as these are indicators of the reasoning 
strategies children employ to answer counterfactual reasoning questions. The classification of 
responses based on reasoning errors are summarised in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3 Classification of Responses by Reasoning Errors 






Doctor Typical 1 Hospital Swimming pool   
 Atypical 1 Park Swimming pool Hospital  
 Typical 2 Hospital Swimming pool  Park 
 Atypical 2 Park Swimming pool Hospital 
 
 
Teacher Typical 1 School House   
 Atypical 1 Playground House School  
 Typical 2 School House  Playground 
 Atypical 2 Playground House School 
 
 
Fireman Typical 1 Fire-station Forest   
 Atypical 1 Liv-room Forest Fire-station  
 Typical 2 Fire-station Forest  Living-room 
 Atypical 2 Liv-room Forest Fire-station 
 
 
Policeman Typical 1 Police station Car park   
 Atypical 1 Shopping centre Car park Police station  
 Typical 2 Police station Car park  Shopping centre 







Differences from the original task. There were a number of variations between the original 
version of the story and how this task was administered which should be outlined. These 
differences will be factored in when interpreting results from the two studies: 
 
a)  The order of the presentation of the stories were counterbalanced using a Latin Square 
design but the conditions were not counterbalanced. Rafetseder and Perner (2010) 
counterbalanced at both levels.  
 
b) Every task began with introducing the different ‘locations’ in the story and then asking the 
participant to identify each location, for example, “show me again where the fire-station is? 
And where is the forest? And where is the living-room?” The participant did not proceed with 
the task unless they correctly identified each location. A record was not kept of the number of 
times these questions had to be repeated. Rafetseder and Perner (2010) kept track of the number 
of repetitions for these questions, treating them as control questions.  
 
(c) Another noteworthy difference relates to the ‘Before Control’ question. If a participant 
failed the before control question; the control question was repeated to give the participant a 
second go at answering the question. Regardless of the answer the subsequent questions 
(counterfactual reasoning question and Now Control question) were posed. This is markedly 
different from how the task was originally administered by (Rafetseder & Perner, 2010) who 
repeated the story to students if they failed to answer the first control question correctly.  
Arguably, repeating the story and subsequent control question allows one to attribute a child’s 
success on the counterfactual reasoning task to their capacity for counterfactual reasoning over 
a memory fault. The researcher therefore acknowledges that by not repeating the story when a 
participant was unsuccessful at answering the first control question may be a limitation of this 
study. Traditionally, it is thought that the burden of memory recall removes the focus on 








4.3.3 Executive Functions  
Three measures of executive functions were administered targeting working memory and 
inhibitory control. Two of the tasks were measures of inhibition which can be defined as simple 
and complex inhibition similar to the classification used by (Garon et al., 2008). The tasks were 
a delay of gratification paradigm and the Head Toes Knees and Shoulders task. 
  
4.3.3.1 Head Toes Knees and Shoulders Task (HTKS)  
Background. The HTKS was developed by McClelland, Duncan, Bowles, Acock, Miao, and 
Pratt (2014). It can be described as a complex inhibition measure as it involves holding an 
arbitrary rule in mind, responding according to this rule, and inhibiting a dominant response 
(Garon et al., 2008). HTKS is reported to have good construct validity in relation to other 
executive function measures (McClelland et al., 2014).  
 
Task Administration. HTKS takes the form of a short game which uses no materials but only 
relying on interactions between the examiner and the child. The only apparatus is the task sheet 
for recording students’ actions. The HTKS comprised of three sections with up to four paired 
behavioral rules: “touch your head” and “touch your toes”, “touch your shoulders” and “touch 
your knees”. Children are guided through a series of instructions first requiring them to respond 
naturally followed by a switch in the instructions as in, “when I ask you to touch your head 
instead of touching your head you touch your toes and when I ask you to touch your knees 
instead of touching your knees you touch your shoulders”. Hence, the activity becomes 
increasingly challenging where children must remember the switch for two actions (head and 
toes) – first trial, then four actions (head, toes, knees and shoulders) – second trial, and then 
another switch as in, ‘when I ask you to touch your head you touch your knees and when I ask 
you to touch your shoulders you touch your toes’- third trial.  
 
Task Scoring. Children got one mark for each correct switch they performed.  The HTKS record 







4.3.3.2 Delay of Gratification Task   
Background. The delay of gratification task used in this study was based on that reported by 
Thompson, Barresi, and Moore (1997). Delay of Gratification is a measure of impulse control 
or inhibition. The delay of gratification paradigm used assessed a child’s ability to make an 
initial choice for a delayed reward in preference to a current reward (Thompson et al., 1997). 
This task was used to keep children motivated, between each counterfactual reasoning story. 
The reward of stickers based on the options of ‘now’ or ‘later’ was used to sustain children’s 
attention for the duration of the administration of the sixteen counterfactual reasoning stories. 
 
Task Materials. The only materials needed for this task were stickers. 
 
Task Administration. A child was offered the opportunity to win “1 sticker now” or “2 stickers 
for later” before each of the four counterfactual reasoning story set (doctor, teacher, fire fighter, 
policeman). The four delay of gratification trials were interspersed before each CFR story by 
saying to the participant, “Before I tell you the stories about the Fire fighter (or Doctor, 
Teacher, Policeman) you can have 1 sticker now or two stickers for later - which would you 
like?” If the child chose one sticker now; they could have that sticker right away. If the child 
chose two stickers for later, they would have to wait to get the stickers after they heard the four 
versions of a given counterfactual story. The envelope for delayed-reward stickers was shown 
to the child and they were assured that if delayed-reward were chosen, the stickers would be 
placed in the envelope and saved until the end of the stories. At the end of the game, all the 
stickers were taken out of the envelope and handed to the child, so they could take them home. 
The researcher’s responses to any of the participants’ choices remained uniform and mildly 
positive.  
 
Task scoring. The number of stickers the child chooses for each trial makes up their total score 
on the task. In other words, 1 score for choosing one sticker now and 2 scores for choosing 2 
stickers for later. A participant could receive between 4 to 8 stickers unless they indicated that 






4.3.3.3 Spin the Pots  
Background. The Spin the Pots task developed by Hughes (1998) was used to assess working 
memory. Working memory generally involves holding information in mind and updating the 
information held in mind (Garon et al., 2008). This task has been administered in numerous 
studies. Hence, it is considered to be reliable and valid measure of working memory (Beck, 
Schaefer, Pang, & Carlson, 2011; Hughes & Ensor, 2005).  
 
Task Administration. The materials used were: 1 Lazy-Susan, twelve differently shaped boxes 
each painted a different colour, a white, opaque hand kerchief large enough to cover the boxes, 
and 10 stickers per children. Each child was given their ten stickers and invited to hide 
individual stickers in ten of the twelve boxes. Then the boxes were placed on the Lazy-Susan, 
covered with the hand kerchief and spun. Afterwards, the scarf was lifted, and the child is asked 
to recall where the stickers were hidden. Whether or not the child wins a sticker the box is 
returned to the Lazy-Susan, covered, and spun ready for the next trial. After each spin only one 
box could be selected at a time and this continues until the child finds all 10 stickers hidden or 
their twenty chances ran out whichever is sooner.  
 
Task Scoring. Performance scores on the task were calculated as 20 trials minus the total 
number of errors made. 
 
 
4.3.4 Receptive Language  
Receptive language is an index of listening and auditory comprehension (Wigg et al., 2006). 
 
4.3.4.1 Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals 
Background. The Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals (CELF) Preschool-2uk 
pinpoints language and communication strengths and weaknesses in children ages 3 to 6 years. 
Receptive language developed was the focus of assessment and were assessed using two 
subtests of the Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals (CELF) by Wigg, Secord, and 
Semel (2006). The assessment comprises of two components: (a) Sentence Structure and (b) 
Concepts and Following Directions. Sentence Structure evaluates the child’s ability to interpret 
spoken sentences of increasing length and complexity. Understanding spoken sentences is an 
integral feature of developing conversational skills, participating in interactive story-telling, 
following directions, as well as, understanding of relationships between spoken language, real-
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life references and situations emphasized through listening to stories, descriptions of events 
and matching pictured references to spoken or read stimuli. Concepts and Following Directions 
evaluates the child’s ability to interpret spoken directions of increasing length and complexity 
that contain concepts that require logical operations; remember the names, characteristics, and 
order of mention of pictures; and identify from among several choices the targeted objects. The 
task speaks to children’s comprehension, recall and the ability to act upon spoken directions.  
CELF Preschool-2uk is recognized for having been standardized on a UK sample which is 
comparable to the US and reports having good reliability and validity. 
 
Task Materials. This is a standardised assessment, so the materials are provided in the form of 
a Stimulus Book, Stimulus Sheets for the Concepts and Following Directions task and the 
Record Form to input participants' responses. (see Appendix F for record forms for both 
Sentence Structure and Concepts & Following Directions). 
 
Task Administration. For both tasks, Sentence Structure and Concepts & Following Directions, 
the child points to pictures in the Stimulus Book in response to oral directions. Each assessment 
requires participants to respond to twenty-two sentences. Items were not repeated for the 
Concepts & Following Directions subtest but could be repeated for the Sentence Structure 
subtest. Discontinue rules were applied if participant scored incorrectly on five consecutive 
items for the Sentence Structure subtest and six consecutive items for the Concepts & 
Following Directions subtest. 
 
Task Scores. Participants were assigned one score for correct responses and zero for incorrect 
responses. Standard scores accompanied raw scores as the test was normed on a UK sample. 
The CELF is a norm-referenced standardized test that is suitable for comparing children with 









4.4.0 Data Collection Procedures 
Each child was tested individually in a quiet space at their school. Children completed three 
sessions of testing. One session to administer the CHIPPA and pretence action task lasting forty 
minutes, another session to administer the Location Change CFR task and delay of gratification 
task lasting forty minutes, and the third session to administer the control measures (the EF tasks 
and the receptive language task) lasting thirty minutes. All the sessions were audio recorded 
except for the CHIPPA which was video-recorded. A research assistant was recruited and 
assisted with data collection at two of the seven schools recruited for the study.  Table 4.2 
shows the breakdown of each task and its corresponding duration time for administration. 
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4.5.0 Ethical Considerations 
Several ethical principles were adhered to during this study. These include communicating 
information transparently to secure participants’ informed consent, informing participants of 
their right to withdraw from the study, providing participants with incentives for participating 
and employing good practices that ensured that the data generated from the study were stored 
securely so the privacy of participants was maintained (British Educational Research 
Association [BERA], 2018). Before commencing fieldwork, a Disclosure Barring Service 
(DBS) check - a criminal records check which verifies that a person is suitable to work with 
young, vulnerable persons – was undertaken because it is a legal requirement before one can 
begin working with children in the UK. This present study underwent ethical review in 
accordance with institutional procedures by the Faculty of Education, University of 
Cambridge. Permission to carry out the research with school-aged children was subsequently 
obtained from schools, headteacher and principals, who agreed for their reception classes to 
participant (see Appendix G – School Information Letter). Written informed consent was 
obtained from parents on behalf of all children before they could partake in the research 
activities given data was collected from 3-5-year-old children (see Appendix H – Parent 
Consent Letter). Upon inclusion into the study, where possible, child assent was also sought 
by allowing each child to express their agreement to take part in the research exercise before 
participating in any of the tasks, thereby protecting children’s wellbeing by respecting their 
right to withdraw at any point during testing. Additionally, to keep children motivated during 
the administration of the battery of cognitive tasks children were rewarded with stickers after 
each task they completed as an incentive for participating. At all stages of the investigation 
participant data and records were maintained securely, in a manner that ensured the 
confidentiality and anonymity of the participant. Identifiable information like names of schools 




4.6.0 Data Analysis Plan  
This section gives an overview of the data analyses conducted for this study. This present study 
brings together two variables which traditionally have been investigated independently with 
the intent of exploring possible links which may exist between the two. Hence, it was decided 
to explore the findings for pretence and counterfactual reasoning separately before considering 
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associations between the two and with other related cognitive skills. The general data analyses 
procedures are detailed below: 
A) Pretence - This study measured indicators of pretence and used these to draw inferences 
about the cognitive structure of pretence. Pretence is a multi-dimensional construct and there 
is no consistent pattern to which indicators of pretence are studied across different studies. To 
my knowledge, there are no published reports from the CHIPPA with a UK sample. Hence, it 
was important to understand the relationship between the indicators of pretence measured in 
this study. Pretence is defined in this present study by the variables of elaborate pretend play, 
and object substitution derived from the two conditions of play with the CHIPPA (with 
conventional imaginative toys and symbolic toys), and symbolic representation derived from 
the Pretend Action Task. 
 
• ANOVA analyses were used as preliminary analyses to explore whether participants’ 
performance on pretence indicators were dependent on factors like gender. 
• Correlational analyses were used to explore associations between the indicators of 
pretence measured - elaborate pretend play, object substitution, symbolic 
representation.  
• Cronbach alpha was run to check that indicators yielded good internal consistency.  
• A Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was run on the measured indicators of pretence 
to determine whether the indicators of pretence could be explained by a single latent 
factor. This factor would be subsequently used to assess whether pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning were correlated at a latent level. 
 
B) Counterfactual Reasoning – The counterfactual reasoning task used in this study has only 
been published in one previous study by Rafetseder and Perner (2010). This task was selected 
because it attempts to discriminate between naïve counterfactual reasoning (basic conditional 
reasoning) and mature adult-like counterfactual reasoning. To my knowledge, there is also no 
published report of this being used with a UK sample. Hence, it was important to understand 
how participants from this study context performed in this counterfactual reasoning task. 
Counterfactual reasoning is inferred by comparing children’s performance across the four 
counterfactual reasoning scenarios based on the typical and atypical scenarios of which 
atypical-2 tasks, especially, require children to overcome basic conditional reasoning to 
provide the correct counterfactual reasoning responses. 
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• Several Chi-square analyses were conducted to assess reasoning error patterns across 
participants’ responses to the counterfactual reasoning questions. These include 
Friedman Chi-square Test and McNemar Chi-square test. 
• Correlation analyses were used to explore associations among the counterfactual 
conditions specified in the task.   
• Cronbach alpha was run to check how well the items from the different counterfactual 
conditions hang together. 
• A Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was run on the measured indicators of 
counterfactual reasoning to determine whether the indicators could be explained by a 
single latent factor. This factor would be subsequently used to assess whether pretence 
and counterfactual reasoning were correlated at a latent level 
(C) The goal of this study is to understand the nature of the relationship between pretence in 
counterfactual reasoning. One way of achieving this goal is to unpick associations between 
Pretence and Counterfactual Reasoning with each other and in relation to other cognitive skills. 
Specifically, contributions of executive functions - working memory, inhibition, delay of 
gratification, and receptive language, to pretence and counterfactual reasoning were explored 
in this present study. 
 
• Correlational analyses showed the associations between the latent scores of pretence 
and counterfactual reasoning to the executive function skills - working memory, 
inhibition, delay of gratification, - and receptive language variables. Partial correlations 
established whether correlations remained significant after controlling for age in 
months. 
• Hierarchical Multiple Regression analyses compared the unique contributions of 
executive function variables and receptive language to pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning. In separate regressions pretence and counterfactual reasoning were treated 
as dependent variables. The independent variables added in separate steps in the model 
were Working memory, inhibition, and language. Age in months and receptive 
language were added first, in separate steps, as controls. The goal was to understand if 
pretence and counterfactual reasoning share cognitive mechanisms by comparing 




(D) As part of the goal of understanding the nature of the relationship shared by pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning the relationship between the two were explored at a structural level 
using structural equation modelling analyses (SEM). SEM is a statistical technique used to 
reduce the number of observed variables into a smaller number of latent variables by examining 
the covariation among the observed variables (Schreiber et al., 2006). A hypothesized model 
of the structural relationship shared by pretence and counterfactual reasoning is proposed in 
Chapter 3 Research Design section 3.2.0. and tested in the following way: 
• Bifactor analysis was used to assess whether a general factor accounts for significant 
covariance in all the observed measures and whether the domain-specific factors of 
pretence and counterfactual reasoning accounts for unique variance in the indicators of 
the specific domain over and beyond the general factor (Brown, 2015). A bifactor 
model is well known for assessing the multi-dimensionality of a domain structure by 
assessing whether the data are more or less consistent with both unidimensional (i.e., a 
strong general factor) and multidimensional (i.e., two or more conceptually narrower, 
correlated factors) measurement models (Rodriguez et al., 2016). Based on this model 
the prevailing question is whether there is enough variance in the data to extract a 
general factor that could explain relationship shared by pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning, as well as, to extract latent constructs representing – pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning 
• A second SEM model used was a second-order factor model which tested whether a 
higher order factor accounts for the relationship observed among lower order factors 
(Chen et al., 2006). This model works on the premise that lower order factors (pretence 
and counterfactual reasoning) are correlated and that association can be explained by 
second-order general factor. 
 
The two different theoretical models provide two different ways of conceptualizing the 
explanation of how pretence and counterfactual reasoning might share cognitive mechanisms. 
Although different in their approaches, both bifactor model analysis and second-order factor 
analysis start from the same premise; that is, two related domains comprise of a general factor 
or construct (Chen et al., 2006). However, in a bifactor model approach the data is explored to 
determine whether it is strong enough to judge whether the multidimensional nature of the data 
can justify a unidimensional measurement model (Rodriguez et al., 2016). In other words, can 
the data account for a general factor over and above the variance explained by that of the 
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domain factors? In a second-order factor analysis approach, the general factor accounts for the 
commonality among lower order factors or domain factors (Chen et al., 2006). The assumption 
tested considers if the data are strong enough to estimate a general factor that accounts for the 
correlation shared by the domain factors. Moreover, the substantive difference between the two 
models is to do with the extent to which the relationship between the domain-specific factors 
are independent of the general factor. 
 
The two different models mapping the possible latent relationships shared by pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning were compared and the adequacy of the models were assessed by: (a) 
checking that each hypothesized model is identified by the data, and (b) checking that the 
model meets the required model fit criteria. A model is said to be identified when a unique 
solution exists for all the model parameters and the statistical adequacy of the model is derived 
from the results of the goodness of fit tests (Bartholomew et al., 2008). The model which best 
fit the data was selected and used to explain the structural relationship shared by pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning.  
 
 
4.7.0 Missing Data  
Instances of missing data were primarily from incomplete task batteries arising from 
participants being absent from school, non-responses during task administration, and in the 
case of the pretend play measure some ten percent of pretend play videos were not coded 
because of time-constraints. The Delay of Gratification task was introduced after the start of 
the study. Hence, participants from the first two schools (approximately twenty-eight children) 
did not do this task. Otherwise, missing data was from participant absenteeism and non-
responsiveness. Since, cases of missing data varied across tasks; cases with missing data were 
not entirely excluded from the study but only from those analyses which included the missing 
measure to avoid losing statistical power. Hence, where applicable analyses were run using 
pairwise deletion. Missing values were not imputed given the small number of missing cases 








Table 4.5 Number of Missing Data Across Study Tasks 
 
Variables Measures Sub-tasks N Missing 
Counterfactual 
Reasoning (CFR) 
Location Change Task Doctor Story 189 6 (3%) 
Teacher Story 189 10 (5%) 
Fireman Story 189 7 (4%) 
Policeman Story 189 8 (4%) 
Pretence/ 
Pretend Play (PP) 





189 18 (10%) 
Object Substitution 
Combined* 
189 19 (10%) 
 Imitated Actions 
Combined*  
 
189 19 (10%) 
Pretend Action Task 
(PAT) 
 189 5 (2%) 
Receptive Language CELF- Sentence 
Structure and Concepts 
& Following Directions 
combined 
 189 4 (2%) 
Working Memory Spin the Pots Task  189 4 (2%) 
 
Inhibition Head Toes Knees & 
Shoulders task (HTKS) 
 
 189 8 (4%) 
Delay of Gratification 
(DoG) 
 189 36 (19%) 
*combined scores are derived from the summing the two conditions of play from the CHIPPA 
*Imitated action scores are indicators of the child’s reliance on pretend play ideas modelled by the researcher  




4.8.0 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided an overview of the research methods employed for this study. The study 
participants are identified and the rational for selecting the specific age range to study is 
explained. All the measures used to collect data in this study are described by providing a 
background, list of materials, task administration procedures and scoring guidelines. The 
general data collection procedures followed are explained. Plans for data analysis were framed 
based on participants’ performance for the pretence and counterfactual reasoning tasks 
independently. Data analyses methods included correlational analyses, ANOVA, factor 
































































Chapter 5 Results A 
 
5.1.0 Introduction  
This chapter is the first of two results chapters for this thesis. The overall aim of the study, and 
the research questions which framed the study design are reviewed. The study sample is 
described and the findings from the first two research questions are addressed in this chapter. 
The first two research questions are aimed at exploring findings about pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning independently before considering how the two are related with each 
other and other cognitive skills like executive functions and receptive language. The first two 
research questions are important because they clarify how pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning are conceptualized and set the parameters for generalizations made about pretence 
and counterfactual reasoning from this study. Quantitative analyses were done primarily using 
Stata release version 12 (StataCorp., 2011) and to a lesser extent with IBM SPSS version 25 
(IBM Corp, 2017). 
 
 
5.2.0 Study Aim 
This thesis aimed to explore the theoretical assertion that counterfactual reasoning and pretence 
are related cognitive skills which share similar cognitive mechanisms. 
 
 
5.3.0 Research Questions 
The main research questions addressed in this study are outlined here and sub-questions which 
incrementally generated findings to answer the main research questions are stated.  
 
RQ 1. Is there evidence that the observed pretence behaviours depend on a common underlying 
ability in this domain? 
1a. Are the indicators of pretence correlated? 
1b. Can the indicators of pretence be reduced to a single latent factor? 
 
RQ 2. Is there evidence that the observed counterfactual reasoning behaviours depend on a 
common underlying ability in this domain? 
2a. Are the indicators of counterfactual reasoning correlated?  
138 
 
2b. What do patterns of errors and successes in children’s counterfactual reasoning 
responses tell us about the type of reasoning strategies they employ? 
2c. Can the indicators of counterfactual reasoning be reduced to a single latent factor? 
 
RQ3. How are pretence, counterfactual reasoning, executive functions, and receptive language 
associated? 
3a. Are pretence, counterfactual reasoning, executive functions, and receptive language 
correlated?  
3b. Do receptive language, symbolic representation, and EFs account for unique 
variance in Child-initiated Pretence?  
3c. Do receptive language, symbolic representation, and EFs account for unique 
variance in CFR? 
 
RQ4. Is there support for the idea that the constructs from the domain of pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning are underpinned by a general imaginative representation ability? 
4a. Is there support for the latent model showing the relationship between pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning?   
4b. Is there support for the structural model showing that pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning are underpinned by an imaginative representation ability?  
 
 
5.4.0 Study Sample  
The study participants were reception-aged children attending schools across Cambridgeshire. 
The sample comprised 192 children. The study focused on typical development so any 
participant with a diagnosis of atypical development was excluded from the analyses. Three 
participants were excluded due to having a diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder. Participant 
data were analysed for 189 typically developing children; males = 101, females = 88 with 32% 
(n=62) of participants coming from multilingual homes. Participants’ ages ranged from 48 





5.5.0 Research Question 1: Is there evidence that the observed pretence behaviours 
depend on a common underlying ability in this domain? 
In this section, the role of pretence as an independent variable in this study is examined. To 
answer the research question, correlational analysis was used to determine if the indicators of 
pretence correlated with each other and a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was run to extract 
a latent construct of pretence. This is an important question because it clarifies how well the 
indicators selected to represent the concept of pretence hang together and thereby indicates the 
validity of the construct of pretence. Three indicators of pretence were measured – elaborate 
pretend play, object substitution and symbolic representation. Pretence was assessed using: The 
Child Initiated Pretend Play Assessment (CHIPPA) developed by Stagnitti, Unsworth, and 
Rodger (2000) and the Pretend Action Task by Overton and Jackson (1973). A brief recap of 
what the measure entails will help to provide the reader with some context for interpreting the 
results. Summary descriptives and tests of parametric analyses are reported. The correlations 
among the indicators are also examined and the results of the CFA are reported. The section 
concludes with a summary of the findings.   
 
5.5.1 CHIPPA 
The CHIPPA measure provided indicators of elaborate pretend play and object substitution. 
Children were video recorded participating in two pretend play conditions: (1) Conventional-
imaginative Play with conventional or structured play materials in the form of a farm set and 
(2) Symbolic Play with unstructured play materials in the form of random objects like a tin, 
cone, et. cetera, both of which lent themselves to eliciting elaborate pretend play actions and 
object substitution actions (see the Chapter 4 Research Methods section 4.3.1.1 for a full 
description of the task battery and scoring procedures). For each condition, records of 
children’s play actions are pooled into three categories:  
1) Percentage of Elaborate Pretend Play to reflect the complexity of a child’s ability to 
logically sequence pretend play actions, such that, the longer the sequence of play 
actions the more complex and organised the play of the child and the higher the 
elaborate play score;  
2) Number of Object Substitutions to indicate the use of symbols in play by representing 
play object as if they were something else, such that, the higher this score the more 
symbolic and representative is the play of the child, and;  
3) Number of Imitated Actions to identify if a child imitates the experimenter’s actions 
as this shows that a child has difficulty initiating their own play ideas, such that the 
140 
 
lower this score the more likely that the child is spending time self-initiating their 
pretend play.  
CHIPPA results are therefore reported for the two play conditions; conventional-imaginative 
play (CV) and symbolic play (SY). Each condition comprises three subscales: percentage of 
elaborate pretend play (PEPA), number of object substitutions (NOS), and number of imitated 
actions (NIA). 
 
5.5.1.1 CHIPPA inter-rater reliability 
11% (n=20) of the total sample (n = 189) was double coded by the researcher and a second 
observer to obtain inter-rater reliability agreement. Intra-class correlation (ICC) analyses based 
on a mean-rating for two coders (k=2) using a 2-way mixed-effects consistency model was 
used to measure inter-observer consistency on PEPA, NOS, and NIA. CHIPPA sub-scales were 
found to have good to excellent reliability and are reported in Table 5.1 (Koo & Li, 2016; 
Shrout & Fleiss, 1979). 
Table 5.1 CHIPPA Inter-rater Reliability Results from Intra-class Correlations 
CHIPPA Sub-scores Average ICC 95% CI Significance Level 
PEPA Conventional .88 [.67, .95] F (19,19) = 7.53, p < .001 
PEPA Symbolic .96 [.90, .98] F (19,19) = 25.03, p < .001 
PEPA Combined .94 [.85, .98] F (19,19) = 16.29, p < .001 
NOS Conventional .90 [.74, .96] F (19,19) = 9.73, p < .001 
NOS Symbolic .96 [.89, .98] F (19,19) = 23.84, p < .001 
NOS Combined .96 [.89, .98] F (19,19) = 23.75, p < .001 
NIA Conventional .88 [.71, .95] F (19,19) = 8.56, p < .001 
NIA Symbolic .87 [.67, .95] F (19, 19) = 7.73, p < .001 
NIA Combined .84 [.60, .94] F (19, 19) = 6.26, p < .001 
ICC: Intraclass Correlation Coefficient 
CI: Confidence Intervals 
PEPA conventional: Percentage of Elaborate Pretend Play in the conventional imaginative play condition 
PEPA symbolic: Percentage of Elaborate Pretend Play in the symbolic play condition 
PEPA combined: Percentage of Elaborate Pretend Play combined across conventional imaginative play and 
symbolic play conditions 
NOS conventional: Number of Object Substitutions in the conventional imaginative play condition 
NOS symbolic: Number of Object Substitutions in the symbolic play condition 
NOS combined: Number of Object Substitutions combined across conventional imaginative play and symbolic 
play conditions 
NIA conventional: Number of Imitated Actions in the conventional imaginative play condition 
NIA symbolic: Number of Imitated Actions in the symbolic play condition 





5.5.1.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The scores for the CHIPPA subscales are summarised as means, standard deviations, minimum 
and maximum scores and presented in Table 5.2. Children had a higher percentage average of 
PEPA scores in the conventional-imaginative play condition than the symbolic play condition. 
This shows that children engaged in longer sequences of complex and organised elaborate 
pretend play when playing with conventional toys than unstructured toys. Conversely, children 
had a higher average of object substitution scores in the symbolic play condition than the 
conventional play condition. The low average number of object substitutions in the 
conventional play condition suggested that children were less likely to engage in symbolic play 
when playing with familiar conventional toys like a farm set. Scores for imitative action were 
few for both conventional and symbolic play conditions which is expected for typically 
developing children suggesting that children were more likely to initiate their own pretend play 
ideas than to imitate the pretend actions modelled by the experimenter. Overall, children had 
low mean scores for object substitution in the conventional play condition and for all three 
number of imitative action scores (conventional play, symbolic play and combined).  
Table 5.2 Summary Statistics of CHIPPA Scores 
Sub-scales N Mean SD Min  Max 
PEA-CV 170 66.76% 15.77 15% 95% 
PEPA-SY 171 48.57% 21.20 0% 86% 
PEPA-CB 171 115% 32.55 17% 180% 
NOS-CV 170 2.25 6.05 0 49 
NOS-SY 171 12.86 9.86 0 42 
NOS-CB 170 15.07 10.95 0 49 
NIA-CV 170 1.08 2.04 0 18 
NIA-SY 171 1.34 1.71 0 7 
NIA-CB 170 2.37 2.81 0 19 
PEPA-CV: Percentage of Elaborate Pretend Play in the conventional imaginative play condition 
PEPA-SY: Percentage of Elaborate Pretend Play in the symbolic play condition 
PEPA-CB: Percentage of Elaborate Pretend Play combined across conventional imaginative play and symbolic 
play conditions 
NOS-CV: Number of Object Substitutions in the conventional imaginative play condition 
NOS-SY: Number of Object Substitutions in the symbolic play condition 
NOS-CB: Number of Object Substitutions combined across conventional imaginative play and symbolic play 
conditions 
NIA-CV: Number of Imitated Actions in the conventional imaginative play condition 
NIA-SY: Number of Imitated Actions in the symbolic play condition 




5.5.1.3 Testing Assumptions of Parametric Analyses 
Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality were conducted for all nine sub-scales of the CHIPPA measure 
and are reported in Table 5.3 along with skewness and kurtosis statistics. Histograms 
visualizing the distribution of CHIPPA scores with normality curves are presented in the 
Appendix I Figures I-1 to I-12 to illustrate the results from Shapiro Wilk’s normality tests.  
 
The distribution of scores for all categories showed significant deviation from normality except 
for the scores for the percentage of elaborate pretend play in the symbolic play condition 
(PEPA-SY) and the scores for the percentage of elaborate pretend play combined (PEPA-CB), 
that is, the sum of scores for the symbolic pretend play and conventional imaginative play 
conditions. The three categories of PEPA scores showed small but negative skewness in 
contrast to the three categories of NOS and NIA scores which were all positively skewed. 
According to Acock (2018), a normal distribution has skewness of 0 and kurtosis greater than 
10 is typically concerning whilst greater than 20 is problematic.  
 
Three subscales had kurtosis greater than 10; NOS-CV, NIA-CV, and NIA-CB. A closer 
inspection of NOS-CV and all three NIA scores indicate scores were at floor on these scales 
(see Figure 5.1 for the distribution of these four scores using box plots). Imitated actions are a 
marker of limited self-initiated pretend play skills therefore floor effects mean that children are 
capable of pretending, hence the NIA subscales were not considered in further analyses. NOS-
















Table 5.3 Results of Tests of Assumptions of Normality for CHIPPA sub-scales 
CHIPPA Sub-scales Results Shapiro-Wilks  
Test of Normality  
Skewness Kurtosis 
PEPA-CV W(170) = .96, p < .05 -.71 3.22 
PEPA-SY W(171) = .99, p = .10 -.08 2.15 
PEPA-CB W(171) = .98, p = .05 -.34 2.81 
NOS-CV W(170) = .56, p < .05 4.73 30.00 
NOS-SY W(171) = .95, p < .05 .73 2.94 
NOS-CB W(170) = .95, p < .05 .68 2.90 
NIA-CV W(170) = .66, p < .05 4.54 32.49 
NIA-SY W(171) = .91, p < .05 1.36 4.31 
NIA-CB W(170) = .81, p < .05 2.42 12.22 
PEPA-CV: Percentage of Elaborate Pretend Play in the conventional imaginative play condition 
PEPA-SY: Percentage of Elaborate Pretend Play in the symbolic play condition 
PEPA-CB: Percentage of Elaborate Pretend Play combined across conventional imaginative play and symbolic 
play conditions 
NOS-CV: Number of Object Substitutions in the conventional imaginative play condition 
NOS-SY: Number of Object Substitutions in the symbolic play condition 
NOS-CB: Number of Object Substitutions combined across conventional imaginative play and symbolic play 
conditions 
NIA-CV: Number of Imitated Actions in the conventional imaginative play condition 
NIA-SY: Number of Imitated Actions in the symbolic play condition 






















5.5.2 Pretend Action Task 
The Pretend Action Task provided an indicator of symbolic representation in pretence. 
Children were video recorded performing six self and externally directed pretend actions.  The 
resulting pretend action score indexes a capacity for symbolic representation from a concrete 
signifier and through abstract symbolization (Kirkham & Kidd, 2015).  
 
5.5.2.1 PAT Inter-rater Reliability 
The Pretence Action Task was coded from video. Hence, 11% (n=20) videos of the total sample 
(n=189) were double coded by the researcher and a second observer to obtain inter-rater 
reliability agreement on children’s representation of symbolic actions (refer to Chapter 5 
Research Methods section 4.3.1.2 for the coding scheme for the Pretence Action Task). Inter-
rater reliability on the 20 videos was excellent yielding a Kappa coefficient of .93 similar to 
that of the original study by Overton and Jackson (1973). 
 
To determine the reliability of the Pretence Action Task, a Cronbach alpha reliability analysis 
was run to check the reliability of the six questions which made up the task. Cronbach alpha 
assesses the internal consistency of items within a task by assessing how closely the items are 
correlated. The results of Cronbach alpha analysis on the Pretence Action Task indicated good 
internal consistency (α = .73, M = 7.17, SD = 1.80). The value of Cronbach’s alpha met the 
recommended alpha of .70 (Streiner, 2003). This result suggested that the six pretence action 
sequences were potentially a reliable measure of symbolic representation.  
 
5.5.2.2 Descriptive Statistics & Tests of Assumptions of Parametric Analyses 
Children performed relatively well on the Pretend Action Task (PAT) N = 184, Mean = 7.17, 
SD = 1.8, Min = 0, Max = 12. The score distribution had skewness value = -.22 and kurtosis 
value = 5.68. Normality plots for children’s scores on PAT are displayed in Appendix I Figures 
I-13 and I-14. The results of the Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality showed that symbolic 
representation scores significantly deviated from normality; W (184) = .95, p = .00. Skewness 
and kurtosis statistics as well as a histogram showed that the distribution of scores were 





5.5.2.3 Preliminary Analyses: Pretence Scores 
Of the two measures of pretence, only four of the scores were used in subsequent analyses - 
PEPA-CV, PEPA-SY, NOS-SY, and symbolic representation. The individual CHIPPA scores 
were used over the combined subscales of PEPA-CB and NOS-CB and outliers were retained 
to maintain the full variability of scores from the different tasks (Song et al., 2013).  
 
Preliminary analyses in the form of one-way ANOVAs were conducted to determine if there 
were gender differences for the four pretend scores. There was a significant difference in 
participants’ elaborate pretend action scores in play with conventional toys (PEPA-CV) based 
on gender: F(1,168) = 10.29, p = .002, ῃ2 = .06. Girls had more elaborate pretend actions (N = 
83, M = 70.63, SD = 15.23) than boys (N = 87, M = 63.07, SD = 15.47) and Scheffe follow-up 
test of mean differences was significant (M = 8.54, p = .002). 
 
Similarly, there was a significant difference in participants’ elaborate pretend actions in play 
with symbolic toys (PEPA-SY) based on gender: F(1,169) = 7.19, p = .01, ῃ2 = .04. Girls had 
more elaborate pretend actions (N = 83, M = 52.96, SD = 20.75) than boys (N = 88, M = 44.42, 
SD = 20.89) and Scheffe follow-up test of mean difference was significance (M= 8.54, p = 
.008). 
 
In contrast, there was no significant difference in the number of object substitutions in play 
with symbolic toys (NOS-SY) that participants generated based on gender: F(1,169) = .86, p = 
.36, ῃ2 = .005. Similarly, there was no significant difference in the number of pretence action 
scores that participants generated based on gender: F(1,182) = .97, p = .32, ῃ2 = .005.  
 
Essentially, gender differences were observed only for girls on PEPA sub-scores suggesting 
that girls were more likely to engage in elaborate imaginative pretend play than boys. There 
were no gender effects for the number of object substitution and symbolic representation 







5.5.3 Research Question 1a. Are the indicators of pretence correlated? 
A Pearson pairwise correlation was used to explore correlations between the scores from the 
CHIPPA subscales and the pretence action task. The results are presented in Table 5.4. All 
CHIPPA subscales were significantly intercorrelated with each other but the pretend action 
task did not correlate with any of the CHIPPA scores.  The results imply that the pretence 
action task may be tapping into a different aspect of pretence from that measured by the 
CHIPPA suggesting that symbolic representation (from the pretence action task) may be 
conceptually different from elaborate pretend play and object substitution (from the CHIPPA). 
This same pretend action task was found not to be correlated with the ability to make pretend-
reality distinctions in a study with similar aged children by Carlson, White, and Davis-Unger, 
(2014). 
 
Table 5.4 Pearson Pairwise Correlation of Pretence Measures 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. PEPA-CV -      
2. PEPA-SY .50* -     
4. NOS-SY .20* .42* .36* -   
5. Symbolic Representation .12 .05    .10 .08 .02 - 
* significant correlations at the .05 level 
PEPA-CV: Percentage of Elaborate Pretend Play in the conventional imaginative play condition 
PEPA-SY: Percentage of Elaborate Pretend Play in the symbolic play condition 
NOS-CV: Number of Object Substitutions in the conventional imaginative play condition 
NOS-SY: Number of Object Substitutions in the symbolic play condition 
 
Internal Consistency of CHIPPA. As a result of not being correlated with the other pretence 
indicators the symbolic representation task was excluded from further analyses. This meant 
that the remaining indicators were drawn only from the CHIPPA assessment and represented 
the constructs: elaborate imaginative pretence and object substitution. Since, one of the four 
CHIPPA indicators (NOS-CV refer to discussion in section 5.5.1.3) was also excluded a 
reliability analysis was run to assess the reliability of the CHIPPA with the three indicators 
which had been retained. The results of the Cronbach’s alpha analysis on the standardized score 
of the three indicators yielded modest internal consistency (α = .63). Although, the value of 
Cronbach’s alpha was slightly below the recommended alpha of .70; an alpha of greater than 
.60 is also viewed as reasonable in basic research (Streiner, 2003). 
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5.5.4 Research Question 1b. Can the indicators of pretence be reduced to a single latent 
factor? 
Inferences about the construct of pretence drawn from this study are based on how well the 
indicators of pretence cohere together. A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was run to test 
whether the covariation among the respective indicators of pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning could be explained by a single latent factor for each construct (Brown, 2015)).  A 
latent factor representing Child-initiated Pretence was derived from the correlated measures of 
pretence – elaborate imaginative pretence in conventional, elaborate imaginative pretence in 
symbolic play, and object substitution in symbolic play. These measures were derived from the 
CHIPPA assessment. The three indicators were moderately correlated with each other (refer to 
Table 5.4) and had a reasonable internal consistency α = .63 (refer to section 5.5.3 on internal 
consistency of the CHIPPA in this chapter). 
 
A confirmatory factor analysis was conducted using Promax oblique rotation solution with the 
three indicators from the CHIPPA based on robust maximum likelihood ratio. The Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin measure verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis, KMO = .56. which is 
mediocre but meets the bare minimum criteria; however, there is need for caution in 
interpreting the results because ideally, we are looking for a KMO value which is close to 1 to 
indicate that the patterns of correlation are relatively compact for the factor analysis to yield 
distinct and reliable factors values between (Field, 2013). Bartlett’s test of spherecity χ2 (6) = 
81.80, p = .001, indicated that the correlations met the criteria for a factor analysis. The analysis 
returned eigenvalues for each component in the data and found only one component had 
eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and explained 58.84% of the variance (see Figure 5.2 
for scree plot showing eigenvalues). Hence, CHIPPA indicators were reduced to a single latent 
factor score referred to as child-initiated pretence (or CIpretence when abbreviated) which was 














This section addressed the first research question which investigated the relationship between 
the indicators of pretence measured. The findings revealed that symbolic representation did not 
correlate with elaborate pretend play and object substitution which were correlated with each 
other. The measure of symbolic representation (PAT) was different from that of elaborate 
pretend play and object substitution (CHIPPA) suggesting that not all measures of pretence are 
correlated. However, it may be that different measures of pretence may correlate with 
counterfactual reasoning. It is interesting to note that girls engaged in longer periods of 
elaborate pretend play than boys. The indicators of pretence cohered unto a latent pretence 
construct referred to as child-initiated pretence. The results will be fully discussed in the 
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5.6.0 Research Question 2. Is there evidence that the observed counterfactual reasoning 
behaviours depend on a common underlying ability in this domain? 
In this section, the role of counterfactual reasoning as an independent variable in this study is 
examined. To answer the research question, it was necessary to first examine the patterns of 
children’s responses to the questions posed in the task. Children’s responses to control 
questions and counterfactual questions are reported and the probability of correct to incorrect 
responses are explored to make conclusions about the strategy used to answer counterfactual 
reasoning questions. Correlational analysis was used to determine if the different types of 
counterfactual reasoning questions were correlated with each other and a confirmatory factor 
analysis was run to extract a latent construct of counterfactual reasoning. This is an important 
question because it clarifies whether variations in counterfactual responses are representative 
of a single construct of counterfactual reasoning and thereby potentially indicates the validity 
of the construct of counterfactual reasoning. Counterfactual reasoning was assessed using the 
Location Change Task developed by Rafetseder and Perner (2010). A short recap of the 
counterfactual reasoning task is given to facilitate interpretation of the results section. 
Summary descriptives, tests of parametric analyses, and the main results are reported. The 
section concludes with a summary of the results of children’s performance on the 
counterfactual reasoning task. 
  
 
5.6.1 CFR Location Change Task   
The counterfactual reasoning task developed by Rafetseder and Perner (2010) was specifically 
designed to tease apart basic conditional reasoning from adult-like counterfactual reasoning on 
child-level assessment of counterfactual reasoning. The assumption is that early years 
counterfactual reasoning is still naïve and does not fully represent mature counterfactual 
reasoning. In basic conditional reasoning plausible real-world answers are provided as a default 
response to a counterfactual scenario. In adult-like counterfactual reasoning, the contents from 
a given counterfactual story are duly considered and factored into counterfactual responses. 
This task varies from counterfactual scenarios exploring the differences where correct 
counterfactual answers can be correct and incorrect if basic conditional reasoning is the 




The Location Change Task comprised four main story themes about a doctor, teacher, fireman 
and policeman. Each story contained four conditions, two of which target conditional reasoning 
and two counterfactual reasoning. The counterfactual conditions are classified as single and 
dual location changes. Single location changes are categorised as Typical-1 and Atypical-1 
stories, and dual location changes are categorised as Typical-2 and Atypical-2 stories. In total, 
the task battery comprised of sixteen counterfactual reasoning questions derived from 4 story 
themes each story theme consisting of the four counterfactual conditions – two single location 
change stories and two dual location change stories. Each counterfactual condition also has two 
related control questions - one posed before the counterfactual reasoning question, referred to 
as a Now Control Question (NCQ) and one posed after the counterfactual reasoning question 
referred to as a Before Control Question (BCQ).  
 
The counterfactual reasoning task is analysed by children’s performances according to story 
themes and counterfactual conditions. First, performances on control questions are explored. 
Second, performances by story themes and then by story conditions are analysed. The purpose 
for analysing responses by story themes is to check for order effects. To address the research 




5.6.2 Research Question 2a. What do patterns of errors and successes in children’s 
counterfactual reasoning responses tell us about the type of reasoning strategies they 
employ? 
The results are presented according to control questions, performances by story themes, and 
story conditions.  
 
5.6.2.1 CFR: Control Questions 
Participants correctly answered 98% of NCQ and 73% of BCQ indicating that children were 
better at recall on the first control question than on the last control question.  
 
The first control question – Now Control Question (NCQ) - checked that children could tell 
the location of the protagonist when the story ends whereas, the second control question – 
Before Control Question (BCQ) - required the child to remember the location of the protagonist 
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when the protagonist was called to change their location in the story. While both NCQ and 
BCQ are memory questions; the chain of events to backtrack to arrive at the correct answer is 
more demanding in the latter control question than the former control question. It is unsure 
whether the decline in children’s performance may be attributed to task complexity or issues 
with recall. Hence, a decision was made to analyse counterfactual responses only for instances 
of answering NCQs correctly.  
 
 
5.6.3 CFR Responses: Story Themes 
This section discusses children’s performances on the counterfactual reasoning task based on 
the story themes. Descriptive statistics are reported, assumptions of parametric analyses are 
considered and order effects for administration of the story are assessed. 
 
 
5.6.3.1 Descriptive Statistics   
 The average responses given to now control questions and counterfactual reasoning questions 
by story themes are presented in Table 5.5. For example, it shows that for the Doctor Story 183 
children answered the first control question (NCQs) correctly and 183 children also answered 
the CFR question correctly having also answered the NCQ correctly. In all cases counterfactual 
scores are counted only if the child answered NCQs correctly. A difference between the number 
of participants succeeding on the control questions and the counterfactual questions indicates 
a drop in the number of children who successfully answered the control question. For each sub-













Table 5.5 Summary Statistics for Counterfactual Reasoning Stories 

































NCQ 181 3.87 .47 1 4 











NCQ 182 3.82 .63 0 4 










 NCQ 181 3.92 .42 0 4 
CFR questions 181 3.02 1.07 0 4 
*NCQ – Now Control Questions 
*CFR – Counterfactual Reasoning 
 
5.6.3.2 Test of Parametric Assumptions 
Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality were conducted on the CFR scores by story themes. The 
distribution of scores for all four counterfactual stories showed significant deviation from 
normality: Doctor story W(183) = .92, p < .001, Teacher story W(179) =.89, p= .001, Fireman 
story W(180) = .93, p = .001, and Police story W(181) = .95, p = .001. 
 
Histograms visualizing the distribution of CFR scores by story themes are presented in 
Appendix J Figures 1-4. Skewness and kurtosis statistics are presented in Table 5.6.  According 
to (Acock, 2018) a normal distribution that has skewness of 0 and kurtosis greater than 10 is 
typically concerning whilst greater than 20 is problematic. The histograms, skewness, and 
kurtosis statistics show that the distribution of scores for all story conditions were negatively 
skewed but kurtosis was not an issue.  
 
Table 5.6 Counterfactual Reasoning Scores by Story Themes: Skewness & Kurtosis Statistics 
Story Conditions Doctor  Teacher  Fireman  Police  
Skewness -1.13 -1.51 -1.02 -1.03 
Kurtosis 4.41 5.16 3.99 3.42 
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5.6.3.3 Order and Gender Effects  
 The percentages of correct counterfactual responses were similar across the different stories: 
doctor story = 77%, teacher story = 82%, firefighter story = 78% and police story = 75%. The 
order of administering the stories were randomized using a fixed block Latin Square design. 
There was a significant main effect of story order F (3, 179) = 3.71, p = .01, ῃ2 = .08 but further 
post hoc analyses using Scheffe follow-up procedure found no significant differences in the 
pairwise comparisons suggesting that the order in which the stories were told to children did 
not influence their performance. Additionally, there was no significant main effect of gender 
for correctly answering counterfactual questions F (1, 179) = 3.57, p = .06, ῃ2 = .08.  
 
5.6.3.4 Conclusion 
The goal of this section was to check whether the order in which the differently themed 
counterfactual stories were told influenced children’s pattern of responses.  The results of the 
ANOVA indicated there was no effect of either story theme order or gender based on story 
theme order; hence the classification of responses by story was not considered further.   
 
 
5.6.4 Counterfactual Responses: Story Conditions 
This section discusses children’s performances across the story conditions of the counterfactual 
reasoning task. There were four categories or conditions of counterfactual reasonings questions 
classified as typical-1, atypical-1, typical-2, and atypical-2. Stories based on typical-1 and 
atypical-1 conditions involved a protagonist moving from one antecedent location to 
consequent location after being called to respond to an emergency. Stories based on typical-2 
and atypical-2 conditions involve a protagonist moving between two locations to a consequent 
location before being called to respond to an emergency. Stories in the typical condition present 
participants with the typical location where a protagonist works, for example, a firefighter is 
working at the fire-station when called to respond to an emergency fire in the forest. Atypical 
stories present participants with an atypical location where a protagonist is before responding 
to an emergency call, for example, a firefighter is at home in his living-room when he is called 
to respond to an emergency fire in the forest. The assumption is that individuals use knowledge 
either from the counterfactual scenario or from their own general-knowledge of the world to 
respond to counterfactual scenarios – the latter response is referred to basic conditional 
reasoning. This counterfactual reasoning task assesses whether children are able to integrate 
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non-typical information from the story into the counterfactual response to arrive at the correct 
counterfactual answer by comparing the frequency of responses between typical and atypical 
conditions. 
 
For the initial analyses, descriptive statistics are reported, assumptions of parametric analyses 
are considered, and patterns of errors and successes across the four counterfactual conditions 
are explored. To conclude, consideration is given to how counterfactual scores should be 
summarised for use in subsequent analyses. Hence, the construct validity of the task is 
evaluated to justify summarising the scores from the four counterfactual conditions into one 
factor score that represents one underlying dimension of counterfactual reasoning.  
 
 
5.6.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The average responses given to control questions and counterfactual reasoning questions by 
condition are presented in Table 5.8. For example, it shows that for the typical-1 condition 184 
children answered the first control question (NCQ) but 183 children answered the 
counterfactual reasoning question correctly having succeeded at the control question. In all 
cases counterfactual scores are counted only if the child answered the control question 
correctly. A difference between the number of participants succeeding on the control questions 
and the counterfactual questions indicate a drop in the number of children who successfully 
answered the control question. For each sub-score, the mean, standard deviation, minimum and 














Table 5.7 Summary Statistics of Counterfactual Reasoning Stories by Story Conditions 







 NCQ 184 3.88 .49 0 4 









NCQ 184 3.84 .53 1 4 







 NCQ 183 3.86 .49 0 4 







 NCQ 182 3.86 .44 1 4 
CFR responses 182 2.37 1.19 0 4 
*NCQ: Now Control Questions 
*CFR: Counterfactual Reasoning 
 
 
5.6.4.2 Tests of Parametric Assumptions 
Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality were conducted on the counterfactual reasoning scores by story 
conditions. All counterfactual condition categories showed significant deviation from 
normality except the atypical-2 condition which did not deviate from a normal distribution; 
Typical-1 W(183) = .79, p = .00. Atypical-1 W(184) = .87, p = .00, Typical-2 W(182) = .97, p 
= .00, and  Atypical-2 W(182) = .99, p = .28.  
 
Histograms visualizing the distribution of counterfactual reasoning scores by condition are 
presented in Appendix K Figures 1 – 4. The histograms also support that the distribution of 
atypical-2 scores show a trend towards a normal distribution but skewness and kurtosis 
statistics reported in Table 5.9 indicated that the distribution of the scores for the other four 
variables were negatively skewed. According to (Acock, 2018) a normal distribution has 
skewness of 0 and kurtosis greater than 10 is typically concerning whilst greater than 20 is 





Table 5.8 Skewness & Kurtosis Statistics for Counterfactual Reasoning by Story Conditions 
 Typical-1  Atypical-2  Typical-2  Atypical-2  
Skewness -2.19 -1.58 -.66 -.34 
Kurtosis 8.15 5.15 2.82 2.16 
 
 
5.6.4.3 Children’s errors and successes across the counterfactual conditions  
Children’s responses to the counterfactual questions are summarised in Figure 5.3. The 
percentage of correct responses to counterfactual questions in each condition include: typical-
1 = 89%, atypical-1 = 85%, typical-2 = 73% and atypical-2 = 59%. Children could make three 
types of counterfactual reasoning error: realist error, typical error and atypical error (see 
Chapter 4 Research Methods section 4.3.2.1, Table 4.3 Classification of Responses by 





Figure 5.3 Bar Graph showing Proportion of Responses per Counterfactual Reasoning 
Conditions 
 
Realist error. Realist errors indicate that a child has difficulty inhibiting the salient features of 
a story and occurred 6% of the time across all sixteen counterfactual questions. For each of the 
four counterfactual conditions, realist errors occurred in all the four conditions: typical-1 = 8%, 
atypical-1 = 9%, typical-2 = 4%, atypical-2 = 2%. The average occurrence of realist errors 
across all counterfactual questions for all children were M = .89, SD = 1.75, min = 0, and max 







Typical-1 Atypical-1 Typical-2 Atypical-2 Total
Conditions
Proportion of Responses per CFR condition    
Counterfactual Response Realist Error Typical Error Atypical Error
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A Freidman test found the differences in the frequency of realist errors across the four 
counterfactual conditions were significant ꭓ2 (3, N = 182) = 64.62, p < .001. The results from 
pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni corrections for multiple comparisons showed that the 
number of realist errors in the atypical-2 condition (2%) were statistically different from the 
number of realist errors in the typical-1 condition (8%) (Median = 0, p = .024) and the number 
of realist errors in the atypical-1 conditions (9%) (Median = 0, p = .004). In contrast, the number 
of realist errors between the typical-1 condition (8%) and atypical-1 condition (9%), and the 
typical-2 (4%) and atypical-2 (2%) conditions were not significantly different (p > .05) for all 
comparisons. The results show that children were more likely to make realist errors in stories 
with only one location change (typical-1 & atypical-1 conditions). Also, the number of realist 
errors in related conditions were similar. The drop in the number of realist errors in the two-
condition stories gives the impression that the ability to overcome the salient features of the 
story and engage in more effortful reasoning is within reach of some of the children who made 
realist errors in the one-condition stories.  
 
Typical and Atypical errors. Typical errors are considered to stem from a difficulty inhibiting 
what is known to be true about the world and reasoning from general real-world knowledge 
(Rafetseder & Perner, 2010). Typical errors could occur with stories in the atypical-1 condition 
as well as atypical-2 condition. The difference is that in the atypical-2 condition the child is 
presented with the real-world option (the resultant typical error) as a plausible answer - one of 
the two locations where the protagonist could be.  On average, typical errors occurred more 
frequently in atypical-2 conditions, 35% (M = 1.40, SD = 1.10, min = 0, max = 4) than in 
typical-2 conditions, 2% (M = .06, SD = .28, min = 0, max = 2).  
 
For all pairs of atypical-1 and atypical-2 responses across the four-story conditions McNemar 
repeated measures chi-square test with continuity correction determined that the difference in 
the proportion of typical errors in atypical-1 and atypical-2 conditions was statistically different 
(reported in Table 5.10). Children were more likely to make a typical error when it is presented 
as a plausible option in the story scenario as was the case with 2-condition stories. It is also 
interesting that children made typical errors on their own even when they were not presented 
as plausible answers (atypical-1 stories). This suggests that children are able to retrieve real-





Table 5.9 Proportion of Typical Errors in Atypical-1 & Atypical-2 Conditions 
 
Story 
Proportion of Typical Errors  




Doctor .03 .43 ꭓ2 (1, N = 174) = 62.35, p < .001 
Teacher .02 .33 ꭓ2 (1, N = 170) = 46.45, p < .001 
Firefighter 0 .27 ꭓ2 (1, N = 167) = 43.02, p < .001 
Police .001 .42 ꭓ2 (1, N = 173) = 68.12, p < .001 
 
 
Scenarios with two location changes could result in either an atypical error in typical-2 
conditions or typical error in atypical-2 conditions. An atypical error could only occur in 
typical-2 conditions. Atypical errors accounted for 19% of children’s responses (M = 0.78, SD 
= .90, min = 0, max = 4) in contrast to typical errors which accounted for 35% (M = 1.40, SD 
= 1.10, min = 0, max = 4) as reported earlier.  For all pairs of typical-2 and atypical-2 responses 
across the four-story conditions McNemar repeated measures chi-square test with continuity 
correction determined that the difference in the proportion of typical and atypical errors in 
typical-2 and atypical-2 conditions was statistically different (as reported in Table 5.11). 
Children were more likely to make typical errors, for example, say fire station instead of living 
room in 2-condition stories. This suggests that although children can overcome realist errors 
children are prone to making typical errors when reasoning counterfactually. In other words, 




Table 5.10 Proportion of Typical Errors in Typical-2 and Atypical-2 Conditions 
 
Story 
Proportion of Atypical & Typical Errors  




Doctor .19 .43 ꭓ2 (1, N = 176) = 18.82, p < .001 
Teacher .08 .32 ꭓ2 (1, N = 168) = 28.07, p < .001 
Firefighter .40 .26 ꭓ2 (1, N = 171) = 5.13, p = .02 
Police .13 .43 ꭓ2 (1, N = 174) = 35.15, p < .001 
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Counterfactual Successes. Children performed better in tasks with one location change; 
typical-1 = 89% (M = 3.57, SD = .79, min = 1, max = 4) and  atypical-1 = 85% (M = 3.42, SD 
= .85,  min = 0, max = 4)   than on tasks with two location changes; typical-2 = 73%  (M = 2.95, 
SD = 1.08, min = 0, max = 4 ) and atypical-2 = 59% (M = 2.37 , SD = 1.19, min = 0, max = 4). 
The difference between correct counterfactual responses in 1-condition and 2-condition 
scenarios was assessed using the McNemar repeated measures chi-square test. The difference 
between the 1-conditions was not significant with Teacher story being the only exception 
(reported in Table 5.12). Generally, children performed similarly in the two single condition 
stories. 
 
Table 5.11 Proportion of Successes between Typical-1 and Atypical-1 Conditions 
 
Story 
Proportion of Correct CF Responses  






Doctor .91 .89 N = 179, p = .68 
Teacher .95 .88 N = 173, p = .004 
Firefighter .93 .95 N = 167, p = .23 
Police .90 .86 N = 174, p = .23 
 
 
For all pairs of 2-condition scenarios, successful responses to counterfactual responses between 
typical-2 and atypical-2 stories were significantly different (reported in Table 5.13). Children 
had difficulty inhibiting typical responses like fire station in favour of the correct answer living 
room.  
 
Table 5.12 Proportion of Successes between Typical-2 and Atypical-2 Conditions 
 
Story 
Proportion of Correct CF Responses  






Doctor .77 .55 ꭓ2 (1, N = 176) = 15.92, p < .001 
Teacher .89 .67 ꭓ2 (1, N = 168) = 24.45, p < .001 
Firefighter .58 .73 ꭓ2 (1, N = 171) = 6.62, p = .010 
Police .82 .53 ꭓ2 (1, N = 174) = 30.72, p < .001 
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5.6.4.4 Summary of Reasoning Strategies 
According to Rafetseder and Perner (2010), four reasoning strategies could be elicited from 
this counterfactual reasoning task – counterfactual reasoning, basic conditional reasoning, 
realist reasoning, or a mixed reasoning strategy wherein none of the aforementioned strategies 
are distinguishable. Counterfactual reasoning is judged as correctly answering all 
counterfactual questions, for example answering with ‘fire-station’ in all typical story 
conditions and ‘living-room’ in all atypical story conditions of the fire-station stories. In all, 
only 13 children (7%) met the criteria for ‘counterfactual reasoning’ in this sample, that is, 
succeeding on all sixteen counterfactual scenarios. Basic conditional reasoning is classified as 
successfully answering all counterfactual questions (typical-1, atypical-1, typical-2) but failing 
atypical-2 questions (Rafetseder & Perner, 2010). In this study, no child succeeded in 
answering all questions in typical-1, atypical-1 and typical-2 conditions correctly to the 
exception of atypical-2 questions. Similarly, no child used only realist reasoning across all four 
counterfactual conditions. Consequently, majority of the participants (93%) did not show an 




This section addressed the second research question which explored children’s patterns of 
errors and successes on the counterfactual reasoning task as an indication of the reasoning 
strategy they employed. The goal of the task was to determine whether children were equally 
successful at counterfactual reasoning as basic conditional reasoning. The findings indicate 
counterfactual reasoning was not distinguishable from basic conditional reasoning among four 
to five-year-olds as children applied a mix of strategies. 
 
 
5.6.5 Research Questions 2a. Are the indicators of counterfactual reasoning correlated? 
The correlation between the four counterfactual conditions was assessed by running a 
spearman’s rank-order correlation to determine whether the sub-scales were correlated with 
each other; in addition to having modest internal consistency. The results showed all four 





Table 5.13 Spearman Rank-order Correlation of Sub-scales of CFR Conditions 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
1. Typical 1 -    
2. Atypical 1 .50* -   
3. Typical 2 31* .36* -  
4. Atypical 2 31* 36* .25* - 
*all associations significant at p < .05 
 
 
Internal Consistency of the Location Change Task. To determine the reliability of the 
counterfactual reasoning task, a Cronbach alpha reliability analysis was run to check the 
reliability of the sixteen questions which made up the task. Cronbah alpha assesses the internal 
consistency of items within a task by assessing how closely the items are correlated. The results 
of Cronbach’s alpha analysis on the counterfactual task used in this study indicated modest 
internal consistency (α = .67, M = 12.05, SD = 3.10). Although, the value of Cronbach alpha 
was slightly below the recommended alpha of .70; an alpha of greater than .60 is also viewed 
as reasonable in basic research (Streiner, 2003). This suggested that the sixteen counterfactual 
reasoning questions were potentially a reliable measure of counterfactual reasoning. This was 
promising considering that children’s responses did not show that children were relying on any 
distinct counterfactual reasoning strategy. 
 
The four counterfactual conditions used to make inferences about children’s reasoning 
strategies (refer to section on summary of reasoning strategies) can be classified as subscales 
of the counterfactual reasoning task since they were specifically designed to simulate different 
conditions of counterfactual reasoning. The reliability of the subscales was calculated using 
Cronbach’s alpha for the sum of responses of the four items in each subscale or counterfactual 
condition. The results of Cronbach’s alpha for the four subscales of the counterfactual task 
indicated the following internal consistency: typical-1 (α = .51, M = 3.57, SD = .79), atypical-
1 (α = .30, M = 3.40, SD = .89), typical-2 (α = .50, M = 2.78, SD = 1.06) and atypical-2. (α = 
.40, M = 2.37, SD = 1.19). The Cronbach’s alpha for the individual sub-scales ranged from α 
= .30 to α = .51 suggesting that the sub-scales were modestly correlated with their component 
items. A limitation of Cronbach’s alpha is that it is strongly influenced by the length of the 
scale, so it is not surprising for Cronbach’s alpha to be low in a four-item sub-scale (Streiner, 
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2003). A further check of the internal consistency of the four sub-scales together resulted in α 
= .72. Generally, for a developmental task the subscales show a positive trend of being a 
reliable measure of counterfactual reasoning.  
 
 
5.6.6 Research Question 2b. Can the indicators of counterfactual reasoning be reduced to 
a single latent factor? 
Inferences about the construct of counterfactual reasoning drawn from this study are based on 
how well the indicators of counterfactual reasoning cohere together. A confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) was run to test whether the covariation among the respective indicators of 
pretence and counterfactual reasoning could be explained by a single latent factor for each 
construct (Brown, 2015).  The factor representing CFR was derived from the four sub-scales 
of the counterfactual reasoning task. The four indicators were moderately correlated with each 
other (refer to Table 5.14) and had reasonable internal consistency α = .72 (refer to section 
5.6.5 above in this chapter).  
 
A confirmatory factor analysis was conducted using Promax oblique rotation solution with the 
four indicators from the counterfactual reasoning tasks based on robust maximum likelihood 
ratio. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis, KMO 
= .75 (good according to Field, 2013). Bartlett’s test of spherecity χ2 (6) = 171.01, p = .001, 
indicated that the correlations were sufficiently large for a factor analysis. An initial analysis 
was run to obtain eigenvalues for each component in the data and found only one component 
had eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and explained 57.44% of the variance. Hence, the 
counterfactual reasoning sub-scales were reduced to a single factor score subsequently used as 








Figure 5.4 Scree Plot Showing Eigenvalues for Indicators of Counterfactual Reasoning 
 
 
5.7.0 Chapter Summary 
This chapter addressed the following research questions: 
 
RQ 1. Is there evidence that the observed pretence behaviours depend on a common underlying 
ability in this domain? 
1a. Are the indicators of pretence correlated? 
1b. Can the indicators of pretence be reduced to a single latent factor? 
 
RQ 2. Is there evidence that the observed counterfactual reasoning behaviours depend on a 
common underlying ability in this domain? 
2a. Are the indicators of counterfactual reasoning correlated?  
2b. What do patterns of errors and successes in children’s counterfactual reasoning 
responses tell us about the type of reasoning strategies they employ? 
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The general findings indicate that children’s engagement in elaborate pretend play was 
significantly correlated with object substitution but not symbolic representation and could be 
reduced to a single latent factor to represent the construct Child-initiated Pretence. Basic 
conditional reasoning was not distinguished from counterfactual reasoning in this sample 
suggesting that a child can successfully answer counterfactual questions but use a mix of 
strategies. The CFR subscales were generally correlated with each other, had modest internal 
consistency and could be reduced to a single latent factor to represent the construct CFR. The 


























Chapter 6 Results B 
 
6.1.0 Introduction 
This chapter is the second of two results chapters for this thesis. The goal of this chapter is to 
unpack the theoretical assertion that pretence and counterfactual reasoning share similar 
cognitive mechanisms. To explore this assertion, associations between pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning are explored together and in relation to other related cognitive skills. 
Several sub-research questions are posed investigating correlations among the relevant study 
variables; in addition to exploring similarities, differences, and general associations between 
pretence, counterfactual reasoning, executive functions, and receptive language.  The aim is to 
tease apart associations between the variables with the goal of understanding the mechanisms 
that input the cognitive workspace that underpins imaginative thinking.   
 
 
6.2.0 Chapter Research Questions 
To achieve the goals of the study, two main research questions were posed and are the focus 
of this chapter. The research questions are outlined as follows:  
 
RQ3. How are pretence, counterfactual reasoning, executive functions, and receptive language 
associated? 
3a. Are pretence, counterfactual reasoning, executive functions, and receptive language 
correlated?  
3b. Do receptive language, symbolic representation, and EFs account for unique 
variance in Child-initiated Pretence?  
3c. Do receptive language, symbolic representation, and EFs account for unique 
variance in CFR? 
 
RQ4. Is there support for the idea that the constructs from the domain of pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning are underpinned by a general imaginative representation ability? 
4a. Is there support for the latent model showing the relationship between pretence and 
CFR?   
4b. Is there support for the structural model showing that pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning are underpinned by an imaginative representation ability? 
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6.3.0 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics summarising how children performed on the pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning tasks which were reported in the previous chapter are reported here again together 
with summary statistics for the new measures explored in this chapter, namely executive 
functions (EFs) and receptive language. Therefore, Table 6.1 reports the scores from the 
pretence sub-scales, counterfactual reasoning sub-scales, in addition to the scores for three 
executive functions skills – working memory, inhibition and delay of gratification measured in 
this study. The table shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values for 
all the study measures. The working memory score represents the proportion of success on the 
working memory trials, the inhibition, delay of gratification, and receptive language scores 
represent the total number of correct responses.  
 
Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics: Pretence and Counterfactual Reasoning 






 PEPA_CV 170 66.76% 15.77 15% 95% 
PEPA_SY 171 48.57% 21.20 0% 86% 


















CFR_Typical-1 183 3.57 .78 0 4 
CFR_Atypical-1 184 3.40 .89 0 4 
CFR_Typical-2 182 2.78 1.06 0 4 














s Working memory 185 .62 .16 .35 1 
Inhibition 181 27.56 18.15 0 58 






e Receptive Language 185 27.27 8.33 7 40 
PEPA-CV: Percentage of Elaborate Pretend Play in the conventional imaginative play condition 
PEPA-SY: Percentage of Elaborate Pretend Play in the symbolic play condition 
NOS-SY: Number of Object Substitutions in the symbolic play condition 
CFR_T1: CFR scenario typical condition with one location change 
CFR_At1: CFR scenarios atypical condition with one location change 
CFR_T2: CFR scenarios typical condition with two location changes 




6.4.0 Test of Parametric Assumptions.  
Tests of parametric assumptions are reported for the variables not previously reported on – 
working memory, inhibition, delay of gratification, and receptive language. Shapiro-Wilk tests 
of normality were conducted for all four control variables. All control variables showed 
significant deviation from normality: language W(185) =.95, p < .001, working memory 
W(185) =.97, p < .001, inhibition W(181) =.93, p < .001, and delay of gratification W(153) 
=.97, p < .001.  
 
Histograms and box plots visualizing the distribution of each control variable are presented in 
Appendix L Figures 1 - 4. The histograms support the results of the normality tests that the 
distribution of scores for the control variables show some skewness. Skewness and kurtosis 
statistics are presented in Table 6.2 and confirm that all four variables were negatively skewed, 
except working memory because a proportional score is used. According to (Acock, 2018) a 
normal distribution has skewness of 0 and kurtosis greater than 10 is typically concerning 
whilst greater than 20 is problematic. Issues with kurtosis was not concerning for these 
variables were not explored further and outliers were retained in subsequent analyses. 
 





Inhibition Delay of 
Gratification 
Skewness -2.19 -1.58 -.66 -.34 
Kurtosis 8.15 5.15 2.82 2.16 
 
 
6.5.0 Research Question 3. How are pretence, counterfactual reasoning, executive 
functions, and receptive language associated? 
This research question sets the foundation for exploring whether pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning share cognitive mechanisms. Several sub-questions are answered towards this goal 
as outlined here:  
3a. Are pretence, counterfactual reasoning, executive functions, and receptive language 
correlated?  
3b. Do receptive language, symbolic representation, and EFs account for unique 
variance in Child-initiated Pretence?  
168 
 
3c. Do receptive language, symbolic representation, and EFs account for unique 
variance in CFR? 
 
 
6.5.1 Research Question 3a. Are pretence, counterfactual reasoning, executive functions, 
and receptive language correlated?  
A Pearson’s product-moment correlation was run to assess the relationship among all the 
variables measured to the constructs of Child-initiated pretence and counterfactual reasoning 
(see Table 6.3). There were small to moderate statistically significant correlations among some 
variables. Child-initiated pretence was significantly correlated with all variables except 
working memory. Inhibition was significantly correlated with all variables except delay of 
gratification. Delay of gratification did not correlate with any other executive function variable. 
 
Table 6.3 Pearson Pairwise Correlation between Study Measures 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Child-initiated Pretence -      
2. Counterfactual Reasoning .50* -     
3. Receptive Language .36* .53* -    
4. Working Memory .11 .21* .22* -   
5. Inhibition .41* .55* .54* .25* -  
6. Delay of Gratification .18* .20* .08 .06 .15 - 
*p < .05 
 
A Pearson’s partial correlation was run to assess the relationship among the variables after 
controlling for age in months (see Table 6.4). Generally, correlations among variables remained 
statistically significant with a few exceptions. Specifically, working memory did not retain any 
statistically significant relationships with the other variables and delay of gratification which 
was previously associated with both child-initiated pretence and CFR only shared significant 
correlations with CFR when age was controlled. The relationship between inhibition and 
working memory was also not retained. It was interesting to see that the effects of controlling 
for age did not influence previous statistically significant correlations with receptive language 
and inhibition with child-initiated pretence and CFR.  
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Table 6.4 Pearson Partial Correlation between Study Measures 
Control Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Age 1. Child-initiated Pretence -      
 2. Counterfactual reasoning .50* -     
 3. Receptive Language .34* .49* -    
 4. Working memory .10 .09 .12 -   
 5. Inhibition .45* .53* .54* .16 -  
 6. Delay of Gratification .14 .16* .01 .01 .08 - 
*p < .05 
 
 
6.5.2 Research Question 3b. Do receptive language, symbolic representation, and 
executive functions account for unique variance in Child-initiated Pretence?  
Previous studies have identified executive functions and receptive language as cognitive skills 
which are related to pretend play as well as counterfactual reasoning (Beck et al., 2009; Carlson 
et al., 2014). For this reason, it was important to tease apart the independent contributions of 
executive functions (EFs) and receptive language to explaining variance in pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning scores in this study, over and beyond the influence of age and gender. 
Raw scores for each of the variables were used in these analyses. 
 
A hierarchical multiple linear regression (HMR) was calculated to test the hypothesis that 
executive functions and receptive language account for unique variance in child-initiated 
pretence, beyond age and gender. Age in months and gender were entered in the first block, 
receptive language was entered in the second block, and inhibition, working memory and delay 
of gratification were entered in the third block. 
 
The three regression models, that is each block, were all significant: age and gender F(2,185) 
= 9.20, p = .001, receptive language F(3,180) = 11.93, p = .001, and executive functions 
F(6,142) = 8.52, p = .001. The contribution of each model to account for variance in Child-
initiated Pretence were: 9%, 17%, and 27%, respectively. The results of the HMR are reported 
in Table 6.5. Age was a significant predictor only in the first step (model 1: β = .20, p = .007; 
model 2: β = .10, p = .09; model 3: β = .05, p = .46). There was a consistent effect of gender 
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(model 1: β = .27, p = .001; model 2: β = .24, p = .002; model 3: β = .22, p = .004). When 
receptive language was added in the second step, the variance accounted for in child-initiated 
pretence significantly increased by 8% (p = .001) but the effect of receptive language was lost 
when the executive function measures were added to the model. Although only inhibition was 
a significant executive function contributor (β = .29, p = .002); an additional 10% (p = .01) of 
variance was accounted for.  
 
Table 6.5 Contribution of age, receptive language, and EFs to Child-Initiated Pretence 
 B SE B β R2 ∆R2 
    .10  
Constant -26.77 .7.87    
Age .36 .13 .20*   
Gender 3.85 .1.17 .27*   
    .19 .09* 
Constant -26.43 7.66    
Age .22 .13 .10   
Gender 3.53 1.14 .24*   
Receptive Language .29 .07 .28*   
    .31 .12* 
Constant -22.90 8.47    
Age .12 .15 .05   
Gender 3.52 1.22 .22*   
Receptive Language .16 .10 .12   
Inhibition .13 .04 .29*   
Working Memory .10 4.02 .004   







6.5.4 Research Question 3c. Do receptive language, symbolic representation, and EFs 
account for unique variance in CFR? 
A hierarchical multiple linear regression (HMR) was calculated to test the hypothesis that 
executive functions and receptive language account for unique variance in CFR beyond age 
and gender. Age in months and gender were entered in the first block, receptive language was 
entered in the second block, and inhibition, working memory and delay of gratification were 
entered in the third block (see Table 6.6).  
 
The three regression models were all significant: age and gender F(2,185) = 5.37, p = .01, 
receptive language F(3,180) = 21.93, p = .001, and executive functions F(6,142) = 11.58, p = 
.001. The contributions of each model to account for variance in CFR were: 6%, 26%, and 
33%, respectively. However, the change in r-square for the third model (7%) was not 
significant (p = 1.00) suggesting that the combination of independent executive function 
variables together did not have additional explanatory power. The results of the HMR are 
reported in Table 6.6. Age was a significant contributor only in the first step of the model 
(model 1: β = .24, p = .01; model 2: β = .09, p = .11; model 3: β = .04, p = .54) and there was 
no effect of gender (model 1: β = .20, p = .08; model 2: β = .16, p = .06; model 3: β = .14, p = 
.07). Receptive language was added in the second step of the model and was a consistent 
contributor to CFR (model 2: β = .42, p = .001; model 3: β = .42, p = .001). When receptive 
language was added in step 2 an additional 21% of variance in counterfactual reasoning was 
accounted for (p = .001). Although, the executive functions variables together did not explain 
additional variance in CFR; inhibition and receptive language were significant predictors of 














Table 6.6 Contribution of age, receptive language, and EFs to Counterfactual Reasoning 
 B SE B β R2 ∆R2 
    .07  
Constant -1.38 .45    
Age .02 .01 .24*   
Gender .12 .07 .20*   
    .31 .24* 
Constant -1.53 .41    
Age .01 .007 .09   
Gender .11 .06 .16*   
Receptive Language .03 .004 .42*   
    .43 .12 
Constant -1.27 .42    
Age .005 .01 .04   
Gender .11 .06 .14   
Receptive Language .02 .01 .30*   
Inhibition .01 .002 .23*   
Working Memory -.03 .20 -.01   




The links between child-initiated pretence, counterfactual reasoning, executive functions and 
receptive language were analysed to explore the theoretical assumption that pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning shared common variance. Inhibition significantly predicted both 
Child-initiated Pretence and CFR (β = .29 and β = .23), respectively. The effect of receptive 
language on child-initiated pretence was lost when executive functions were added to the 
model; although inhibition was the only executive function measure to be significantly 
associated with counterfactual reasoning in this study. Receptive language was a significant 
predictor of CFR (β = .30) but not of Child-initiated pretence (β = .12) above and beyond age, 




6.6.0 Research Question 4. Is there support for the idea that the constructs from the 
domain of pretence and counterfactual reasoning are underpinned by a general 
imaginative representation ability? 
A hypothetical model delineating links between pretence and counterfactual reasoning at 
observable and latent levels was specified in the research design stage of this study (refer to 
the Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3 Research Design section 3.2.0 Statement of the Problem). The 
hypothetical model was a conceptual framework mapped in response to the suggestion that 
pretence and counterfactual reasoning share cognitive mechanisms and an underlying cognitive 
dimension might be linking the two cognitive skills (Walker & Gopnik, 2013b; Weisberg & 
Gopnik, 2013). The conceptual framework provided a starting point for exploring latent 
relationships between pretence and counterfactual reasoning using structural equation 
modelling analysis (SEM). Although SEM is more of a confirmatory technique it can also be 
used for exploratory purposes (Schreiber et al., 2006). Hence, in this study, although theory 
driven statistical approaches were required to test the proposed hypothetical models; the 
findings reported here are to some extent exploratory in nature given the proposed theory being 
tested is still rudimentary and inchoate in nature with no pre-existing empirical evidence to 
draw from. Two different models mapping the possible latent relationships shared by pretence 
and counterfactual reasoning were compared and used as the basis for refining ideas about the 
nature of the relationship between pretence and counterfactual reasoning. The model which 
best fit the data was selected to explain the structural relationship of pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning.  
 
 
6.6.1 Hypothesized Model of Pretence and CFR (adjusted) 
The initial theoretical framework, Figure 3.1, set out in Chapter 3 Research Design section 
3.2.0 Statement of the Problem was revised based on trends in the data from analysing the 
pretence and counterfactual reasoning tasks. The revised conceptual framework is presented in 










Figure 6.1 Adjusted Hypothesized Model of Counterfactual Reasoning and Pretence 
 
 
Two of the pretence measures from the study were excluded from structural equation analyses: 
a) Number of Object Substitution in Conventional Play, because scores had a floor effect 
(see Chapter 5 Results A section 5.5.1.3 Testing Assumptions of Parametric Analyses 
for CHIPPA). 
b) Symbolic representation because this task did not correlate with the other indicators of 
pretence (See Chapter 5 Results A section 5.5.3 where correlations among pretence 
indicators are reported). 
As a consequence, the three pretence measures retained were from the CHIPPA assessment. 
Hence, it was decided that the factor score generated would be a measure of a child-initiated 
pretence (CIpretence) and the factor score generated from the four counterfactual reasoning 
tasks would simply be a measure of counterfactual reasoning (CFR).   
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6.6.2 Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) 
The hypothesized model of the underlying relationship between pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning specified in Figure 6.1 was tested using structural equation modelling analysis 
(SEM). In the first instance, the hypothesized model proposed during the research design stage 
of the study specified a type of structural equation model known as a bifactor model. A bifactor 
model is used to assess whether (a) there is a general factor that is hypothesized to account for 
the commonality of all the items (a capacity for Imaginative Representation – IR); and (b) there 
are multiple domain specific factors (child-initiated pretence and CFR). In bifactor analysis 
researchers are interested in the domain specific factors as well as the common factor (Chen et 
al., 2006).  
 
In the second instance, model revisions were made to the hypothesized model by integrating 
the findings from the data to inform modifications to the proposed theoretical framework. A 
revised theoretical framework was designed using the model of a hierarchical factor analysis. 
The hierarchical factor model specified was a second-order factor model. In a second-order 
factor analysis (a) the lower order factors are correlated, and (b) there is a higher order factor 
that is hypothesized to account for the relationship among lower order factors (Chen et al., 
2006). In this study, the second-order factor represented the general factor - imaginative 
representation (IR) and the lower order factors were child-initiated pretence and CFR.  
 
Structural equation modelling analyses involve two levels of analyses; at the first level the 
measurement model specified is assessed and at the second level the structural model is 
assessed. The measurement part links the observed variables to the latent variables in a 
confirmatory way and is measured first; whereas the structural part links the latent variables to 
each other and is only measured when an adequate or satisfactory fit of the measurement model 
is obtained (Bartholomew et al., 2008). The models were estimated using maximum likelihood 
estimation and the fit indices used to evaluate how well each model fits the data included: Chi-
square, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the Standardized Root Mean Square (SRMR), and 
the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA). The interpretations of the fit indices 
are based on the following criteria: CFI values above .90 indicate acceptable fit, while values 
above .95 indicate good fit; SRMR values below .06 indicate good fit; RMSEA values below 
.08 indicate acceptable fit and values below .06 indicate good fit (Brown, 2015; Longo et al., 
2016). The fit of competing models was compared using the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC), which produces lower values for better fitting models and average variance explained 
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by each factor was compared to the variance shared by the factors (Longo et al., 2016). The 
chi-square test statistics are known to be sensitive to sample size (Bartholomew et al., 2008). 
The results from the analyses of the measurement models are presented and the structural 
models are presented afterwards.  
 
 
6.6.3 Research Question 4a. Is there support for the latent model showing the relationship 
between pretence and CFR?   
 
6.6.3.4 Results of Measurement Model 
The Bi-factor model comprised two measurement portions; (a) the two-factor model – which 
tests that the observed measures can be explained by two latent factors which are correlated 
and (b) the unidimensional model – which test that the observed measures can also be explained 
by one latent factor (refer to Figure 6.1).  
 
(a) Two-factor model. The two factors – child-initiated pretence and CFR were significantly 
correlated (r = .52, p = .001). The two-factor model showed good fit and the results of the two-
factor model without any method correction are shown in Table 6.7.  
 
(b) Unidimensional model. The unidimensional model without any method correction showed 
poor fit. To improve the model fit, covariances were added between the three child-initiated 
measures. The model was significantly improved with good fit. The results of the model fit are 
shown in Table 6.7 alongside the two-factor model.  
 
The BIC indices for the two models were comparable; although the unidimensional model had 
a slightly lower value. Diagrams showing the standardized factor loadings of two-factor model 










Table 6.7 Goodness of Fit Indices for the Two-factor and Unidimensional Models 









 (167) = 74.28 
(p = .001) 
ꭓ
2
 (167) = 266.73 
(p = .047) 
ꭓ
2
 (167) = 15.32  
(p = .224) 
RMSEA .066 .161 .041 
CFI .961 .755 .986 
SRMR .051 .090 .040 











































Figure 6.3 Model Fit for the Unidimensional Model 
 
 
6.6.4 Research Question 4b. Is there support for the structural model showing that 
pretence and counterfactual reasoning are underpinned by an imaginative representation 
ability?  
 
6.6.4.1 Results of Structural Model 1 
A bi-factor model analysis was run on the general factor (imaginative representation) and 
specific factors (child-initiated pretence and CFR); however, the estimation of the bi-factor 
model was under-identified as indicated by the Stata software. This estimation problem may 
be due to the fact that a bi-factor model with equal loadings and covariates is not identified, 
that is, it is not possible to get a unique solution for the parameter estimates (Eid et al., 2018).  
 
In a bi-factor model, as it was previously explained, the model specifies that for a given set of 
indicators, correlations among items can be accounted for by (a) a general factor representing 
shared variance among all the indicators, and (b) the domain-specific factors where variance 
over and above the general factor is shared among subsets of indicators presumed to be highly 
similar in content (Rodriguez et al., 2016). Essentially, general and domain-specific factors are 



































indicators do not differ in their loadings on the general factor (imaginative representation) and 
the domain-specific factors (child-initiated pretence & CFR); estimation problems will arise 
since in a bi-factor model the two measurement components are additively decomposed into 
the (a) covariance of the general factor (imaginative representation) and (b) variance of the 
general factor with the domain-specific factors (child-initiated pretence & CFR) (Eid et al., 
2018). The similarities in the BIC value for the two-factor model and unidimensional model; 
as well as, a comparison of the two models presented in Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3 indicate that 
the factor loadings for the indicators of CFR also to be fairly similar and this may be indicative 
of why the bi-factor model could not be identified.  
 
Although, the bifactor model could not be estimated it was important that this finding be 
reported in light of its implication for the hypothesized model framework proposed in the 
research design. The assumption was that if child-initiated pretence and CFR were associated 
one likely explanation is that the variance shared between these two skills could be uniquely 
partitioned from a broader imaginative representative ability. The results of an under-identified 
model can only be interpreted as an inconclusive finding until it can be disproved that the 
relationship between the domain-specific factors of child-initiated pretence and CFR can be 
explained over and beyond by a general factor. In a case such as this, it is worth exploring 
whether an alternative explanation might fit the data from this study since in practice structural 
equation modelling is used to assess whether the model holds approximately instead of whether 
it holds exactly (Bartholomew et al., 2008). 
 
   
6.6.4.2 Revised Hypothetical Model 
A revised theoretical framework based on a second-order hierarchical model was developed as 
an alternative hypothetical model delineating links between pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning at observable and latent levels. In contrast to bi-factor models which specify general 
factors to be uncorrelated with specific factors; second-order hierarchical models account for 
the covariation among multiple factors such that the construct consists of a single broader factor 
which is correlated with several sub-factors (Brown, 2015). Additionally, the findings from the 
regression analyses indicated that inhibition was a consistent, significant predictor of child-
initiated pretence and CFR so the decision was taken to include inhibition into the model as an 
indicator of imaginative representation (see section exploring similarities or differences in the 
unique contributions of executive functions and receptive language to pretence and 
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counterfactual reasoning). The revised hypothesized model mapping links between the latent 
factors – child-initiated pretence and CFR to second-order latent factor proposed to be a 












6.6.4.3 Results of Structural Model 2 
The measurement portion of this hypothesis model is based on the two-factor model specified 
in the section, Results of Measurement Model in this chapter which found that the two-factor 
model was a good fit for the data; hence the results are applicable to this new hypothetical 
model being tested (refer to Figure 6.2).   
 
The results of the second-order factor model without any method correction showed good fit 
ꭓ2 (167) = 24.46 (p = .14), RMSEA = .047, CFI = .975, and SRMR = .047, BIC = 6987.85. 
This suggests that a second-order factor analysis is a better fit of the data and supports the view 


















































This section addressed the research question whether a common underlying latent factor could 
explain the relationship between pretence and CFR. The initial theoretical proposal suggested 
that the cognitive structure of pretence and counterfactual reasoning comprised a general 
capacity, as well as the independent cognitive skills of pretence and counterfactual reasoning. 
A bi-factor model tested the hypothesis that the group factors of child-initiated pretence and 
CFR accounted for significant variance in the data above that of a general factor (imaginative 
representation) The result of the bi-factor model analysis was under-identified suggesting that 
the amount of variance in the data did not support the extraction of unique variance for both a 
general imaginative representative factor alongside the sub-factors of child-initiated pretence 
and CFR. It would be interesting to see whether this finding would be upheld in a larger dataset 
with greater statistical power. 
 
An alternative hypothetical framework was proposed which specified a second-order factor 
analysis. The assumption was that a general factor called imaginative representation would be 
correlated with the group factors – child-initiated pretence and CFR. Inhibition was also 
included as a predictor of the general factor given it was a consistent, independent predictor of 
child-initiated pretence and CFR. The second-order factor analysis fitted the data well and 




6.6.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter addressed the following research questions: 
RQ3. How are pretence, counterfactual reasoning, executive functions, and receptive language 
associated? 
3a. Are pretence, counterfactual reasoning, executive functions, and receptive language 
correlated?  
3b. Are there similarities or differences in the unique contributions of executive 
functions and receptive language to pretence and to counterfactual reasoning?  
3c. If pretence is a form of counterfactual reasoning, is pretence a significant predictor 




RQ4. Is there support for the hypothesized model showing that the constructs of pretence and 
CFR are underpinned by an imaginative representation ability? 
4a. Is there support for the latent model showing the relationship between pretence and 
CFR?   
4b. Is there support for the structural model showing that pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning are underpinned by an imaginative representation ability?  
 
The chapter unpacked the hypothesis that pretence and counterfactual reasoning share 
cognitive mechanisms. Data was analysed exploring the relationship between child-initiated 
pretence, CFR, executive functions and receptive language. For the most part, the variables 
were correlated with each other except for working memory and delay of gratification which 
did not significantly correlate with several variables. Receptive language and inhibition 
correlated strongly with child-initiated pretence and CFR.  
 
A number of hierarchical multiple regression analyses were run to assess the contribution of 
executive functions and receptive language to child-initiated pretence and CFR. Inhibition was 
a significant predictor of both Child-initiated Pretence and CFR above and beyond factors like 
working memory, delay of gratification, age, gender and receptive language. Interestingly, the 
effect of receptive language was not retained when child-initiated pretence was regressed on 
CFR. These results were consistent when child-initiated pretence was added to account for 
unique variance in CFR and vice versa. Both child-initiated pretence and CFR were significant 
predictors of each other. 
 
Competing models of the hypothesized relationship between pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning at the latent level were compared using structural equation modelling. Two 
measurement models were tested to assess whether the data best fit a two-factor model or a 
unidimensional model. A comparison of the two models showed the fit indices generated for 
the two models were similar suggesting that both measurement models might equally represent 
the data. The results from testing the structural model showed that a bi-factor model analysis 
approach was under-identified but a second-order factor analysis produced good model fit. The 
resulting conclusion was that the data better supported the theoretical idea of a second order 
general factor which represents an imaginative representation capacity that is correlated with 








































Chapter 7 Discussion Chapter 
 
7.1.0 Introduction 
This study sought to generate empirical evidence to test the theoretical claim that pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning share cognitive mechanisms. Overall, the evidence supported the 
claim that pretence and counterfactual reasoning are related cognitive skills. This chapter 
examines the results with the intention of elucidating what are the cognitive mechanisms shared 
by pretence and counterfactual reasoning. The key findings discussed are organized around the 
main research questions and the results are examined in relation to the existing body of 
literature in the fields of pretence and counterfactual reasoning. There is a theorising section 
which evaluates the theoretical proposal made about pretence and counterfactual reasoning. 
The empirical evidence generated in this study are taken into consideration and new ideas for 
furthering a general theory that links between pretence and counterfactual reasoning are 
proposed. A consideration of the strengths and limitations of the study is presented followed 
by a discussion of the implications of the findings, and the contribution of this study to the 
discussion about the role of pretence in child development. The chapter concludes with a 
general summary of the chapter. 
 
 
7.2.0 Discussion of Findings 




Both pretence and counterfactual reasoning are complex constructs having multiple measures 
by which they are defined. Pretence has several defining features and definitions of pretence 
will vary based on the goals of a study (Frahsek et al., 2010; Thompson & Goldstein, 2019). In 
this present study, the construct of pretence was inferred from a child’s ability to engage in 
elaborate pretend play and object substitution. These two constructs were measured 
independently and were significantly correlated with each other (r = .50). The indicators of 
pretence were elicited in the context of a child-initiated pretend play paradigm where children 
Is there evidence that observed pretence behaviours depend on a 
common underlying ability in this domain? 
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generated imaginary ideas including projecting unto objects in the spirit of fun or play (Lillard, 
1993a).  
The results of the confirmatory factor analyses yielded psychometric support for a generalized 
construct of pretence and as the indicators of the generalized construct came from a measure 
of child-initiated pretend play; the pretence factor was named ‘child-initiated pretence’. 
Pretend play behaviours such as elaborate imaginative pretend actions with objects, verbally 
attributing properties to objects, using one object to represent another, and referring to an 
absent object as if it were present were used to infer the cognitive skill of pretence. Other 
studies have also validated a cognitive construct of pretence; although, there were slight 
variants in the composition of the factor mostly influenced by contextual differences in the 
conceptualization and development of the aspect of pretence being studied. For example, the 
Affect in Play Scale-Preschool Version (APS) has validated a two-factor model of their 
measure – an affect factor and pretence factor explained by imagination, organization, and 
comfort (Kaugars & Russ, 2009; Marcelo, 2016). The inputs of the pretence factor in the APS 
are similar to that of the CHIPPA with the exception of comfort. Moreover, a study investigated 
changes in children’s pretend play ability based on the APS over a period of twenty-three years 
concluded that children demonstration of these cognitive pretence skills (imagination in play 
and comfort in play) have significantly increased over time despite children having less time 
to play (Russ & Dillon, 2011). This suggest that pretence is potentially a stable construct. 
Future studies should give more consideration to conceptualising pretence more globally 
beyond its individual pretend play indicators.  
 
Contrary to expectations, not all the indicators of pretence correlated with each other. In this 
instance, symbolic representation inferred from the pretend action task (a separate measure to 
the CHIPPA) did not correlate with either elaborate imaginative pretend play or object 
substitution – the indicators of pretence elicited from CHIPPA. One possible explanation is 
that the two pretence measures used different play contexts. The Pretend Action Task is a 
highly structured prescriptive task as children are instructed on the pretend actions to perform; 
whereas, the CHIPPA used a free play paradigm where children are given set objects but are 
encouraged to engage in spontaneous extended pretend play. Congruent with the present 
findings, a study with similar aged children found that the pretend action task did not correlate 
with a pretend-reality task which was used to assesses a child’s ability to differentiate between 
the actual and pretend identities of objects, or with measures of executive functions (Carlson, 
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White, & Davis-Unger, 2014). In the study by Carlson, White, and Davis-Unger (2014) both 
measures of pretence were structured tasks so this suggests that dissociations among pretend 
play tasks may extend beyond the task structure to the quality of non-literal representation 
elicited within the task. Perhaps, being asked to represent an object symbolically evokes a 
different quality of pretence representations from engaging in extended elaborate pretend play 
with object substitutions. This gives rise to the question of whether all categories of pretence 
require the capacity to metarepresent – hold in mind dual representations by decoupling the 
pretend world from the real world (Leslie, 1987; Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2000). Although, the 
pretend action task is a well-established task of symbolic representation further research is 
needed in understanding differences in mental representations, symbolic representations, 
metarepresentations, and imaginative representations.  
 
There was an effect of gender on the amount of pretence actions elicited. Girls engaged in more 
elaborate pretend play than boys. Previous studies have found gender differences in 
engagement in pretend play throughout development (Jones & Glenn, 1991; Meland, Kaltvedt, 
& Reikerås, 2019; Sansanwal, 2014; Smith & Lillard, 2012). Jones and Glenn (1991) observed 
that at the age of four girls engaged in more person fantasy orientation whereas boys were more 
inclined towards object fantasy play. Sansanwal (2014) reported that girls were found to engage 
more in realistic role-playing than boys of their age in the preschool years. In contrast, 
retrospective reports from undergraduates on the persistence of their engagement in pretend 
play over the course of their childhood revealed that pretend play persisted well into middle 
childhood with males reporting that they continued to engage in pretend later than females 
(Smith & Lillard, 2012). The observed differences in males and females engagement in 
pretence in the early years as compared to later years have been attributed to the idea that girls 
mature earlier than boys in respects like linguistic development so what may be happening is 
that girls are growing into and maturing out of pretence more quickly than their male 
counterparts (Meland et al., 2019; Smith & Lillard, 2012). A validity study would therefore 







7.2.2 Research Question 2 
 
 
Similar to the findings for pretence, the results of a confirmatory factor analysis yielded 
psychometric support for a generalized cognitive construct of counterfactual reasoning.  The 
latent construct is referred to by the abbreviation CFR. The CFR construct is drawn from a 
social-causal counterfactual reasoning task which assessed whether children could successfully 
apply counterfactual reasoning over basic conditional reasoning when responding to 
counterfactual questions. What has been observed is that to reason counterfactually all the 
features of the story must be preserved and integrated into the counterfactual response instead 
children tend to apply basic conditional reasoning where they drop all non-permanent features 
of the story and rely on as default domain-general real world knowledge (Leahy et al., 2014; 
Rafetseder & Perner, 2010). Since a goal of this study was to understand the cognitive 
mechanisms of counterfactual reasoning it was important to select a task that elucidated the 
cognitive skills children were applying. The findings replicated the work of Rafetseder and 
Perner (2010) who reported that before the age of six years the children were not successful at 
giving mostly correct answers to counterfactual reasoning questions on a social-causal task but 
demonstrated a mix of basic conditional and counterfactual reasoning strategies.  
 
Social-causal tasks like the one used in this present study generally fall into the category of 
real-world counterfactuals which are focused on how past events could have been different and 
involve changing a course of action  (Beck & Riggs, 2014; Byrne, 2016). The difference 
between real world counterfactuals and pretence is the cognitive process of mentally undoing 
an aspect of the past event sequence that has happened (McCormack, et al., 2018). The 
similarity is that both are derived from setting up false premises of the real-world as it is known. 
The expectation when engaging in real-world counterfactual reasoning is that children will be 
able to constrain their thinking based on the real world and avoid forming conclusions primarily 
based on background assumptions (Beck, Riggs, et al., 2011; Rafetseder & Perner, 2010).  
 
The reasoning strategies deployed by children in this study included basic conditional 
reasoning, counterfactual reasoning and realist reasoning. A realist error is a difficulty with 
reasoning in counterfactual situation which occurs when a child responds with the current state 




of affairs (Robinson & Beck, 2000). So, when asked a counterfactual question, children 
struggled with whether they should answer with the present location in the real world, resulting 
in a realist error, or with the present location in the possible world, resulting in the correct 
counterfactual answer (Rafetseder & Perner, 2010). Realist reasoning was the least likely 
strategy used by children in this study. Generally, three-year olds are prone to making realist 
errors but by the age four children are generally able to overcome this tendency (Riggs et al., 
1998). Reasoning with the current state affairs means that the counterfactual premise is 
completely ignored and implies an absence of considering the alternative possible world which 
was proposed.  
 
Trends in basic conditional reasoning or counterfactual reasoning strategies were compared by 
looking at the likelihood of children not using basic conditional reasoning to respond to 
counterfactual reasoning questions in scenarios where it would yield incorrect answers. For 
instance, in one of the scenarios used in this study a firefighter leaves the fire-station where he 
works and is at his living-room watching TV when he is called to respond to an emergency fire 
in the forest. In response to the counterfactual question, “if there had not been a fire where 
would the firefighter be?”; to answer with fire-station suggests that the child did not factor in 
their response that the fire-fighter was no longer at the fire-station but was at his living-room 
when the emergency call was received. An explanation put forward is that young children are 
unable to interpret the relevant part of the counterfactual question, “…where would the 
firefighter be?”; instead they take it to mean, “where is a firefighter (typically)?” and thus 
answer with ‘fire-station’ (Rafetseder & Perner, 2010). What we see from the present data is 
that while most children were able to overcome making the realist error by answering with the 
firefighter’s actual location (forest); the most common error was indeed to answer with the 
typical location where a firefighter would be thereby making a typical error. This is 
symptomatic of basic conditional reasoning where although the child recognised the imagined 
impact of the ‘if’ antecedent when there are two alternatives to the real location, children tend 
to pick the typical location where the firefighter works (basic conditional reasoning).  
 
However, that is not to say that the children in the present study had a consistent pattern of 
responses for answering questions with two alternative locations. Their response was consistent 
with the findings from Rafetseder and Perner (2010) in that in the two location scenarios 
children mixed the strategies of basic conditional reasoning with counterfactual reasoning. For 
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the participants in Rafetseder and Perner (2010) study, reasoning with counterfactual 
antecedents became dominant only by the age of six. This dominance in counterfactual 
reasoning was not observed in this study, probably because the participants were less than six 
years old. Hence, this study supports the conclusion that mature counterfactual reasoning is 
still a developing ability between the ages of four to five years (Beck, Riggs, et al., 2011; 
McCormack et al., 2018b; Rafetseder & Perner, 2010). It can therefore be argued that the 
generalized construct of counterfactual reasoning (referred to as CFR) found in this study 
represents a combination of both basic conditional reasoning and mature counterfactual 
reasoning.  
 
Children’s difficulty with counterfactual reasoning is intriguing especially since children seem 
to be able to handle counterfactual imaginations in pretence from eighteen months but 
seemingly have difficulty with counterfactual imaginations in formal contexts of counterfactual 
reasoning (Riggs et al., 1998). The core attributes of adopting a counterfactual premise by 
decoupling, creating an event sequence while having an awareness of the reality and fantasy 
distinction identified as common to both pretence and counterfactual reasoning by Weisberg 
and Gopnik (2013) seem to occur quite simplistically in pretence. Perhaps it is because in 
pretence there are no constraints on the real world and there are no bounds to the imaginative 
worlds hypothesized. Hence, children could elaborate on their imaginative ideas and object 
substitutions at will while playing pretence. The only comparison necessary in pretence is to 
separate the real-world model of the world from its counterfactual imaginative alternative 
model. In counterfactual reasoning, it may not always be enough to hold a model of the real 
and alternative world in mind. Additionally, inferences are drawn from comparing these two 
worlds and sometimes multiple counterfactual models must be held in mind, compared to each 
other and reality (Amsel & Smalley, 2000; Weisberg & Gopnik, 2013). Essentially, the space 
of counterfactuals is continuous and can be characterised along a continuum of developmental 
milestones as opposed to pretence which may lack such levels of differentiation (Beck, 2016; 
Weisberg & Gopnik, 2016). Regardless of demands from having to draw inferences of varying 
difficulties in a counterfactual reasoning, it is the capacity for dual representation that sits at 
the core of both pretence and counterfactual reasoning. 
There are several explanations as to why children are not able to consistently reason 
counterfactually between the ages of four to five years. It may be that the psychological 
demands arising from the nearest possible world constraints of the task may be too taxing on 
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children. Children must hold in mind the understanding of the causal relationship between the 
specific past event and its subsequent outcome, and the other possible world where had the 
specific event been different another outcome would have occurred (Beck & Riggs, 2014). 
These require multiple mental models to facilitate changing only these features of a scenario 
that are causally dependent on a counterfactual antecedent while holding all else constant 
(McCormack et al., 2018b; Nyhout & Ganea, 2019). Children may just not be able to 
consistently and successfully maintain making multiple modifications to specific elements of 
reality and simultaneously inhibit their own empirical knowledge in difference to the contents 
of the counterfactual premise. 
 
Alternately, it may be that different counterfactual tasks may be more challenging than others. 
Counterfactual reasoning tasks used with children can be broadly classified into two groups: 
physical causal tasks where children engage in causal action sequences on objects or things 
(Nyhout & Ganea, 2019; McCormack, et al., 2018) and social causal tasks or mental tasks 
which take the form of people deciding to do things (Rafetseder et al., 2013). There are 
conflicting claims about the age which children can successfully reason counterfactually, 
depending on which task is used. In contrast to previous suggestions that children can 
successfully reason counterfactually by the age of six; Nyhout and Ganea (2019) claim that 
four to five-year old children can engage in mature counterfactual reasoning given a clear, 
novel causal structure. The researchers used a physical causal task using a ‘blicket detector’ 
machine and showed children over-determined trials having two causal blocks on a box and 
single causal trials having one causal and one non-causal block; then asked children what 
would have happened if one of the two blocks had not been placed on the box. Five-year olds 
performed at ceiling even when the experiment was repeated using a temporal delay paradigm 
between the first and second causal block sequence (Nyhout & Ganea, 2019). The researchers 
argued that a possible explanation for failed evidence for robust counterfactual thinking before 
six years rest with the use of overly complex tasks which expect children to reason from opaque 
causal structures. It may be that social-causal tasks are inherently complex because they aim to 
replicate real-world experiences to children so inadvertently require adequate context and 
explanation. The counterfactual reasoning task used in this present study was a social-causal 
task which was lengthy to administer such that reward strategies were employed to sustain 
children’s attention and ensure that they understood the scenarios. Although task was made to 
be as simple as possible; the complexity of such tasks cannot be overlooked. It stands to reason 
that complex tasks would therefore be more cognitively demanding. Beck (2016) argued that 
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real-world counterfactuals may be different from other types of counterfactuals (e.g. physical-
causal tasks) in their relationship with reality but also by a matter of degree, for instance, by 
making greater inhibitory control demands. In this vein, the case for recognizing the boundaries 








It was hypothesized that if pretence and counterfactual reasoning draw on the same core 
cognitive processes; then their pattern of associations with other related cognitive skills should 
bear similarities. On this basis, the associations between executive functions and receptive 
language with pretence and counterfactual reasoning were compared. The findings showed that 
inhibition was a significant predictor of both child-initiated pretence and CFR as opposed to 
working memory and delay of gratification which were significantly associated with neither 
child-initiated pretence nor CFR. Receptive language also significantly predicted child-
initiated pretence and CFR but the effect of receptive language on child-initiated pretence was 
not sustained over and beyond the influence of executive functions; in the case of child-initiated 
pretence. Interestingly, receptive language accounted for more variance in CFR than inhibition; 
(receptive language β = .30 and inhibition β = .23) probably because of the linguistically 
demanding nature of the counterfactual reasoning task.  
 
Researchers have hypothesised strong conceptual relationships among the processes of 
pretence and counterfactual reasoning with language, executive functions, and other cognitive 
skills (Bergen, 2002). For this reason, a strategy for understanding the associations between 
pretence and counterfactual reasoning was to investigate how other related cognitive skills 
might potentially influence children’s ability to pretend or reason counterfactually. It is a 
widely discussed idea in the literature that the representational qualities of pretence may be a 
part of the same core abilities needed to consider alternatives in counterfactual thinking and 
that both rely on an ability to execute dual representations of the real and imagined world 
What is the relationship between pretence, counterfactual reasoning, 
executive functions and receptive language? 
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(Carlson, White, & Davis-Unger, 2014; Harris & Levers, 2000; Gopnik & Walker, 2013; 
Weisberg & Gopnik, 2013). One view drawn from connectionist theory is that representational 
abilities are innate but representations recruit other cognitive processes like language and 
executive functions (Carlson, et al., 2014; Guajardo & Cartwright, 2016). However, domain-
general cognitive abilities are subject to the process of development and maturation throughout 
the course of childhood which have an adverse effect on how skills reliant on mental 
representations are applied across different contexts. Support for the idea of shared cognitive 
processes  come from neuroscience research that report for example, that goal-oriented 
cognitive processes of executive functions recruit similar regions of the brain (Van Hoeck et 
al., 2015; Whitehead et al., 2009).  
 
The findings for this research question speak to the question about which executive function 
skills are more likely to be associated with pretence and counterfactual reasoning and why 
might it be the case. In a study exploring evidence for a relationship between executive function 
and pretence representation in preschool children; the results revealed there was a robust, 
positive correlation between inhibition and the ability to manage dual representations in 
pretence (Carlson et al., 2014). In addition, a positive correlation was also found between 
inhibition and counterfactual reasoning in a study which related children’s counterfactual 
reasoning and executive functions (Beck et al., 2009). In both these studies, inhibition shared 
the strongest correlations with pretence or counterfactual reasoning; whereas, working memory 
did not significantly predict engagement in pretence or counterfactual reasoning after 
controlling for factors like age and language. The results are consistent with the findings from 
this present study but raises questions about the role of working memory in pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning. It may be that thinking about possibilities allows the thinker not to 
depend on their memory of how the world should be but to suspend conventional understanding 
in favour of creating fantastical themes. 
 
On the other hand, other studies exploring links between executive functions and counterfactual 
reasoning have reported slightly different results. Guajardo, Parker, and Turley-Ames (2009) 
found that working memory and cognitive flexibility significantly predicted performance in 
counterfactual reasoning and Drayton, Turley-Ames, and Gaujardo (2011) reported working 
memory, inhibitory control and counterfactual reasoning were all significantly correlated. A 
study by Slot, Verhagen, and Leseman (2017) found no correlations between a pretend factor 
score and executive functions measured as selective attention, visuospatial short-term memory, 
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visuospatial working-memory, delay of gratification. Pretend play was defined in terms of role 
play and symbolization. Across different studies, the type of executive functions selected 
varied and the pattern of results were not always consistent. However, inhibitory control has 
been attributed as central to the ability to suppress one’s empirical knowledge of the world to 
reason from a counterfactual premise. Others have argued that working memory is 
inadvertently activated by virtue of having to remember the contents of the false premise. It 
might be that as a complex executive function cognitive flexibility is predictive beyond 
inhibitory control and working memory (Guajardo & Cartwright, 2016). There is need for 
further research aimed at understanding the contribution of executive functions to pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning. 
 
There remain strong arguments for the influence of inhibition in solving or generating 
counterfactuals. As previously discussed, to successfully answer real-world counterfactuals 
require that one applies real-world constraints by changing only those features of an event that 
are causally dependent on a counterfactual antecedent, holding all else constant, and inhibiting 
the prepotent tendency to defer to general real-world knowledge about the counterfactual 
premise (Leahy et al., 2014; Nyhout & Ganea, 2019). The salience of real-world knowledge 
comes from it being a strong, desirable response since it is a habitual well-practice response; 
but to overcome basic conditional reasoning it must be inhibited so that the less activated 
response – the contents of the counterfactual premise – can be activated (Beck, Carroll, et al., 
2011). So, there is an expectation that inhibitory control will account strongly in counterfactual 
reasoning. Interestingly, support for the influence of inhibition comes from research with 
children with autism. Scott, Baron-Cohen, and Leslie (1999) attributed the success of children 
with autism in answering counterfactual questions to having a weak central coherence system 
described as a diminished drive to integrate new information with information from long term 
memory leaving children to rely solely on information from the counterfactual premise. This 
suggests that children with autism are not faced with the need to apply real-world constraints 
by inhibiting prepotent responses from their knowledge of the real world but for typically 
developing children without a cognitive impairment this skill is essential. Furthermore, while 
a pretence dysfunction is characteristic of autistic children that is not to say that they are 
incapable of imaginative thought. The evidence indicates that children with autism can imagine 
when instructed to do so (Scott et al., 1999). Moreover, it may mean that for typically 
developing children inhibitory control is one of the cognitive mechanisms that influences 
engagement in pretence and counterfactual reasoning. 
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Receptive language was significantly correlated with both pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning but was a unique predictor of only counterfactual reasoning, not pretence. From a 
practical perspective, the counterfactual reasoning task was linguistically demanding so it 
stands to reason that success on this task require that children have acquired receptive language 
skills. In contrast, the CHIPPA, which was used to assess pretence, focuses on pretend action 
sequences and does not necessarily require children to be verbally expressive unless they 
choose to. Language is considered parallel to pretence, and by extension counterfactual 
reasoning, as all involve the use and comprehension of symbols (Lillard et al., 2011). 
Therefore, one can infer from the results of this study that whilst receptive language is 
associated with pretend play given their simultaneous appearance in development; pretend play 
does not necessarily depend on receptive language especially considering it appears in children 
from eighteen months when formal language communication is just developing. In contrast, 
one’s ability for counterfactual reasoning can only be inferred from a shared language 
exchange, that is, the child must understand the counterfactual premise presented and verbally 
or gesturally respond to the counterfactual question. Hence, it makes sense that receptive 
language would be predictive of counterfactual reasoning. It has also been found that children 
with lower language ability found counterfactual conditional questions with short causal chains 
more difficult than long causal chains whereas for children with higher language ability their 
performance was unaffected by the length of the causal chains they had to consider (Beck, 
Riggs, & Gorniak, 2010). Language is generally viewed as influential as it is elemental to 
understanding mental representations. In related fields like theory of mind there is the 
suggestion that conceptual developments in theory of mind may also be facilitated later by 
advances in language development (de Villiers & de Villiers, 2000). Similarly, the expectation 









7.2.4 Research Question 4 
 
 
This study directly responded to the assertion that pretence and counterfactual reasoning are 
related cognitive skills sharing psychological processes (Gopnik & Walker, 2013; Weisberg & 
Gopnik, 2013). It makes a unique contribution to knowledge because no study has attempted 
to empirically quantify the direct associations between independent measures of pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning. It is well understood that the representational abilities of pretence 
and counterfactual reasoning in young children are not developmentally aligned. On one hand, 
very early in development (from the age of eighteen months) young children have little 
difficulty with counterfactual representations in pretence and can successfully manoeuvre 
pretend-reality distinctions without getting confused. Alternately, formal counterfactual 
reasoning by virtue of being more cognitively demanding develops later than pretence with 
children having to overcoming several counterfactual reasoning milestones like realist errors 
and basic conditional reasoning before laying claim to the prize of mature counterfactual 
reasoning. Bearing the developmental difference in mind, this study uniquely modelled the 
relationship between pretence and counterfactual reasoning at a time in development when 
pretence climaxes and counterfactual reasoning begins to become cemented. This ensured that 
conclusions about the relationship between pretence and counterfactual reasoning were 
captured at a time when children could reasonably produce both skills. Thus, claims from this 
study about how pretence and counterfactual reasoning share cognitive processes are in 
reference to early years development.  
 
This study is novel as it has showed that the constructs of child-initiated pretence and CFR are 
significantly correlated at a latent level. Child-initiated pretence was moderately correlated 
with CFR (r = .52). The only other study to investigate the relationship between pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning was conducted by Buchsbaum, Bridgers, Weisberg, & Gopnik (2012). 
The researchers used an experimental design and taught children a novel causal system in a 
real-world context and pretend context and children were asked counterfactual reasoning 
questions about the causal system in the real-world context and questions about the causal 
system in a pretend context. For two versions of this experiments Buchsbaum, Bridgers, 
Weisberg, and Gopnik (2012) reported that children’s pretence scores were significantly 
correlated with their counterfactual reasoning scores (r = .62 and r = .44). The correlational 
Is there support for the hypothesized model of the structural relationship 
between pretence and counterfactual reasoning?  
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link found between child-initiated pretence and CFR provided justification for computational 
modelling of the cognitive link shared between these two abilities.  
 
The fundamental probing question asked what is the underlying capacity that supports the dual 
representations involved when children engage in pretend play or counterfactual reasoning. In 
both contexts, children seemingly make a cognitive leap from a real-world premise venturing 
into an imaginary cognitive workspace where contrary to fact hypothetical ideas are imposed 
on their real-world ideas, objects, things, interactions or experiences. The difference, however, 
between pretence and counterfactual reasoning lies in how loosely or tightly the information 
from the real world is decoupled from the alternate imaginary world evoked. It was, therefore, 
hypothesized that the cognitive architecture activated during pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning is one where an underlying imaginative representative capacity is germane to the 
mental representations elicited when reality is represented in alternative hypothetical ways.  
 
The evidence from this study supported the theoretical model which was designed to test the 
proposed hypothesis that the underlying mechanism linking pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning was the capacity to represent imaginative thoughts. The data fitted the theoretical 
model which specified path relationships predicting that the covariation between the latent 
variables of child-initiated pretence and CFR could be explained a second-order latent factor 
named imaginative representation. The theoretical model also included inhibition as a 
significant predictor of the second-order factor imaginative representation. It was predicted that 
this theoretical model would explain most of the covariation among the latent constructs and 
the indicators or observed variables measured in the study (Brown, 2015). Specifically, the 
results showed that the intercorrelations among child-initiated pretence and CFR were 
explained by a common cause or underlying construct named imaginative representation which 
was also significantly predicted by inhibition.  
 
There is strong conceptual evidence that alternating between real and counterfactual thoughts 
requires inhibiting what is known about the real world to explore the possibilities of the 
imaginary world while holding both representational models in mind (Amsel & Smalley, 2000; 
Beck, Riggs, et al., 2011; Beck et al., 2006; Weisberg & Gopnik, 2013). Developmentally, this 
feat is accomplished early in pretence as children are able to distinguish between the real and 
imaginary world and often rebuff intrusions from the real world by reminding their play partner 
that they are pretending. In counterfactual reasoning, this ability develops more slowly as the 
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evidence shows that children gradually become better at deciding when bits of information 
from the real world are necessary for reasoning successfully in the counterfactual world (Beck 
et al., 2014). This study found support for this perspective as inhibition was a significant 
predictor of both child-initiated pretence and CFR. The arguments from the literature suggested 
that inhibitory control is in its own right a cognitive skill which facilitates being able to generate 
imaginary thoughts. A deductive approach was used and the theoretical model was mapped to 
show that the mechanisms by which imaginative representations are portrayed also relies on 
inhibitory control.   
   
In the final analysis, the data supported the theoretical model that the relationship between 
pretence and counterfactual reasoning could be explained by a second-order factor, imaginative 
representation which relied on inhibitory control. The model was a good fit of the data as all 
fit indices were well above acceptable ranges. The preliminary tests of the measurement model 
confirmed that child-initiated pretence and counterfactual reasoning were better conceptualised 
as a two-factor model as opposed to viewing all the measures from the two factors as 
unidimensional. This model is promising in terms of having scope for considering whether 
other cognitive skills that rely on generating alternative representations of the real-world like 
false belief understanding or even creativity are also underpinned by this broad capacity for 
imaginative representations.  
 
An alternative model was considered but did not fit the data. This other theoretical model was 
tested using a bifactor model to determine whether the data could uniquely explain the variance 
in child-initiated pretence and CFR after extracting a general factor of imaginative 
representation factor (Bonifay et al., 2017). The bifactor model, however, was under-identified. 
An under-identified model is one in which it is impossible to obtain a unique estimate of all 
the model’s parameters but it is not necessarily the case that barring modifications to the data 
the equation cannot be solved (Kenny & Milan, 2012). Suggestions for making the model 
identifiable include measuring more variables of a particular type or obtaining additional 
indicators of the latent construct because adding another good indicator or an instrumental 
variable can help (Kenny & Milan, 2012). Limits on the time-frame for finishing this thesis did 
not permit these options to be explored. Hence, recommendations which could be implemented 
to make the bifactor model identifiable include: (a) explore the option for increasing the 
number of indicators for pretence and counterfactual reasoning, and (b) include other 
counterfactual reasoning variables which may also be reliant on an imaginative representation 
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capacity that is grounded in reality or a given premise., for example, false belief, syllogistic 
reasoning or even creativity.  
 
Moreover, by virtue of the model being under-identified the question of whether a general 
imaginative representation factor can account for variance independent from that shared by 
child-initiated pretence and CFR remains unanswered. Why is this question important? 
Bifactor models provide a different way of thinking about the psychological structure of 
counterfactual reasoning. If a bifactor model of the relationship between pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning is supported there are implications for how these cognitive skills are 
conceptualised in future research - as a general factor as well as by domain-specific factors 
(Chen et al., 2006). This may also provide a novel way of conceptualizing measures of 
imaginative thinking, counterfactual thinking, and other cognitive skills which rely on some 
form of imaginative representation, for example, false belief understanding, creative thinking 
et. cetera, as bi-factor models are useful tools for understanding the psychometric properties of 
a concept (Bonifay et al., 2017). However, there is a caveat for attempts to be made at validating 
confirmatory evidence about psychological processes from bifactor models be validated at 
psychobiological levels (Bonifay et al., 2017). Notwithstanding, future considerations of other 
theoretical models are worth investigating as a model having a good fit does not rule out 
competing models given many different models may fit a given dataset (Thompson & Borrello, 
1992). 
 
An important consideration is that the efficacy of structural models rest with the validity and 
reliability of the measures or indicators purported to predict the hypothetical latent constructs. 
This was a challenge in this study as there are currently limited robust theories providing clear 
definitions and measurements of pretend play and counterfactual reasoning. In fact, the extant 
literature indicates that the construct of pretend play is ill-defined and there is lack of consensus 
on its multiple components and how these components can be measured in tandem (A. S. 
Lillard et al., 2013; B. N. Thompson & Goldstein, 2019). Similarly, historical measures of 
counterfactual reasoning have come under scrutiny for whether they are indeed capturing a true 
definition of counterfactual reasoning (Leahy et al., 2014; Rafetseder & Perner, 2010, 2014). 
This study uniquely tackled these notions by developing psychometric evidence that can 




The results of the factor analysis produced strong evidence that the construct of child-initiated 
independent pretend play comprised of an ability to substitute objects and attribute pretend 
properties to objects, people or ideas during play. Support for this finding was found in a paper 
by Thompson and Goldstein (2019) who proposed a hierarchical developmental progression of 
pretend play from reviewing one hundred and ninety-nine empirical articles which had 
measured pretend play. From their review of the literature, the researchers suggested that it is 
likely that pretend play behaviours develop additively from least to psychologically complex 
following the order of object substitution, attribution of pretend properties, social interactions 
within pretend play, role enactment, and pretence-related metacommunication. The final three 
pretend play behaviours identified by Thompson and Goldstein (2009) are typically measured 
in the context of social-pretend play, which was not a condition of this study. However, my 
study provides evidence that object substitution and attribution of pretend properties are 
definitional to the construct of pretence. 
 
Current discussions in the counterfactual reasoning literature has scrutinized historical tasks 
that measure children’s counterfactual reasoning and questions whether children’s successes 
on such tasks should be attributed to basic conditional reasoning or mature adult-like 
counterfactual reasoning and whether basic conditional reasoning counts as counterfactual 
reasoning. I think that in addition to clear conceptual distinctions of what a concept is and is 
not; there is space for recognising the developmentally age appropriate ways that children can 
reasonably represent concepts at different stages of their development. The counterfactual 
reasoning task used in this study replicated the findings of Rafetseder and Perner (2010) that 
before the age of six years children are not very good at applying mature counterfactual 
reasoning consistently in responding to counterfactual reasoning questions and more often use 
basic conditional reasoning as their reasoning strategy. It was not that children could not apply 
mature counterfactual reasoning but that they were not doing so consistently. Essentially, they 
were not good at it. However, the evidence from the current literature is mixed on the precise 
age that children can actually apply mature counterfactual reasoning consistently (Nyhout & 
Ganea, 2019; Rafetseder et al., 2013; Robinson & Beck, 2000). With this awareness, I propose 
that construct validity evidence for counterfactual reasoning should be drawn from indicators 
that showcase children’s age appropriate depictions of the construct (refer to section 2.3.4 of 
the Literature Review for a breakdown of levels of counterfactual thinking). The results of the 
factor analysis showed that basic conditional reasoning and mature-counterfactual reasoning 
responses were significantly correlated and were reliable indicators of the construct of 
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counterfactual reasoning. Hence, I think that an age appropriate definition of the construct of 
counterfactual reasoning during early childhood needs to include basic conditional reasoning.  
 
This study provides evidence for defining and measuring the constructs of pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning. Concept definition and measurement is a critical first step in testing 
structural equation models. A challenge for future studies modelling the structural relationship 
of pretence and counterfactual reasoning is to consider whether there are additional dimensions 
that can serve as indicators of the concepts. One constraint of the structural models tested in 
this study is the limited number of dimensions that predicted the latent constructs – the child-
initiated pretence construct comprised of three dimensions and the counterfactual reasoning 
construct comprised of four. Future attempts at testing the structural relationship between 
pretence and counterfactual reasoning could benefit from exploring the inclusion of addition 
dimensions that may potentially be included in the construct measurement of these variables 
and thereby increase the robustness of the structural model (Kline, 2015). This field of research 
would greatly benefit if convergent validity (the degree to which two or more attempts to 
measure the same concepts through dissimilar methods agree) on an increase number 
dimensions for each construct could be achieved (Fornell & Larcker, 1981).  
 
Notwithstanding, the findings describing the structural model of pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning are valuable and are linked to other evidence from neuroscience research showing 
pretence, counterfactual reasoning, and executive functions inhabit the same cognitive 
workspace. Separate studies investigating the brain systems activated when adults pretend, 
reason counterfactually or engage in executive function tasks have identified that similar 
cortical locations in the brain become active. For instance, activity was observed in the inferior 
frontal gyrus and medial frontal gyrus when participants viewed pretence acts and the inferior 
parietal lobule, fusiform & superior parietal lobule associated with substitute object pretence 
(Smith et al., 2013). Similarly, a study by Whitehead, Marchant, Craik, and Frith (2009) found 
that when participants viewed object substitution the medial prefrontal cortex, posterior 
superior temporal sulcus and temporal poles were activated. Another study found patients with 
frontal and parietal impairments had difficulties with identifying pretend actions (Apperly, 
Samson, & Humphreys, 2009). Counterfactual sentences elicited activity in the left superior 
frontal gyrus, medial frontal gyrus, supplementary motor area and neural activity also 
overlapped with executive function networks such as the medial prefrontal structures which 
underpin selection and inhibition of alternate action representations (Urrutia et al., 2012). A 
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meta-analysis of neuroimaging data for inhibition, updating and switching showed the areas 
with the most significant activation in the whole adult sample included the left medial and 
superior frontal gyri; bilateral areas of the insula and parietal areas; and right sided activation 
in the precentral gyrus, claustrum, and precuneus; and the child sample group showed that 
activation resided bilaterally in the medial frontal gyri and right sided activation in the cingulate 
gyrus, claustrum, the inferior parietal lobe, and precuneus (McKenna et al., 2017). The findings 
from neuroscience research taken together with the findings that the relationship between 
pretence and counterfactual reasoning can be explained at a structural level provides 
compelling evidence that the two are shared cognitive skills.  
 
7.2.5 Conclusion 
The empirical associations from this study supported the theoretical claim that pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning share the same cognitive machinery. This study established that 
pretence and counterfactual reasoning are correlated at a latent level. Inhibition consistently 
accounted for unique variance in pretence and counterfactual reasoning. The cognitive 
processes of pretence and counterfactual reasoning are underpinned by a general capacity for 
imaginative representations which is influenced by inhibitory control skills. The findings 
presented here presents a first foray into understanding the development of pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning during the early years at a structural level. More importantly, it opens 
for discussion a proposal that the cognitive mechanisms responsible for generating alternative 
representations of reality or thinking about possible worlds is an underlying capacity for 
imaginative representations.   
 
7.3.0 Application to the Unified Theory of Pretence & Counterfactual Reasoning 
The purpose of this thesis was to undertake empirical work that would illuminate the unifying 
theoretical framework proposed by Gopnik and Walker (2013) and Weisberg and Gopnik 
(2013) explaining that pretence and counterfactual reasoning involve the same cognitive 
mechanisms and as such the two may share underlying cognitive dimensions. The crux of the 
argument is that the very early manifestation of pretence in young children may be responsible 
for enhancing children’s cognitive abilities generally and more specifically presents as an 
opportunity to practice the cognitive skills responsible for the serious business of 
counterfactual reasoning and by extension causal reasoning  (Weisberg & Gopnik, 2013). The 
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researchers argued that pretence is crucial for early years learning likening its cognitive 
mechanisms as a counterfactual process reflective of a Bayesian learning strategy typically 
applied to understanding causal models. The aim of Gopnik and Walker (2013) and Weisberg 
and Gopnik (2013) papers were to establish pretence as having an integral role in the 
development of important cognitive skills which involve the process of generating alternatives 
to reality. The researchers argue that cognitive skills which engage in generating alternatives 
to reality all follow a process of: disengaging with current reality, making inferences about an 
alternative representation of reality, and keeping this representation separate from reality. 
However, beyond pointing out the process of generating counterfactual alternatives, the 
researchers did not venture to postulate about the specific cognitive structures which might 
make these processes possible. 
 
The empirical work conducted in this present thesis aims to add to the description of the 
cognitive processes utilized to engage in pretending or counterfactual reasoning. The findings 
are used to propose a possible explanation of the cognitive structures which interact when 
pretending or reasoning counterfactually and in so doing advances the theoretical claim that 
the manifestation of early years pretence has a development role in the progression of 
counterfactual reasoning. The ensuing discussion will draw on the work of researchers like 
Amsel and Smalley (2000), Byrne (2016), Leslie (1987), and Lillard (2001) who have reported 
on the cognitive mechanisms of pretence or counterfactual reasoning. The empirical evidence 
from the structural equation model reported in this present study is used to elucidate a feasible 
explanation of cognitive structures activated when thinking about possible imaginary worlds. 
The goal here is to merely present a theoretical suggestion developed through an exercise of 
deduction, scrutiny of the empirical evidence, and induction which remains open to being 
falsified based on the cycle of theory generation by Goodwin & Goodwin (2014) and 







Figure 7.1 Overview of Theory Development (from Goodwin & Goodwin, 2014) 
Illustration of Goodwin & Goodwin (2014) Overview of Theory 
Development removed for copyright reasons. The copyright holder is 
John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
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7.3.1 Theoretical Premise 
The expectation that pretence and counterfactual reasoning are empirically related stems from 
the observation that to perform either skill requires one to: 
• disengage with current reality 
• make inferences about an alternative representation of reality 
• keep this representation separate from reality 
On this premise, Weisberg and Gopnik (2016) proposed a unifying theory of imaginative 
processes to suggest how pretence and counterfactual reasoning come share these component 
cognitive skills. This proposal was empirically tested in this study through the use of structural 
equation modelling analyses (SEM) which tested the latent relationship between pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning and whether a common underlying factor might explain the 
correlation between the two. The study results found support for the prediction that pretence 
and counterfactual reasoning are underpinned by a general cognitive ability. The key finding 
from this research was that a second-order factor could explain the relationship between 
pretence and counterfactual reasoning. This latent factor was named imaginary representation 
as I believe it accounts for the idea from the theoretical discussions (see Chapter 2 Literature 
Review section 2.5.2) that imaginative processes are the common link between pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning. The second-order factor was also predicted by inhibitory control 
providing credence to the argument that domain-general cognitive skills like executive 
functions influence hypothetical thinking. The finding from the SEM supports the idea that a 
capacity for imaginary representation may be the cognitive structure that facilitates an ability 
to generate alternatives to reality.    
 
 
7.3.2 Theoretical Proposal 
This study proposed to test a theoretical model which hypothesized a model of the cognitive 
structure of the relationship between pretence and counterfactual reasoning (refer to Chapter 3 
Research Design section 3.2.0 which discussed the Statement of the Problem). The initial 
prediction was the variance from the data would successfully partition a general factor, referred 
to as imaginary representations; in addition to latent factors that captured the constructs of 
pretence and counterfactual reasoning. However, the empirical evidence supported only a 
second-order factor model where only one general latent factor accounted for the variance 
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shared by pretence and counterfactual reasoning (refer to Chapter 6 Results B section 6.6.4). 
The resulting theoretical proposition from the empirical findings supports a tentative claim that 
the relationship between pretence and counterfactual reasoning could be explained by an 
underlying general factor, that is, an ability to generate imaginary representations. I propose 
that if this theoretical proposition holds true then it means the cognitive structure which 
facilitates the cognitive skills utilised when someone is pretending or reasoning 
counterfactually is derived from the ability to imagine possible worlds. Whilst this conclusion 
has been pointed out by researchers of pretence and counterfactual reasoning; the findings from 
this present study shows that a construct called ‘imaginary representations’ can be empirically 
tested. Given that the construct was extracted from two different types of hypothetical thinking, 
I propose that different types of hypothetical thinking are reliant on the same imaginary 
representational capacity. An imaginary representational capacity is therefore relied on to 
pretend, reason counterfactually, as well as to perform related skills like engage in future 
hypothetical thinking, syllogistic reasoning, false belief, et cetera. Therefore, I argue that there 
is empirical evidence showing that it is an ability to imagine that makes it possible for someone 
to consider events that have not occurred.  
 
 
7.3.3 Theoretical Model 
Drawing on the work of Amsel and Smalley (2000) who proposed a model of counterfactual 
reasoning about possibilities (see discussion in Chapter 2 Literature Review section 2.5.1), I 
propose ‘A Mental State Model of Imaginary Representations’, depicted in Figure 7.2, to 
capture how interactions between true and false states of affairs are reliant on the ability to 
imagine possible worlds. In essence, I extended Amsel and Smalley’s (2000) model to consider 
false premises as a more general imaginary representational capacity from which other 
specialised forms of thinking about possible worlds originate. Essentially, all cognitive skills 
relating to generating alternative hypothetical worlds that reflect off of reality have been pulled 
under the umbrella of a spectrum of imaginative thinking. As discussed in Chapter 2 Literature 
Review section 2.5.1, Amsel and Smalley (2000) proposed that the representational format of 
the true world and its counterfactual representation, in any given context, operate through a 
process whereby a sequence of events from the real world are copied and then edited by altering 




I use the Mental State Model of Imaginary Representations to depict the cognitive interactions 
involved in thinking of imaginary worlds that are counterfactual to reality. Four broad arrows 
are used towards the bottom of the model. The first two of the broad arrows show how sensory 
or perceptual information and the environment or social context influences the process of 
forming our knowledge of the world. The second two of the broad arrows show that the process 
by which real world knowledge is received and acted upon as imaginary mental representations 
may be influenced by domain general skills like executive functions and other cognitive 
processes, perhaps like language. The model also includes two smaller arrows pointing in 
opposite directions to each other between the real-world representations and imaginary 
representations. Based on Amsel and Smalley’s (2000) explanation, one of the small arrows, 
pointing from the real-world premise to its counterfactual alternative, shows how information 
from the real world is copied, edited and received as an input or a mental representation of the 
real world. How the real world is edited would depend on the type of hypothetical thought 
being imagined. The second small arrow, pointing from the imagined world back to the real-
word premise, depicts the comparing and contrasting processing requirements of the edited 
imagined representation to real-world representation necessary to reason from the false 
premise. This pattern of cognitive processing may occur when pretending, reasoning 
counterfactually or engaging in other related forms of hypothetical thinking. The challenges 
experienced with reasoning from false premises may reside with cognitive skills being 
undeveloped but children overcome this challenges as their cognition matures and through 






Figure 7.2 A Mental State Model of Imaginary Representations 
 
According to Amsel and Smalley (2000) very early in development children struggle with 
comparing and contrasting the true state of affairs with the false state so as to reason 
successfully from the imagined false premise. The researchers identified that children have 
difficulties with: (a) the ability to evaluate how changes in the false state of affairs impact the 
true state of affairs or the real world (counterfactual reasoning); (b) the ability to understand 
pretence as representational and intentionally create mental representations of another’s 
representation of the false state of affairs (false belief). Children’s difficulties have been 
associated with poor executive function skills and the results from this present study showed 
that inhibitory control is integral to both pretending and counterfactual reasoning. The 
structural model tested in the results section suggested that the activation of imaginary 
208 
 
representations is influenced by inhibitory control. Researchers generally agree that 
counterfactual thinking makes inhibitory demands on children and real-world counterfactuals 
are more cognitively demanding than others types of counterfactuals (Beck, 2016; Weisberg & 
Gopnik, 2016).  
 
Moreover, the ‘Mental State Model of Imaginary Representations’ uses Amsel and Smalley’s 
(2000) model of counterfactual reasoning about possibilities to show how different forms of 
thinking about counterfactuals or false states of affairs may actually share the same cognitive 
workspace - general ability to generate imaginary representations. If the imaginary 
representational model proposed is to be upheld it should be able to account for: (a) the 
differences in imaginary ideas which are derived from pretending or counterfactual reasoning, 
(b) the discrepancies in the different demands that pretence and counterfactual reasoning make 
place on the imagination, that is, pretending is typically open-ended whilst, counterfactual 
reasoning is more constrained, (c) the incremental successes children have with counterfactual 
reasoning as they develop, for example, progressing from basic conditional reasoning to 
counterfactual reasoning.  
 
To account for these differences across different forms of hypothetical thinking and how they 
develop, I argue that connectionist theory of cognition provides a model of explaining how 
mental representations emanate in the mind and can shed light on how an imaginary 
representational capacity might function. Connectionism was previously discussed in Chapter 
2 Literature Review section 2.5.2.1 as a theory which can explain how seemingly different 
cognitive processes share similar cognitive mechanisms. Connectionists use the model of the 
brain to conceive the mind as a networked system of connected units capable of sending signals 
to each other and function because of an inherent capacity to learn from interactions with the 
environment and from the maturation of neural connections (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; 
Herberle, 1998; Smith & Conrey, 2007). The units in a connectionist model are sometimes 
referred to as distributed representations owing to shared connections with units in the brain 
and outside environments (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). Units of mental representations become 
interconnected via means of relevant properties becoming excited and irrelevant properties 
being inhibited. The general principles of how mental representations function in a 
connectionist system were described in section 2.5.2.1 in Chapter 2 Literature Review. 
Following on from this discussion, counterfactuals depicted in the Mental State Model of 
Imaginary Representations would bear the following characteristics in a connectionist system: 
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(1) that counterfactual worlds receives as input perceptual and context information to form 
a mental representation of the real-world 
(2) an edited imaginary version of the real-world presented is created to hold in mind dual 
representations 
(3) it is possible for there to be multiple imaginary possibilities of the real-world hence the 
relevant imaginary representation is activated and non-relevant representations are 
inhibited 
(4) evaluations of the dual world representations are influenced by domain-general 
cognitive processes like inhibition 
(5) Intentional understanding or metarepresentations are subject to the processes of 
cognitive maturation  
 
The proposal that I have put forward describing the ability to think about possible worlds as an 
imaginary representational ability that operates on a spectrum of hypothetical thinking skills, 
allows us to take into account the role of imagination across the lifespan. Theories explaining 
imaginary representations in counterfactual contexts, therefore, need to account for the 
incremental changes in children’s success with counterfactual reasoning over the course of 
development (Harris, 2000). The Mental State Imaginative Representation Model provides a 
reasonable explanation of thinking about how different imagination related phenomena that 
draw on reality, albeit closely or loosely, including those exhibited in adulthood are still 
underpinned by the same cognitive mechanism. Over the course of development human beings 
generate alternative hypothetical versions of the real-world as they know it for various reasons. 
During the early years it emerges as pretence where the alternative imaginary world is a product 
of the real-world as it is experienced but over the course of development it takes on different 
formats like thinking about future hypotheticals, basic conditional reasoning, counterfactual 
reasoning, theory of mind understanding, and even potentially expanding to thinking about 
fantastical realms far removed from the world as we know it. Within different types of 
hypothetical thinking there is also marked by incremental improvements in the extent to which 
children are able to hold multiple imaginary models in mind, reason from them, to eventually 




Therefore, the expectation is that different forms of counterfactuals would be associated and 
perhaps predictive of each other over the course of development. Support for this hypothesis 
comes from our understanding of the link between pretence and theory of mind. A study by 
Dore and Lillard (2015) found that children’s measures of fantasy orientation predicted 
improvement in theory of mind over two time points where at time point one children’s ages 
ranged from 3.0 – 3.11 years and at time point two children’s ages ranged from 3.7 – 4.7 years. 
Fantasy worlds differs from reality but it differs from pretence in that the focus is on possible 
worlds that could not actually exist (Dore & Lillard, 2015). Another example of the 
imagination-reality dichotomy in adulthood is from fantasy proneness. Fantasy proneness is 
defined as a tendency to imagine fictitious situations often to escape reality and is believed to 
be normally distributed in the population with various degrees of daydreaming considered a 
fairly universal part of normal emotional functioning (Bacon et al., 2013). A study by Bacon, 
Walsh, and Martin (2013) found that individuals high in fantasy proneness had a general 
tendency to think counterfactually. Fantasy proneness bears similarities to early years pretence, 
so it may be interesting to test the hypothetical model used in this study with an adult population 
by measuring fantasy proneness and counterfactual reasoning to see if the model could be 
replicated. In a similar aged population to this present study, the legitimacy of the hypothesized 
model tested in this present study can be assessed by extending it to include measures like 
syllogistic counterfactual reasoning and false belief understanding to check if these related 
hypothetical skills are indeed correlated and whether a general higher-order factor can explain 
the associations predicted. The empirical evidence can provide meaningful insight for 
evaluating the Mental State Imaginative Representational Model proposed here in this study. 
Additional executive functions can be added for good measure. An example of the 






















7.3.4 Application to the Initially Proposed Framework of Pretence & Counterfactual 
Reasoning 
The Mental State Model of Imaginary Representations proposed in this present thesis provides 
a coherent explanation of how the interconnections among all the cognitive processes proposed 
by Weisberg and Gopnik (2013) as being integral to unified a framework of pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning come together and supports the claim that a possible role of early 
years pretence is to facilitate counterfactual reasoning. The Mental State Imaginative 
Representational Model meet all the criteria for the unified framework discussed in Weisberg 
and Gopnik’s (2013) paper. It takes into account the crucial role of learning by giving latitude 
to how the aspects of context, cognitive control, and cognitive maturation results in incremental 
change over the course of development whether that be through the process of Bayesian 
inferencing or via other means of learning through play. Learning, therefore, becomes 
cemented as children become better at different forms of counterfactual thinking. An 
imaginative representational cognitive workspace allows the representation of multiple 
possible worlds from one real-world premise and to eventually be able to compare these worlds 
to each other. The perception of an underlying imaginative capacity provides a meaningful 
explanation of how all versions of counterfactual thinking about possible worlds, ranging from 
absurdities to serious reasoning, could occur. More importantly, the proposal made in this 
present thesis provides support for thinking about the relationship between pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning at a computational level and gives an account for how early years 
pretence might evolve into the serious formal business of counterfactual reasoning.  
 
 
7.4.0 Limitations of the Research  
It is worth pointing out that there are some features of this work which limit the conclusions 
we can draw about the findings concerning the relationship between pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning. Firstly, this study employed an observational research design and as 
such is subject to all the shortcomings associated with this research method. The main caveat 
of observational studies is that conclusions made about the associations between the variables 
in the study do not suggest that any one of the variables is causing the other to occur (Goodwin 
& Goodwin, 2014). Although evidence is stronger in longitudinal designs; they also cannot 
prove causation Therefore, it must be emphasized that no causal claims are being made about 
the direction of the relationship between pretence, counterfactual reasoning and other related 
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cognitive skills such as executive functions, receptive language, measured in this study. In 
order to make causal claims about the relationship of the variables in this study it would have 
been necessary to use an experimental, longitudinal or cross-lagged observational study design.  
 
Moreover, this does not take away from the value of observational research in that it can be 
used to describe, explain and predict the strength of the associations shared among variables in 
a study. Observational studies are powerful research approaches that are (a) descriptive in that 
they can provide the first steps towards the generation of new knowledge; (b) explanatory in 
that they provide scientific explanations which form the basis for theory building; and (c) useful 
for testing predictions based off of scientific explanations (Dyer, 2007). Hence, the findings 
from this research are valuable because it provides quantifiable evidence of how the 
psychological constructs of pretence and counterfactual reasoning can be conceptualized, it 
confirms that pretence and counterfactual reasoning are indeed correlated, and tests cognitive 
models aimed at explaining the cognitive mechanisms involved in pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning. The findings from this study can therefore provide foundational information 
necessary for making decisions about controlling variables in follow up experimental design 
studies or longitudinal studies.   
 
An inherent characteristic of observational studies is the third variable problem – the inability 
to control extraneous variables directly (Goodwin & Goodwin, 2014). In developmental studies 
like this, not all measurable third variables can be in included usually because only a limited 
number of observations can be reasonably and ethically be carried out with children. One such 
example, is the exclusion of the variable ‘false belief’ which has been considered a type of 
counterfactual reasoning by some researchers (Amsel & Smalley, 2000). Practically, the third 
variable problem exists because only a limited number of measures could be included in studies 
with children otherwise the testing time with children would become unreasonably and 
unethically long. The structural model is therefore limited in that it does not include other 
cognitive skills known to rely on alternative, imaginative thinking. It would be worth designing 
future research that tests how additional, related cognitive, constructs involving alternative, 
imaginative thinking hang together in a structural model. Hence, it is important to be aware 
that the hypothetical model is limited but the results from this study provided a good starting 




Another limitation relates to the extent to which all of the measures used in the study 
maintained the standard of being valid assessments of the cognitive skill being measured in the 
context of this research. Of particular concern was the validity and reliability of the working 
memory, delay of gratification and symbolic representation tasks and thinking about whether 
they did a good job of capturing variable performance in this sample. None of these measures 
correlated well with other study variables of the same domain. For example, the working 
memory and delay of gratification tasks did not correlate with measure of inhibition and the 
symbolic representation tasks did not correlate with the other indicators of pretence. Two 
possible explanations are either: (a) the measures fell prey to a task selection issue, that is, not 
the most appropriate task given the background of students in the study; or (b) that the results 
are indeed robust and the constructs which these tasks assessed were really in fact not 
associated with the other variables measured in this study. A case for there being a task 
selection issue is on the basis that the participants’ scores in the symbolic representation task 
had a limited range, that is, most scores fell within the range of the third percentile.  These 
results merits asking whether the tasks were age-appropriate and performed the discriminatory 
function of capturing variability in participants’ performances. A recommendation going 
further is to allow for a more extensive pilot in the study context so that study measures can be 
validated with the sample of interest.  Alternately – check other studies to know if a similar 
pattern of non-correlations existed. For this reason, it is worth emphasizing that the 
generalizability of quantitative research is limited to the extent that the population bears the 




7.5.0 Implications of the Research 
The findings from this present study addresses the gap which exists since there is a dearth of 
empirical evidence which has investigated the proposal that a unifying theory of pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning can explain the conceptual similarities observed between the two. At 
the time of submitting this dissertation, this study brought the count to two studies to have 
tested associations between pretence and counterfactual reasoning. Accordingly, the first major 
and significant contribution made by this present research is the contribution of empirical 
evidence which can be used to evaluate the claim that pretence and counterfactual reasoning 
share the same component cognitive processes. 
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This present research adds to the conversation about the unity of counterfactual thought. Is the 
space of counterfactuals continuous? Does it mean that the same psychological processes are 
recruited across different counterfactuals? According to Beck (2016) different counterfactuals 
like real-world counterfactuals are qualitatively different by a matter of degree as well as in 
their relationship with reality and children’s difficulties with counterfactual reasoning may not 
necessarily be attributed to executive function demands but could equally stem from concerns 
about children’s competence. Indeed, extensive research has been done by Rafetseder, Cristi-
Vargas, and Perner (2010), Rafetseder, Schwitalla, and Perner (2013), and Rafetseder and 
Perner (2014), as example, about qualitative differences in children’s ability to reason 
counterfactually. In contrast, Weisberg and Gopnik (2016) makes the case for thinking of all 
counterfactuals more generally as united imaginative abilities whilst acknowledging that 
differences in the form, function, and explicit links to an objective real-world reference 
influences children’s success with counterfactual reasoning over time. The theoretical claims 
from this present study suggests that thinking of counterfactuals as being underpinned by a 
general imaginative representation capacity does not negate the qualitative differences which 
exists across different types counterfactuals. I hope that this study pushes the boundaries of 
counterfactual reasoning research to explore subtle the differences and similarities across 
different forms of counterfactual reasoning that will move toward refining a psychometric 
construct definition of counterfactual reasoning.  
 
This present study attempted to present a convincing argument that could explain the nature of 
the relationship between pretence and counterfactual reasoning. A unique contribution of this 
present thesis is the empirical evidence supporting the unified theoretical claim that an 
underlying imaginative representational capacity underpins associations between pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning and by extension other cognitive skills involving generating 
alternative possible worlds or counterfactual thinking (Weisberg & Gopnik, 2013). No 
previous study has modelled the shared cognitive structure of pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning so the arguments made for a broad underlying imaginative representational capacity 
has strong, positive implications which supports the framing of the theoretical argument that 
early years pretence may play role in the development of counterfactual reasoning skills. 
Modelling the relationship between pretence and counterfactual reasoning as the presence of a 
broad, underlying, imaginative representational capacity explained how thinking about 
counterfactuals can take on different forms over the course of development. Additionally, the 
mental state model of imaginary representations is an original attempt to model how a general 
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imaginary workspace might interact across different form of hypothetical reasoning and real-
world premises. Hence, this study supports at a computational level the claim that pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning share the same cognitive mechanisms.  
 
A practical implication of the investigation carried to future research is the provision of a 
testable model which can be used for further empirical tests of the cognitive mechanisms shared 
by pretence and counterfactual reasoning in both child and adult populations. This study 
applied suggestions from the seminal paper by Lillard, Hopkins, Dore, Smith, and Palmquist 
(2013) about the role of pretend play on children’s development for the use of modern statistical 
techniques which support causal inferences from designs with sufficiently large samples and 
numerous measures. It would be interesting to see if the structural model of pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning developed in this study can be replicated. Furthermore, would it 
uphold if the model is extended to include additional forms of counterfactual reasoning. A 
possible strategy would be an effort to replicate this study using a similar observational design. 
Additionally, having established that pretence and counterfactual reasoning are associated; this 
present study provides credibility for undertaking a longitudinal study that directly tests 
whether the quality of a child’s pretence predicts their counterfactual reasoning skills later in 
development, as well as an experimental study that tests the causal relationship between 
pretence and counterfactual reasoning.  
 
 
7.6.0 Chapter Summary 
The goal of this chapter was to elucidate the claim that pretence and counterfactual reasoning 
share the similar cognitive mechanisms.  The validity of the separate measures of pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning were assessed. It was found that for both pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning; the measures could be reduced to single latent constructs with pretence being 
referred to as ‘child-initiated pretence’ and counterfactual reasoning being referred to by its 
abbreviation ‘CFR’. As latent constructs, child-initiated pretence and CFR were significantly 
correlated with each other. They also shared significant associations with receptive language 
and inhibition. Inhibition commonly accounted for unique variance in child-initiated pretence 
and CFR whereas, receptive language only uniquely predicted CFR. A structural equation 
model was used to test the theoretical model predicting that associations between child-initiated 
pretence and counterfactual reasoning could be explained by an underlying latent capacity to 
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generate imaginative representations. Support was found for a computational model which 
conceptualised that a second-order factor which was predicted by inhibition adequately 
explained the correlations shared between child-initiated pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning. The evidence generated from this present study, provides strong, empirical support 
for the theoretical proposal claiming that a unified theory where a common imaginative process 
could explain the conceptual similarities shared by pretence and counterfactual reasoning. I 
presented a theoretical model named ‘A Mental State Model of Imaginative Representations’ 
which depicted the interaction between cognitive processes which make it possible for humans 
to generate alternative representations to real-world premises.  The chapter closes with a 





























































Chapter 8 Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have been concerned with understanding how it is that the cognitive skills of 
pretence and counterfactual reasoning both involve the ability to disengage with current reality, 
make inferences about an alternative representation of reality, and keep this inference 
representation separate from reality even though precocious pretend play precedes 
counterfactual reasoning. The impetus for this present study originated from the work of 
Walker and Gopnik (2013) and Weisberg and Gopnik (2013) who proposed a unified 
theoretical framework attributing that the similarities between pretence and counterfactual 
reasoning may exist so that pretend play functions as an opportunity to explicitly practice the 
cognitive skills responsible for its appearance; that is, learning generally within contexts of 
counterfactual reasoning, causal reasoning and in situations which rely on generating 
imaginative processes as alternatives to reality. Their essential argument is that pretend play is 
a form of counterfactual reasoning and since it precedes counterfactual reasoning in 
development; it initially functions as a naive form of counterfactual reasoning but over time 
the same cognitive skills used in pretence are applied to learning in similar domains which rely 
on imaginative processes.  
 
Against this background, this study focused on unpacking two important questions: what is the 
shared cognitive dimensions or cognitive mechanisms which link pretence to counterfactual 
reasoning? Does an underlying cognitive dimension underpin the associations predicted to be 
shared by pretence and counterfactual reasoning? By asking these questions, this study took a 
step back from the discussion about the role of pretence in counterfactual reasoning which 
framed the discussion in the unified theoretical framework and instead aimed to generate 
evidence to the more fundamental question about; what specific cognitive processes are 
involved in pretence and counterfactual reasoning? In so doing, the foundational question of 
what cognitive processes are involved in pretence and counterfactual reasoning are answered 
first before moving on to design studies that attempt to explore the causal role of pretence in 
counterfactual reasoning.  
 
The study makes a unique contribution that will help shed light on the nature of the relationship 
between pretence and counterfactual reasoning. It is original in its use of a large-scale 
observational research design which supported the use of advance statistical analyses that 
allowed cognitive models of the relationship between pretence and counterfactual reasoning to 
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be tested at a latent level. Typically, pretend play and counterfactual reasoning research usually 
explore associations between study variables at the observable level. Data was analysed for a 
sample of approximately one hundred and eighty-nine typically developing four to five-year-
old children. In particular, my work makes the following contribution to the literature. It 
supported previous work which established that indicators of pretence like elaborate pretend 
play ideas and object substitutions are significantly correlated with each other. It extended to 
knowledge by showing that correlated indicators of pretence could yield a general latent 
construct of pretence. It provided confirmatory evidence that before the age of six children 
have difficulty with counterfactual reasoning in social-causal contexts and that children use an 
inconsistent pattern of applying both basic conditional reasoning and counterfactual reasoning 
to answer counterfactual questions. When both basic conditional reasoning and counterfactual 
reasoning responses resulted in correct answers they were significantly correlated with other 
and yielded a general latent construct of counterfactual reasoning. Inhibition is a cognitive skill 
common to both pretence and counterfactual reasoning above and beyond age and receptive 
language. Pretence and counterfactual reasoning were significantly correlated with each other 
at a latent level. The relationship between pretence and counterfactual reasoning could be 
explained by a common underlying capacity for imaginative representation which is predicted 
by inhibitory control. It proposed A Mental State Model of Imaginary Representations as a 
theoretical model which explains how imaginary processes might underpin counterfactual 
representations. 
 
The results from my work supports the proposal that a unified theoretical framework may 
appropriately describes the relationship between pretence and counterfactual reasoning. There 
is support for the claims that pretence and counterfactual reasoning share cognitive 
mechanisms and an underlying cognitive dimension may be responsible for the relationship 
shared by two. The findings from my research makes a unique contribution to knowledge by 
building on an existing model of counterfactual reasoning and proposing the Mental State 
Model of Imaginative Representations. The model proposed depicts how the mechanism 
responsible for being able to transition between real world premises and false states of affairs 
is a general capacity for imaginative representations. This model is plausible within a 
framework of a unified theory of counterfactuals wherein they are generally underpinned by 
imaginative cognitive processes interacting with perceptual/sensory inputs, social cognitive 
contexts, and other relevant cognitive inputs like inhibition. The strength of these interactions 
influence success with reasoning from false premises.  
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I anticipate that the findings from my research will be of interest to the community of 
counterfactual reasoning researchers. To my knowledge, only a handful of published papers 
directly speak on the idea of a unified framework of pretence and counterfactual reasoning. 
The model proposed in this theory is fairly rudimentary and would benefit from critical 
feedback aligned with the science of theory building. Moreover, this present study is valuable 
as it contributes to the discussion that a possible role of pretence in early development is to 
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Appendix A – Pilot: Phase One Results  
 
Results for Tasks Measured in Phase One Pilot 
Including the Antecedent and Consequent Task by Guajardo and Turley-Ames (2004) 
 
ID 
 Receptive Language Inhibition   WM          CFR Tasks 













 22 22 60 20 4  
01 5.6  22 16 38 18 4 8 
04 5.1 19 20 40 10 4 7 
05 5.1 20 18 33 9 3 5 
07 5.2 16 19 17 10 4 4 
02 4.3  Na 16 7 12 na Na 
03 4.6  7 15 na 11 1 4 
06 4.8 15 18 58 7 4 13 
08 3.10 14 15 na 12 4 5 
09 3.3 10 9 na 10 0 0 
10 3.9 2 5 na 12 1 0 
*HTKS: Head Toes Knees and Shoulders Task 
*WM: Working Memory Task (Spin the Pots) 
*C-CFR: Consequent Counterfactual Reasoning Task 
*A-CFR: Antecedent Counterfactual Reasoning Task         








































 Appendix B – Pilot: Phase Two Results   
 
Results for the Travel Scenario Task  





















































T11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0  
T13 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
T14 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
T15 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
T16 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
T17 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
T18 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
T19 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
T20 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
*T11: Trial participant number 11 
*CF-Alt Depart.: Counterfactual Alternative Departure Question  
*CF Alt Transp.: Counterfactual Alternative Departure Transport  
 
Results for the Road Task  
(An open CFR task by Beck & Crilly, 2009) 
 
Participants 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Total Total 




T11 1 1 1 1 2 2 
T12 1 1 1 1 2 2 
T13 1 1 1 1 2 2 
T14 1 0 1 1 2 1 
T15 0 1 0 0 0 1 
T16 1 0 1 1 2 1 
T17 1 0 1 0 2 0 
T18 1 1 1 0 2 1 
T19 1 1 Na na 1 1 
T20 1 0 1 0 2 0 




Results for the Sweet Story Task 
(A nearest possible world CFR task by Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas, & Perner, 2010) 
 
Participants 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Memory TestQ CFQ Memory TestQ CFQ 
T13 1 na 1 1 Na 1 
T14 1 1 0 1 1 1 
T15 1 1 1 1 1 0 
T17 1 1 0 1 1 0 
T18 1 1 0 1 1 1 
T19 1 1 0 1 1 1 
*na: participant did not respond or provide an answer to the question 
*TestQ: Test Question 




Results for Sweet Story Task 
(A nearest possible world CFR task by Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas, & Perner, 2010) 
 
Participants 
Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Memory TestQ CFQ Memory TestQ CFQ 
 na na na 0 na 0 
T13 1 1 0 1 1 1 
T14 1 1 0 1 1 1 
T15 1 1 0 1 1 0 
T17 1 1 1 1 1 1 
T18 1 1 1 1 1 1 
*na: participant did not respond or provide an answer to the question 
*TestQ: Test Question 










Results for the Location Change Task Doctor Story  
(A nearest possible world task by Rafetseder & Perner, 2010) 
 
Participants 
Doctor Story - 1 
Typical 
Doctor Story - 1 
Atypical 
Doctor Story - 2 
Typical 
Doctor Story - 1 
Atypical 
NCQ CFQ BCQ NCQ CFQ BCQ NCQ CFQ BCQ NCQ CFQ BCQ 
14 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
18 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
21 1 1 na 1 0 na 1 1 na 1 0 na 
*NCQ: Now Control Question 
*CFQ: Counterfactual Question 






Results for the Location Change Task Firefighter Story  
(A nearest possible world task by Rafetseder & Perner, 2010) 
Participants Fire Fighter  Story - 
1 Typical 
Fire Fighter Story - 1 
Atypical 
Fire Fighter Story - 
2 Typical 
Fire Fighter Story - 1 
Atypical 
NCQ CFQ BCQ NCQ CFQ BCQ NCQ CFQ BCQ NCQ CFQ BCQ 
14 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 na 1 1 1 
18 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
21 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 na 0 1 0 1 
*NCQ: Now Control Question 
*CFQ: Counterfactual Question 






















































Child Initiated Pretend Play Assessment (CHIPPA) Coding Scheme removed for 
































































































































































































































































Appendix D – Location Change Task 
Name _____________________________________________________________ Date _________________________________ 
Doctor Story 
[1typ] Set-up: swimming pool and hospital, but no park. 
 
Look what I’ve brought with me: a hospital and a swimming pool (placing both locations on the 
table). Could you show me; where the hospital is? And where the swimming pool is? 
 
Look! I have a doctor and I would like to tell you a story about this doctor. This doctor works in 
this hospital (point to hospital). Look! In the hospital, he is attending to his patient giving her some 
medicine, so she will get better soon. Suddenly, his phone rings (r-i-n-g, r-i-n-g). The doctor is 
called away to an emergency.  
Look what has happened: Jacob has climbed up to the swimming pool and skid down the slide 
(Show how boy climbs up swimming pool and skids down. boy exclaims): “Ouch. My hand hurts!” 
Look! The doctor gets his first-aid bag and runs to the swimming pool to attend to Jacob. 
 
Now Control Question: “Where is the doctor now?” ___________________________________________________ 
Counterfactual Question: “If Jacob had not gotten hurt, where would the doctor be now?” 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
If child does not provide answer, options are provided in a counterbalanced way: 
a. “At the swimming pool or in the hospital?” 
b. “In the hospital or at the swimming pool?” 




[1atyp] Set-up: park and hospital, but no hospital. 
Look what I have brought with me: a park and a swimming pool. Show me, where the hospital is? 
And where the swimming pool is? 
 
Look! I would like to tell you a story about this doctor. After work today, this doctor went to the 
park to read a book. Look! He’s reading his book quietly in the park. Suddenly, his phone rings (r-
i-n-g, r-i-n-g). The doctor is called away to an emergency! 
Look what has happened: Jacob has climbed up to the swimming pool and skid down the slide 
(Show how boy climbs up swimming pool and skids down. boy exclaims): “Ouch! My hand hurts!” 
 Look! The doctor gets his first-aid bag and runs to the swimming pool to attend to Jacob. 
 
Now Control Question: “Where is the doctor now?” ________________________________________ 
Counterfactual Question: “If Jacob had not gotten hurt, where would the doctor be now?” 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
If child does not provide answer, options are provided in a counterbalanced way: 
c. “At the swimming pool or in the park?” 
d. “In the park or at the swimming pool?” 
 




 [2typ] Set-up: swimming pool, park and hospital. 
Look what I have brought with me: a hospital, a park and a swimming pool. Show me again where 
the hospital is? And, where is the swimming pool? And where is the park? 
 
Look! I would like to tell you a story about this doctor. Before work this doctor went to the park 
to read a book. Look! He’s reading his book quietly in the park. Now it’s time to go to work. This 
doctor works in this hospital (point to hospital). Look! In the hospital, he is attending to his patient 
giving her some medicine, so she will get better soon. Suddenly, his phone rings (r-i-n-g, r-i-n-g). 
The doctor is called away to an emergency.  
Look what has happened: Jacob has climbed up to the swimming pool and skid down the slide 
(Show how boy climbs up swimming pool and skids down. boy exclaims): “Ouch. My hand hurts!” 
Look! The doctor gets his first-aid bag and runs to the swimming pool to attend to Jacob. 
 
Now Control Question: “Where is the doctor now?” _________________________________________ 
Counterfactual Question: “If Jacob had not gotten hurt, where would the doctor be now?” 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
If child does not provide answer, options are provided in a counterbalanced way: 
e. “In the park or in the hospital?” 
f. “In the hospital or in the park?” 
 
Before Control Question: “Where was the doctor when he received the phone call that Jacob was 
hurt?” ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
[2atyp] Set-up: swimming pool, park and hospital. 
 
Look what I have brought with me: a hospital, a park and a swimming pool. Show me again, where 
the hospital is? And where is the swimming pool? And where is the park? 
 
Look! I would like to tell you a story about this doctor. After work today, this doctor went to the 
park. Look! He’s reading his book quietly in the park. Suddenly, his phone rings (r-i-n-g, r-i-n-g). 
The doctor is called away to an emergency.  
Look what has happened: Jacob has climbed up to the swimming pool and skid down the slide. 
(Show how boy climbs up swimming pool and skids down. boy exclaims): “Ouch. My hand hurts!” 
Look! The doctor now runs to the hospital to get his first-aid bag, “Ah, there it is!” and runs to the 
swimming pool to attend to Jacob. 
 
Now Control Question: “Where is the doctor now?” ___________________________________________________ 
Counterfactual Question: “If Jacob had not gotten hurt, where would the doctor be now?” 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
If child does not provide answer, options are provided in a counterbalanced way: 
g. “In the park or in the hospital?” 
h. “In the hospital or in the park?” 







Name _____________________________________________________________ Date _________________________________ 
Teacher Story 
 
[1typ] Set-up: school and house, but no playground. 
Look what I have brought with me: a school and a house where a student lives (placing both 
locations on the table). Could you show me again, where the school is? And where the house is? 
 
Look! I have a teacher and I would like to tell you a story about this teacher. This teacher works 
in this school (point to school). In the school, she teaches the children reading, writing and 
mathematics. Suddenly Lisa says: “Miss! Miss! I really don’t feel well”. Lisa has eaten too many 
sweets and now she is feeling sick.  
Look! The teacher gives Lisa some medicine but Lisa is still not feeling well so, the teacher takes 
her home. 
 
Now Control Question: “Where is the teacher now?” ___________________________________________________ 
Counterfactual Question: “If Lisa had not gotten sick, where would the teacher be now?” 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
If child does not reply provide answer options in a counterbalanced way: 
i. “At school or at the house?” 
j. “At the house or at school?” 




[1atyp] Set-up: playground and house, but no school. 
Look what I have brought with me: a playground and a house where a student lives. Show me 
where the playground is? And where the house is? 
 
Look! I would like to tell you a story about this teacher. Because the weather is lovely, the teacher 
went to the playground with the children (point to playground). One child is playing football while 
Lisa is going down a slide (have Lisa go down slide).  
Suddenly Lisa says: “Miss! Miss! I really don’t feel well”. Lisa has eaten too many sweets and now 
she is feeling sick. 
Look! The teacher gives Lisa some medicine but Lisa is still not feeling well so, the teacher takes 
her home.  
 
Now Control Question: “Where is the teacher now?” __________________________________________________ 
Counterfactual Question: “If Lisa had not gotten sick, where would the teacher be now?” 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
If child does not reply provide answer options in a counterbalanced way: 
k. “At the playground or at the house?” 
l. “At the house or at the playground?” 
 






[2typ] Set-up: school, house, and playground. 
Look what I have brought with me: a school, a playground and a house where a student lives. 
Show me again, where the hospital is? And where is the playground? And where is the house? 
 
Look! I would like to tell you a story about this teacher. Because the weather is lovely, the teacher 
went to the playground with the children (point to playground). One child is playing football while 
Lisa is going down a slide (have Lisa go down slide). But now it is time to go to school (point to 
school). 
Look! The teaches the children reading, writing and mathematics. Suddenly Lisa says: “Miss! Miss! 
I really don’t feel well”. Lisa has eaten too many sweets and now she is feeling sick.  
Look! The teacher gives Lisa medicine but Lisa is still not feeling well so, the teacher takes her 
home. 
 
Now Control Question: “Where is the teacher now?” ___________________________________________________ 
 
Counterfactual Question: “If Lisa had not gotten sick, where would the teacher be now?” 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
If child does not reply provide answer options in a counterbalanced way: 
m. “At the playground or at school?” 
n. “At school or at the playground?” 
 




[2atyp] Set-up: school, house, and playground. 
Look what I have brought with me: a school, a playground and a house where a student lives. 
Show me again, where the school is? And which is the playground? And where is the house the 
house? 
 
Look! I would like to tell you a story about this teacher. Because the weather is lovely, the teacher 
went to the playground with the children (point to playground). One child is playing football while 
Lisa is going down a slide (have Lisa go down slide). Suddenly Lisa says: “Miss! Miss! I really don’t 
feel well”. Lisa has eaten too many sweets and now she is feeling sick. 
 
Look! The teacher takes Lisa back to the school where she gives Lisa some medicine but Lisa is 
still not feeling well so, the teacher takes her home. 
 
Now Control Question: “Where is the teacher now?” ___________________________________________________ 
Counterfactual Question: “If Lisa had not gotten sick, where would the teacher be now?” 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
If child does not reply provide answer options in a counterbalanced way: 
o. “At the playground or at school?” 
p. “At school or at the playground?” 
 




Name ____________________________________________________________ Date _________________________________ 
Fire-fighter Story 
[1typ] Set-up: forest and fire-station, but no living room. 
 
Look what I have brought with me: a fire-station and a forest (placing both locations on the table).  
Could you show me, where the fire-station is? And where the forest is? 
 
Here is a fire-fighter, and I would like to tell you a story about this fire-fighter. This fire-fighter 
works at this fire-station (point to fire-station).  Look! At the fire-station he is making sure the fire 
extinguisher works well for when he needs it. Suddenly, his phone rings (r-i-n-g, r-i-n-g). The fire- 
fighter is called away to an emergency.  
Look what has happened: a fire has broken out in the forest. Some trees are already on fire!  
Look! The fire-fighter takes his fire-extinguisher and runs to the forest to put out the fire (take 
flames off the trees). 
 
Now Control Question: “Where is the fire-fighter now?” ______________________________________________ 
Counterfactual Question: “If the fire had not broken out, where would the fire-fighter be now?”  
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
If child does not reply provide answer options in a counterbalanced way: 
q. “In the forest or at the fire station?” 
r. “At the fire station or in the forest?” 
 
Before Control Question: “Where was the fire fighter when he received the phone call that some 
fire has broken out?” _____________________________________________________________________________________ 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
[1atyp] Set-up: forest and living room, but no fire-station. 
Look what I have brought with me: a living room and a forest. Show me, where the living-room 
is? And where the forest is? 
 
Look, I would like to tell you a story about this fire-fighter. Before work, this fire-fighter is at home 
in his living room (point to living room). Look! He is sitting on his sofa watching TV. Suddenly, his 
phone rings (r-i-n-g, r-i-n-g). The fire-fighter is called to an emergency! 
 Look what has happened: a fire has broken out in the forest. Some trees are already on fire! 
Look! The fire-fighter takes his fire-extinguisher and runs to the forest to put out the fire (take 
flames off the trees). 
 
Now Control Question: “Where is the fire-fighter now?” ___________________________________________ 
Counterfactual Question: “If the fire had not broken out, where would the fire-fighter be now?” 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
If child does not reply provide answer options in a counterbalanced way: 
s. “In the forest or the living-room?” 
t. “In the living room or in the forest?” 
 
Before Control Question: “Where was the fire-fighter when he received the phone call that some 




[2typ] Set-up: forest, living room, and fire-station. 
Look what I have brought with me: a fire-station, a living room and a forest. Show me again, where 
the fire-station is? And where is the forest? And where is the living room? 
 
Look! I would like to tell you a story about this fire-fighter. Before work, this fire-fighter is at home 
in his living room (point to living room). Look! He is sitting on his sofa watching TV. But now it is 
time to go to work.  
 
This fire-fighter works at this fire-station (point to fire-station). At the fire-station he is making 
sure the fire extinguisher works well for when he needs it. Suddenly, his phone rings (r-i-n-g, r-i-
n-g). The fire-fighter is called away to an emergency.  
Look what has happened: a fire has broken out in the forest. Some trees are already on fire!  
Look! The fire-fighter takes his fire-extinguisher and runs to the forest to put out the fire (take 
flames off the trees). 
 
Now Control Question: “Where is the fire-fighter now?” _______________________________________________ 
Counterfactual Question: “If the fire had not broken out, where would the fire-fighter be now?”  
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
If child does not reply provide answer options in a counterbalanced way: 
u. “At the fire-station or the living-room?”  
v. “In the living room or at the fire station?”  
 
Before Control Question: “Where was the fire-fighter when he received the phone call that fire 




[2atyp] Set-up: forest, living room, and fire-station. 
Look what I have brought with me: a fire-station, a living room and a forest. Show me again, where 
the fire-station is? And where is the forest? And where is the living room? 
 
Look! I would like to tell you a story about this fire-fighter. After work, the fire-fighter walked 
home and is now in his living room (point to living room). Look! He’s sitting on his sofa watching 
TV. Suddenly, his phone rings (r-i-n-g, r-i-n-g). The fire-fighter is called away to an emergency.  
Look what has happened: a fire has broken out in the forest. Some trees are already on fire!  
Look! The fire-fighter takes his fire-extinguisher and runs to the forest to put out the fire (take 
flames off the trees). 
 
Now Control Question: “Where is the fire-fighter now?” _______________________________________________ 
Counterfactual Question: “If the fire had not broken out, where would the fire-fighter be now?” 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
If child does not reply provide answer options in a counterbalanced way: 
w. “At the fire-station or the living-room?” 
x. “In the living room or at the fire station?” 
Before Control Question: “Where was the fire-fighter when he received the phone call that some 




Name _____________________________________________________________ Date _________________________________ 
Policeman Story 
[1typ] Set-up: police station and car park. 
 
Look what I have brought with me: a police station and a car park (placing both locations on the 
table).  Could you show me; where the police station is? And where the car park is? 
 
Look! Here is a policeman. I would like to tell you a story about this policeman. This policeman 
works in this police station (point to police station). Look! In the police station, he has to do a lot 
of work on the computer. Suddenly, his phone rings (r-i-n-g, r-i-n-g). The policeman is called away 
to an emergency. 
Look what has happened: In the car park the blue car reversed and the yellow car “Crassshed!” 
into the blue car. 
Look! The policeman gets his motor bike and drives fast to the car park, “Nee Nah Nee Nah!” to 
see what has happened.  
 
Now Control Question: “Where is the policeman now?” ________________________________________________ 
Counterfactual Question: “If accident had not happened, where would the policeman be now?” 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
If child does not reply provide answer options in a counterbalanced way: 
y. “At the car park or at the police station?” 
z. “At the police station or at the car park?” 
Before Control Question: “Where was the police man when he received the phone call that an 
accident happened?”  ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
[1atyp] Set-up: shopping centre and car park. 
 
Look what I brought with me: a shopping centre and a car park. Show me, where the shopping 
centre is? And where the car park is? 
 
Look! I would like to tell you a story about this policeman. After work today, this policeman went 
to the shopping centre (point to shopping centre). He is buying some food for his dinner at the 
shopping centre. Suddenly, his phone rings (r-i-n-g, r-i-n-g). The policeman is called away to an 
emergency. 
Look what has happened: In the car park the blue car reversed and the yellow car “Crassshed!” 
into the blue car. 
Look! The policeman gets his bike and drives fast to the car park, “Nee Nah Nee Nah!” to see what 
has happened.  
 
Now Control Question: “Where is the policeman now?” ________________________________________________ 
Counterfactual Question: “If the accident had not happened, where would the policeman be now?” 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
If child does not reply provide answer options in a counterbalanced way: 
aa. “At the car park or at the shopping centre?” 
bb. “At the shopping centre or at the car park?” 
Before Control Question: “Where was the police man when he received the phone call that an 
accident happened?” ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
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[2typ] Set-up: police station, shopping centre and car park. 
Look what I brought with me: a police station, a shopping centre and a car park. Show me again, 
where the car park is? And where the police station is? And where the shopping centre is? 
 
Look! I would like to tell you a story about this policeman. Before work this policeman has gone 
to the shopping centre (point to shopping centre). Look! He is buying some food for lunch at the 
shopping centre. But now it is time to go to work. This policeman works in this police station 
(point to police station).  
Look! In the police station, he has to do a lot of work on the computer. Suddenly, his phone rings 
(r-i-n-g, r-i-n-g). The policeman is called away to an emergency. 
Look what has happened: In the car park the blue car reversed and the yellow car “Crassshed!” 
into the blue car. 
Look! The policeman gets his bike and drives fast to the car park, “Nee Nah Nee Nah!” to see what 
has happened.  
 
Now Control Question: “Where is the policeman now?” ________________________________________________ 
Counterfactual Question: “If accident had not happened, where would the policeman be now?” 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
If child does not reply provide answer options in a counterbalanced way: 
cc. “At the shopping centre or at the police station?” 
dd. “At the police station or at the shopping centre?” 
Before Control Question: “Where was the police man when he received the phone call that an 
accident happened?” ______________________________________________________________________________________ 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
[2atyp] Set-up: police station, shopping centre and car park. 
Look what I have brought with me: a police station, a shopping centre and a car park. Show me 
again, where the car park is? And where the police station is? And which the shopping centre is? 
 
Look! I would like to tell you a story about this policeman. After work today, this policeman 
walked to the shopping centre (point to the shopping centre). Look! He is buying some food for 
his dinner at the shopping centre. Suddenly, his phone rings (r-i-n-g, r-i-n-g). The policeman is 
called away to an emergency. 
Look what has happened: In the car park the blue car reversed and the yellow car “Crassshed!” 
into the blue car. 
Look! The policeman gets his bike and drives fast to the car park, “Nee Nah Nee Nah!” to see what 
has happened.  
 
Now Control Question: “Where is the policeman now?” ______________________________________________ 
Counterfactual Question: “If the accident had not happened, where would the policeman be now?” 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
If child does not reply provide answer options in a counterbalanced way: 
ee. “At the shopping centre or at the police station?” 
ff. “In the police station or at the shopping centre?” 
Before Control Question: “Where was the police man when he received the phone call that an 










Head Toes Knees and Shoulders Task (HTKS) Coding Scheme removed for copyright 
reasons. The copyright holders are Megan McClelland 























































































































































































































































The Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals (CELF) Receptive Language Coding 
























































































































You are invited to participate in a research project exploring the link between pretend play 
and counterfactual reasoning in the first years of primary school, conducted by the Centre for 
Research on Play in Education, Development & Learning (PEDAL) at the Faculty of 
Education, University of Cambridge. 
 
 
What is this project about?  
 
This research project aims to explore an observed link between children’s pretend play 
tendencies and their ability to engage in counterfactual reasoning. Counterfactual reasoning is 
the ability to think of possible ways a situation or an experience could have turned out 
differently. We often get children to engage in counterfactual reasoning when we ask “what 
if” questions that lead to them think about how a situation could have turned out differently if 
a different course of action is chosen. For example, “When Tom is well-behaved, mommy 
rewards him with an ice cream. If Tom is not well-behaved, will he get an ice-cream?”. To 
answer the question the child must imagine a world where an alternative scenario to what is 
presented is played out. Researchers have observed that imagining counterfactual alternatives 
resembles imagining in pretend play because in both contexts children entertain, generate and 
reason about imaginary, made up or hypothetical scenarios. 
 
This study is important because in recent times, researchers are asking, “what contribution 
does pretend play make to children’s development?”. The similarities between pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning suggests that pretence may underpin children’s development of 
higher order thinking and reasoning skills. Therefore, this study examines these observed 
relationships. 
 
PEDAL is serious about play research and the findings from this research initiative will 
contribute to addressing one of our goals which is to answer the question “what is play?” as 
well as to inform the development of child-centred, playful pedagogies that support teaching 
and learning in schools. (https://www.educ.cam.ac.uk/centres/pedal/research/) 
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What does this study entail?  
 
This study will utilize a range of assessments and observations all of which have been used in 
other published research projects with reception age children. The general feedback is that 
children actually enjoy participating in the tasks. For a given child, the assessment periods are 
relatively short to minimise their time away from the classroom. We anticipate that each child 
will spend approximately 20-30 minutes completing tasks one-to-one with an experienced 
researcher, for three sessions. Overall, we anticipate children will miss approximately one 
hour and twenty minutes of class time. 
 
Whilst we endeavour to keep classroom disruption to a minimum, it will be necessary for me 
to spend a number of days in the school, so it is important that the teacher is comfortable with 
my presence and is supportive of the research. However, I would like to stress that there is no 
sense in which we wish to evaluate the teacher or the classroom environment.  
 




Yours sincerely,  
Gill Francis 
PhD Student 
PEDAL Research Centre 
Faculty of Education  
University of Cambridge 
Email: gaf36@cam.ac.uk 























   
Pretend Play and Counterfactual Reasoning Skills in the First Years of 
Primary School 
Parent/Carer Information Statement 
15th January, 2017 
Dear Parent/Carer,  
The Head Teacher and reception teachers at your school, has kindly given me permission to 
contact you regarding a research project carried out by the Centre for Research on Play in 
Education, Development & Learning (PEDAL) at the Faculty of Education at the University of 
Cambridge. All children in Reception are invited to participate. This research, funded by the 
LEGO foundation, seeks to explore how children’s pretend play tendencies might relate to 
their ability to engage in counterfactual reasoning.  
Counterfactual reasoning is the ability to think of possible ways a situation or an experience 
could have turned out differently. We often get children to engage in counterfactual 
reasoning by asking them how a situation could have turned out differently if they had 
chosen a different course of action.  For example, “When Tom is well-behaved, mommy 
rewards him with an ice cream. If Tom is not well-behaved, will he get an ice-cream?”. To 
answer the question children must imagine a world where an alternative scenario to what is 
presented is played out. Researchers have observed that imagining counterfactual 
alternatives resembles imagining in pretend play because in both contexts children entertain, 
generate and reason about imaginary, or hypothetical scenarios. 
This study is important because in recent times, researchers are asking, “what contribution 
does pretend play make to children’s development?”. The similarities between pretence and 
counterfactual reasoning suggest that pretence may underpin children’s development of 
higher order thinking and reasoning skills. Therefore, this study examines these observed 
relationships. PEDAL is serious about play research and the findings from this research 
initiative may contribute to informing policy about the development of child-centred, playful 
pedagogies that support teaching and learning in schools. 
(https://www.educ.cam.ac.uk/centres/pedal/research/) 
Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you 
wish. A member of the team can be contacted if there is anything that is not clear or if you 
would like more information.  
Yours sincerely,  
Gill Francis 
PhD Student 
PEDAL Research Centre 
Faculty of Education  
University of Cambridge 
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What does the project involve? 
Participation in this project involves your child participating in a playful pretend play session 
and completing brief one-on-one tasks with an experienced researcher. The tasks are aimed 
at drawing inferences about children’s cognitive ability. These tasks have been used with 
children many times before and they usually enjoy doing them very much. Children will be 
taken out of lesson times for approximately one hour and twenty minutes, across two 30 
minute sessions and one 20 minute session.  
Video and audio recordings of your child will be made as part of this study. These recording 
will only be accessible to the investigators of this study and will be used only for the purpose 
of research. Your child’s identity will be protected at all times. The project has received 
ethical approval from the Research Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Education University 
of Cambridge. 
If you would like further information about the procedures outlined here, please do not 
hesitate to get in touch using the contact details below.  
Do I have to take part? 
Participation is voluntary and your child will take part only if you give consent. Your decision 
whether or not to permit your child to participate will not prejudice you or your child’s future 
relations with the University of Cambridge. If you decide to permit your child to participate, 
you are free to withdraw your consent and to discontinue your child’s participation at any 
time without jeopardising you or your child’s relationship with the University of Cambridge or 
the school. In addition, because of your child’s age, the teacher and/or researcher will 
terminate any aspect of the study if they have any concerns about your child’s welfare, 
although this is not at all expected to occur. 
 
Will the study benefit me or my child? 
We do not anticipate that there will be any adverse consequences for your child by taking 
part in our study. There is some evidence, in fact, that children benefit from doing the tasks 
described above but we cannot give any assurances that your child will receive any benefits 
from the study. 
 
Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential? 
All aspects of the study, including results, will be strictly confidential. All data will be identified 
only by a code, with personal details kept in a locked file with access only by the immediate 
research team. A report(s) of the study may be submitted for publication and the findings 
presented at national and international conferences related to this area of research, but 
individual participants or schools will not be identifiable in such a report(s). Furthermore, 
schools will not have access to information on individual children’s scores on any tasks they 
complete in the project.   
What if I require further information? 
 
If you have any questions about the study or require further information you are welcome to 
contact Gill Francis (PhD Student at the University of Cambridge, Faculty of Education) on: 
07438 344175 (cellular phone) or gaf36@cam.ac.uk (email). This information sheet is for 




Pretend Play and Counterfactual Reasoning In Young Children 
Consent Form 
 
If you agree for your child’s participation in this study, then lease complete this consent form:  
 
 
Name of Child: ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Child’s Date of Birth ……………………………………… Child’s Gender ……………………. 
 
Languages spoken in the home ………………………………………………………………….. 
 
                                    
 
Please tick box:  
 
1. I give permission for my child to participate in this study  
 
2. I confirm that I have read the information sheet for this project, have 
had an opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and 
received satisfactory answers 
 
3. I understand that my child’s participation is voluntary and that I am free 
to withdraw their participation at any time without giving any reason 
 
4. I understand that my child’s responses may be audio/video recorded to 
ensure accuracy of results. Any recording will be kept confidential and 
will be kept in a secure location.  
 
5. I understand that anonymous information collected about my child may 
be used to support other research and that these data may be 
presented at professional conferences or in academic manuscripts. 
 
 
Signature of Parent/Carer:………………………………………………………………. 
   
   















































Appendix I – Results of Normality Distributions: Pretence Scores 
 
 
    
Figure I-1. Histogram PEPA-CV Scores  Figure I-2. Histogram PEPA-SY Scores 
 
 
      







































































        
    Figure I-5. Histogram NOS-CV Scores      Figure I-6. Histogram NOS-SY Scores  
 
        
Figure I-7. Histogram NOS-CB Scores           Figure I-8. Box Plot NOS Sub-scales  
 
      











































































































     
Figure I-11. Histogram NOS-CB Scores       Figure I-12 Box Plot NIA Sub-scales  
 
 
        
Figure I-13 Histogram Symbolic   Figure I-14 Box Plot Symbolic  








































































Appendix J – Results of Normality Distributions: CFR Scores by 
Story Themes 
      
Figure J-1 Histogram Doctor Story Scores      Figure J-2 Histogram Teacher Story Scores 
 
 
    
























































































































Appendix K – Results of Normality Distributions: CFR Scores by 
Story Conditions 
         
Figure K-1 Histogram Typical-1 CFR Scores    Figure K-2 Histogram Atypical-1 CFR Scores 
 
 
      














































































































Appendix L – Results of Normality Distributions: Executive 
Functions and Receptive Language Scores  
 
      
Figure L-1 Histogram Receptive-Language Scores    Figure L-2 Boxplot Receptive Language    
                                                                                       Scores 
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